611.86A/6–454: Telegram
No. 1464
Memorandum of Conversation, by
Donald C. Bergus of the
Office of Near Eastern Affairs
Subject:
- U.S.-Saudi Arabian Relations
Participants:
- The Secretary
- Sheikh Asad Al-Faqih, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia
- NE—Mr. Bergus
Sheikh Asad stated that he had just returned from Saudi Arabia and that he was the bearer of a message to the Secretary and the President from King Saud. When Sheikh Asad had left the United States for Saudi Arabia three months ago, he had been disturbed at the way in which relations between the United States and Saudi [Page 2454] Arabia had deteriorated. He had done his best to improve them, and had had several discussions with King Saud on the subject.
King Saud wished to assure the Secretary that he wholeheartedly desires to maintain good relations between the two countries. However, since the King’s accession there had been a number of difficulties. Among them was the negative United States response to the King’s request for economic aid made at the time of the King’s accession when the Saudi Treasury was empty and Saudi commitments for development projects were great. Another difficulty had been created by the U.S. requirement that Saudi Arabia accept a number of detailed conditions before receiving military aid. Saudi Arabia was not run by lawyers and the Saudis simply could not understand why such onerous conditions were required, particularly in view of Saudi Arabia’s close collaboration with the United States in World War II when there was no written agreement between the two countries. Saudi Arabia appreciated U.S. help in the Buraimi affair but there were times when it had appeared that U.S. assistance could have been more effective. The King had been of the opinion that his Government’s agreement with Onassis on oil tankers1 had been within Saudi sovereignty and did not run counter to the Aramco concession. When the United States made its position known, however, the King undertook to have the matter examined, especially article IV of the Onassis agreement.
The King had been “obliged” to cancel the Point IV agreement with the United States because the matter came up at a time when he was in receipt of reports of statements of “high U.S. officials in the area” to the effect that the U.S. should concentrate its efforts on Prince Faisal in an attempt to play him off against the King. Sheikh Asad would give no further details on this statement, but he did make it clear that the King did not have Ambassador Wadsworth in mind as the author of the statements. The King had expressed to Sheikh Asad his great esteem for Ambassador Wadsworth.
King Saud appeals to the President and the Secretary to use their influence to maintain close relations between the two countries. There were other disturbing factors such as a recent article in the Christian Science Monitor (which had a certain appearance of being U.S. Government inspired) stating that a revolution could shortly be expected in Saudi Arabia due to the profligacy of the King. The trend in Saudi Arabia was for progress and the King would need the help of the Secretary and the President to maintain this trend.
[Page 2455]The Secretary thanked the Ambassador for his remarks which would be closely studied. There was only a desire on our part to have strong and friendly relations with Saudi Arabia. We had been disturbed over strains and tensions which had appeared in recent months. Some of the things the Ambassador had mentioned had been new to the Secretary. The Secretary could assure the Ambassador that the alleged “remarks of a U.S. official” had no standing with the President or himself. The U.S. Government did not inspire press articles and it was probably best for all concerned if very little attention were paid to press speculation. The Secretary could understand the King’s feelings as to the complicated nature of aid agreements with the United States. The Secretary had made efforts to get these agreements simplified, but it appeared that legislative requirements prevented such simplification.
The Secretary expressed the hope that this exchange of views with the Ambassador would mark a turning point in improved U.S.-Saudi Arab relations.
- For documentation on this topic, see Documents 242 ff.↩