Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

787.5 MSP/4–1154: Telegram

No. 1410
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq¹

secret
priority

Washington, April 15, 1954—2:45 p.m.

577. For Ambassador. Your tel 611² is being given fullest consideration. Regret inform you, however, we believe it will be necessary postpone or stall on negotiations, thus leaving them at their present point, until matter has been considered by NSC. Under present conditions, this may take some time.

Deptel 566³ was drafted to give you best presentation we could conceive for sounding out Iraqi intentions without mentioning our most basic concern. Since time of Secretary’s trip through area and NSC decision on policy of assisting militarily states such as Iraq, Arab-Israeli situation has grown increasingly more dangerous. If Iraq could see her way clear to join Turkey-Pakistan pact we would have good public case for providing her with military equipment. If on other hand she is publicly on record as opposing such a move, and we have no commitment whatsoever that she intends to make move, answer to critics in this country who see Iraq associated only with Arab states and their rash statements regarding use of force against Israel is far less convincing. Also in Iraq’s own interests it is important that best possible justification exist here for extending military assistance as this bound to affect in Congress our ability to follow through in worthwhile manner. We must try at all costs avoid situation where at each appropriation hearing the wisdom of our decision would be questioned with resultant doubt as to our ability to obtain funds or danger of having them extremely limited.

Believe, although your views on effect of delay appreciated, best tactic is for you, in your discretion, either to stall or to inform Iraqis you are under instructions to suspend negotiations temporarily. In either case, in response to their queries you might tell them you do not know the reasons for delay but that you assume Washington may be in the midst of fundamental review entire matter. You could then use some or all of points contained in Deptel 566 as your speculation of what might be under review. If Iraq is really serious about going ahead this procedure might evoke a response from her which would be helpful in NSC consideration.

Deeply regret our inability to meet your recommendations on this important matter near close of your many years of fine service. Our hope is that we will still succeed and in manner which will in long run be to mutual benefit of both Iraq and our own country. On other hand, we feel position you have established in Iraq will help you to obtain better setting for decision, if that is possible at all, and know you will do your utmost prior your departure.

Smith

1. Drafted by Byroade and cleared in draft by Smith.
2. Not printed, but see footnote 3, supra.
3. Supra.