Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

787.5 MSP/4–1854: Telegram

No. 1412
The Ambassador in Iraq (Berry) to the Department of State¹

secret

Baghdad, April 18, 1954—11 a.m.

624. Regarding Deptel 577, April 15.² This morning I called on Prime Minister Jamali who, in spite of illness, got out of bed to receive me. I informed him that I had received instructions to suspend temporarily negotiations on the military aid agreement. I said that I did not know the reasons for the delay but I assumed Washington might be in the midst of a fundamental review of the entire matter. I added that in exploring my mind for the reasons I speculated that the Arab League communiqué of April 1,³ which I then read to him, had a bearing on the matter.

I commented that in the face of such a position the conclusion of our military aid agreement at this time might increase the difficulties of the Iraq Government. While it was true that the United States has been willing to consider military aid to Iraq without insisting upon its adherence to the Turkish-Pakistan pact, we were counting on the clear-cut recognition by Iraq of her interests in regional defense against outside aggression, and her willingness to cooperate with other states who also see the dangers.

The Cairo communiqué casts doubt upon this expectation. If the doubt is unfounded it should be removed. It would seem timely for Iraq to consult with Turkey and Pakistan and determine whether or not it wished to associate itself in some form of mutually satisfactory cooperative agreement before we attempt to move further in our military understanding with Iraq.

The Prime Minister said there was nothing he could say in reply except that “we are losing time”. It was impossible for him to place himself more than he had at the service of the West. He wished to receive US military aid. He believed in the Turkish-Pakistan pact but Iraqi adherence had to come at the proper time. He made no comment on my suggestion that he seek talks with Turkey and Pakistan.

He said that in becoming Prime Minister he had developed three avenues for combatting Communism in Iraq: (1) development of political organization and stability; (2) development of the country; and (3) development of defense capabilities, with the international alignments necessary to this end. These alignments had to come step by step and with careful advance preparation of public opinion. He had now met reverses on all three approaches but he would continue to work for his objectives in and out of office.

He also commented that he was inclined to believe we were making too much of the Cairo statement. The Iraqi Ambassador there had not been authorized to make it and it had been badly translated. Nevertheless, he felt that the decision to suspend negotiations arose not from the statement or from Arab League action or local events but rather from “unfortunate trends” in Washington under Israeli pressures.⁴

Berry

1. Repeated to Karachi, Ankara, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Jerusalem, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, and London.
2. Document 1410.
3. The communiqué is quoted in telegram 566 to Baghdad, Document 1409.
4. Telegram 584 to Baghdad, Apr. 17, authorized the Ambassador to suspend the action ordered in telegram 577, pending further word from the Department of State concerning telegram 621, Apr. 16, supra. Telegram 625 from Baghdad, Apr. 18, informed the Department that upon receipt of telegram 584, the Ambassador telephoned the Prime Minister and asked him to consider the conversation described here as personal and confidential until the Ambassador could talk with him again. Documentation is in Department of State file 787.5 MSP.