787.5 MSP/4–1654: Telegram
No. 1411
The Ambassador in Iraq (Berry) to the Department of State
priority
621. For Byroade from Berry. With heavy heart I finished reading Deptel 577 of April 15.1 Somehow the Embassy has failed to convince the Department how important the US-Iraq bilateral military aid agreement is for obtaining our national objectives in the ME.
As I see the picture the agreement is the foundation stone of a structure we are building in the ME that is capable of halting the advance of communism. By it Iraq becomes the first Arab state to [Page 2379] thus win [throw in?] her lot openly with the west. Through it the Turk-Pakistan pact will come to have a real validity, and through it other Arab states may be led to similar cooperation. By means of our influence, exercised increasingly as Iraqis knit closer to us, we would bring Iraqi attention to focus more and more on the dangers of communism and the need to combat such danger through internal reforms. This approach, applied with skill and perseverence, can crack the hostile Arab ring around Israel and, with Israeli cooperation, can assure the peaceful survival of that country.
The Department’s decision, which at this time is tantamount to a withdrawal of the US offer of military aid to Iraq, will be interpreted locally as giving the lie to the President’s wise words on the strategic importance of the ME, to the belief in greater understanding of Arab views that bloomed after Secretary Dulles visit to the area, and to your own speeches. Today [To say?] even to ourselves that we will “leave the matter in abeyance” for the time being is as illusionary as was the statement that we would “wait for the dust to settle” after the tragic decision was taken concerning China. In Iraq today we have a great opportunity. We are losing it, and may never again have a similar one.
By the Department’s action we set in motion in Iraq a whole series of events that seem to me to be inimicable to our objectives in Iraq and the ME. The news can only increase the frustration and disillusionment of Prime Minister Jamali who has from the first welcomed and accepted the agreement, asking only for changes in language to increase his ability to sell it to the public. I fear, therefore, he may resign shortly and we will, thereby, have lost the most outspoken of all Arab leaders against communism as well as the Iraqi official who is most convinced of the desirability of Arab cooperation with the west. He will probably be followed as Prime Minister by one of the “old gang”. This will provide the opportunity for those who wish to change the order of things in Iraq through unlawful processes. The development of the pattern from there on is well known. The merging of the interests of the Nationalists and Communists into a common front, the beginning of government by mob action, denunciation of the British treaty, old nationalization, and fostering campaigns to rid the country of foreigners. I beg you to bend every effort in NSC review to see that the decision is taken in Washington that will halt this deteriorating process in Iraq. with its chain reaction throughout the ME.
In my reports I have honestly set forth the facts as I see them and tried to state clearly my opinions and recommendations with which the members of the Embassy working with me are in complete agreement. Now, as the Department has given its decision, I shall carry it out to the very best of my ability according to my [Page 2380] instructions. I shall ask to see the Prime Minister tomorrow and early in the week, the King and Crown Prince. As my work here now is done, I shall plan to leave Baghdad by the end of next week. I trust the Department will make an appropriate announcement. I expect to say in making my farewell calls and to the press, when queried, that months ago I asked for retirement at the end of this assignment and the request has been granted. If you have objections to any of my final official actions in Iraq as proposed above please send me a niact message.