Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

120.4382/5–1454

No. 824
Paper Approved by the Chiefs of Mission Conference at Istanbul, May 11–14, 1954¹

top secret

Istanbul, May 14, 1954.

Conference Conclusions On The Danger Of Arab-Israeli Tensions And Recommended Line Of US Action

1. The Conference received with concern reports from the chiefs of mission in the Arab states and Israel regarding increasing tension on the Arab-Israel frontiers and the danger that the Soviet Union might be able to turn this situation to its advantage. Generally speaking it was agreed that, although the Soviet Union has been stepping up its activity in the Near East and making noticeable progress, the United States has been keeping pace except in Jordan and Syria by following a vigorous policy of its own. However, this situation could be changed radically and suddenly if a point were reached where the Soviet Union should seek to profit by a deterioration in the Arab-Israel difficulty by coming out openly as the champion of the Arabs. Means should therefore be found to alleviate existing tension, not only because of the seriousness of the problem per se, but also in order to preclude the danger of loss of the Near East by the West.

2. In examining the nature of present intensified difficulties on the Arab-Israel frontier, the Conference noted that there is, on the Arab side, a persistence of small scale but irritating troubles resulting from the acts of individuals and small groups acting on their own responsibility, and, on the part of the Israel Government, a deliberate policy of reprisals. Apparently impatient at the failure of their efforts to bring about a favorable settlement with neighboring Arab states (and imbued with a spirit of the end justifying the means), an increasing number of Israelis appear to have concluded that matters would have to be made worse before they become better and to have adopted policies in accord with that conclusion. Furthermore, there is always the danger that present tactics could develop more seriously than intended and that more extreme elements might come into power. In that event, the Near East would be thrown into turmoil to the detriment of vital American interests, i.e., political, strategic, oil.

3. A clear-cut peace between the Arab states and Israel would be in the American interest and it should continue to be our ultimate objective. The Conference believed that it would be unrealistic to base our policy on hope of the realization of such a peace settlement in the early future and that the most practical approach would be to seek progress under a modus vivendi. It is not a question of one side desiring peace and the other harboring hostile designs but rather a matter of presently irreconcilable basic attitudes.

4. Since early peace is not to be foreseen, the Conference turned its attention to means which might be taken to alleviate present tensions. In the first place it was their view that strong measures should be taken to strengthen the machinery for the enforcement of the armistice agreements and note was taken of certain details in this connection which are currently under discussion. However, the Conference found that such measures, necessary as they might be, would fall short of meeting the basic difficulty and that, if danger was to be obviated, the American Government should take additional measures commensurate in scope and firmness with the seriousness of the problem.

5. Turning to such additional measures the Conference recommended that, in order (a) to deter Israel from embarking upon aggression as a preventive measure while she still has military superiority, (b) to allay the fears of Israel with respect to the possibility of Arab aggression following a program of arms aid to the Arab countries, and (c) to deter the Arab countries from giving serious consideration to aggressive actions against Israel following the receipt of arms, the United States in conjunction with Britain (and possibly France) should consider the development of plans along the following lines:

(1) Discontinuance governmental aid to the aggressor state.

(2) Placing an embargo on trade between the United States and the aggressor state.

(3) Preventing the transfer of funds from any source in the United States to the aggressor state directly or indirectly.

(4) Recommending to other countries similar measures pursuant to a UN decision or the Tripartite Declaration.

(5) Establishing a naval blockade of the aggressor state by the US, the UK and France.

(6) The use by the three powers of armed forces, pursuant to the Tripartite Declaration of May, 1950, to effect a restoration of the present armistice lines in the event of successful aggression before action of the three powers could have its effect.

The orders and extent to which the above actions would be taken would depend upon the nature of the aggression and the urgency of the situation.

Upon determination of the steps which the United States would be prepared to take, alone or with the British and possibly French, consideration should be given to the desirability of making such decisions public either in whole or in part, bearing in mind that much of the effectiveness of such decisions as a deterrent would probably depend on the extent to which we would be prepared to declare ourselves openly.

6. The Conference recognized that these recommendations are of such scope and importance that they would require highest level clearance and also nation-wide support.

7. The Conference also recognized the importance of reaching understanding and working in collaboration with the British in the implementation of such a policy. However, they foresaw little hope of effective help by the French although the association of the French in the Tripartite Declaration might make necessary their being assigned some nominal role.

8. The Conference was conscious of the fact that their recommendations were addressed only to a part of the Arab-Israeli question, i.e., toward the lessening and warding off of dangerous tensions, and that final solution would require solutions of such problems as refugees, compensation, frontiers, water and Jerusalem. It also concluded that, although the parties must play an important role in seeking such solutions, the full task was beyond their power of negotiation and that the US Government, in association with other powers, would have to assume responsibility for developing solutions and for enforcing their implementation. Regarding immigration, the Conference endorsed the reference thereto in Assistant Secretary Byroade’s recent speech in Philadelphia but agreed with him that we should allow this matter to rest for the time being.

9. The Conference perceived that, in addition to the legal basis and political practicability of their recommendations, there were complications of an unusual nature which might result in putting the recommendations into effect. For instance: It seemed likely that Syria would oppose the use of French troops in Syria even in aid against Israeli aggression. There would be a question whether the forces of a state against which aggression had been committed should be considered as allies. There would also be a question whether, upon our interception in behalf of a victim of aggression, others might decide to participate, ostensibly in collaboration but possibly to serve their own special ends.

10. The Conference endorsed actions by the US Government during the past year in implementing the policy of impartial friendship to all states of the area. The Conference believed that this policy was correct and could see no satisfactory alternative to meet the dangers in the Middle East. The Conference believed that this policy should be pursued, bearing in mind that in its implementation care must be taken so that unfounded fears of Israel would not result in rash action on their part.

1. Regarding the Conference of the U.S. Chiefs of Mission in the Near East area held at Istanbul, May 11–14, 1954, see Documents 210–212. This paper appeared as Annex B to the summary record of the conference.