787.5 MSP/4–854: Telegram

No. 1409
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq 1

secret
priority

566. We have become increasingly concerned at timorous attitude of Iraqi Government over proposed military aid agreement. This concern greatly accentuated by Arab League communiqué issued April 1 at Cairo, reading in part as follows:

“The first question examined by the Committee concerned the rumors recently circulated on the possible adherence of one of the Arab States to the Turko-Pakistan alliance and concerning the early conclusion of a Military Aid Agreement between certain Arab States on the one hand and the United States of America on the other.

“All the representatives of the Arab States on the Committee proclaimed these rumors are false and have no foundation in truth. As to the Turko-Pakistan alliance, the Iraqi representative affirmed in the name of his Government what the President of the Iraqi Council of Ministers had proclaimed, namely that Iraq has not been invited to join this alliance, that it has not considered joining and that everything which has been said concerning the connection of Iraq with this alliance is without foundation.”

It seems to us that if the Iraqis are so unwilling to stand up and be counted on side of free world that at this late stage in negotiations they subscribe to statements such as foregoing, we should reflect very carefully before concluding agreement. If Iraqi leaders are justified in their fears of public reaction and repercussions in other Arab States, agreement may well cause difficulties out of proportion to benefits. We do not wish repetition of events that followed signing of Treaty of Portsmouth. If leaders apprehensions are unjustified would seem that Government lacks requisite courage [Page 2376] and self-confidence to carry forward proper defense program and follow policies essential to defense of area.

Area tensions which have become greater in recent weeks do not encourage us to inject another controversial step into the picture in absence of real enthusiasm on part of those whom we consider to be most interested party.

We believe we could meet remaining Iraqi points re administrative provisions of proposed agreement but in view of foregoing believe it preferable to leave whole matter in abeyance until Iraqis consider themselves in position to take firm stand on Pakistan model. Our whole policy regarding military assistance to Middle East is based on concept of collective security and while we have been willing to consider military aid to Iraq without insisting upon adherence to any regional defense pact or even so loose an arrangement as that just signed by Turkey and Pakistan (Deptels 406 and 4412) we have been counting upon at least clear-cut public recognition by Iraq of her interest in regional defense against outside aggression and her willingness to cooperate with other states who also see the danger.

It now appears our expectations may have been mistaken. We therefore think it best to let the Iraqi Government consult with Turks and Pakistanis and determine whether or not it wishes to associate itself with those and any other like-minded states in some form of mutually satisfactory cooperative agreement before we attempt to move further in military understanding with Iraq.

Request you convey in manner you consider most appropriate substance of foregoing to Prime Minister and any other leaders you consider desirable.3

FYI If, after receiving this communication, Iraqis show real desire to proceed with negotiations and are willing to give firm private assurances of intention to join Turk-Pakistani pact in near future, we would be willing consider resumption discussion remaining difficulties in agreement provided at time of signature Iraqis [Page 2377] would make some public statement at least endorsing pact in principle and indicating intention to use any military assistance received in interests of collective regional defense within that context.

It seems to us that endorsement of pact is if anything a less difficult step for Iraq Government than would be signature of military aid agreement. Since all principal Iraqi leaders have assured us they want to join pact in due course, we think they should be willing to show their good faith and good intentions publicly if only as evidence that they will not allow Arab League or other pressures to divert them from policies envisaged in our military aid programs.

We could not of course go along with Nuri’s apparent desire to convert pact into outright military alliance made operable merely by an attack by one Near Eastern State on another. We assume this is only a bargaining position on his part. End FYI.

Dulles
  1. Drafted by Jernegan and cleared by Byroade for the Secretary and Under Secretary of State. Repeated to Karachi, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, and Paris.
  2. Telegram 406 to Baghdad, Document 186. Telegram 441, Feb. 18, is not printed, but see Document 1404.
  3. Telegram 611 from Baghdad, Apr. 11, informed the Department of State that the Ambassador appreciated the Department’s concern that Iraqi leaders might accept U.S. military aid and then fail to work with Turkey and Pakistan, and indirectly with the United States, toward the development of an adequate regional defense system in the Middle East. But responsible Iraqi leaders had sincerely and enthusiastically approved the sequence of developments on the basis that the military aid program would pave the way for a regional defense program. He suggested that reversal of the sequence of developments at such a late date might cause alienation of the current friendly attitude in Iraqi Government circles. It would also place new and potent weapons in the hands of communists and would probably convince many undecided Iraqis that the United States had made military aid conditional from the beginning on joining the regional defense pact. (787.5 MSP/4–1154)