Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

641.74/6–1053: Telegram

No. 1179
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

top secret
priority

Washington, June 10, 1953—1:50 p.m.

7841. Please deliver following message from President to Churchill:

“From my discussions with Foster about the findings of his recent trip, I am particularly concerned about Egypt. While I will wish to talk to you personally about this matter in Bermuda,² there seems to be a real danger that the situation there will not hold that long without further action.

I was happy to hear that you agreed with Foster’s statement of our position on May 12, 1953 at Cairo.³ He reaffirmed that position in his radio report to the American public on June 1.⁴ I fully concur in his views.

From Foster’s personal observation and from all other reports which reach us, I have come to the conclusion that some step should be made soon to reconcile our minimum defense needs with the very strong nationalist sentiments of the Egyptian Government and people. It appears that it is not possible to conclude a settlement on the basis of Case A⁵ in its entirety, despite its desirability from a military point of view. As we had agreed when it was thought we might negotiate side by side, there may have to be some concessions which will permit a quick start on withdrawal of UK troops and produce an adequate if not ideal arrangement for maintenance of the Base. Dept of State is sending to Amembassy London a formula which illustrates what we have in mind and which your staff can examine if you so desire. To assist further with this problem, if you desired and if it proved helpful with Egyptians, I would be prepared to assign US technicians to participate in the maintenance of the Base.

In addition to the question of maintenance there is, of course, the problem of assuring availability of the Base in time of need. Pending more formal arrangements, a private undertaking by Egypt that the Base would be made available in case of general war to the Arab States and to the Allies of Arab States might serve the purpose. You could invoke your treaties with Jordan and Iraq and we might also be able to utilize our special relationship with Saudi Arabia.

Also, on the conclusion of agreement on evacuation and the future maintenance of the Base, Naguib might publicly invite the United Kingdom and the United States to help develop the defense of Egypt, including training and equipping of the Egyptian forces. In response to this initiative, we could jointly negotiate the necessary formal defense requirements of the West, as well as assistance to Egypt. The results of these negotiations could be made public. Meanwhile, as I think you know, Foster, at your request, is presently deferring any arms aid to Egypt.

Once agreements of the nature described were reached with the Egyptians, we would be prepared to insist uncompromisingly on their being carried out in good faith. This determination could be made unequivocably clear to the Egyptians.

I am sorry to bother you with this before we can talk together at Bermuda but the possible danger from the situation to us all is so much on my mind that I intrude these ideas at this time in accordance with the spirit which has animated our full and frank exchanges of views.”

Dulles

1. Repeated to Cairo as telegram 2338 eyes only for Ambassador Caffery. (641.74/6–1053) Drafted by Byroade and approved by Secretary of State Dulles.
2. Prime Minister Churchill and President Eisenhower planned to meet in late June at Bermuda. The conference, however, was postponed due to illness of both the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary Eden. The conference was finally held in early December with the French also present. For documentation regarding the Bermuda Conference, see vol. V, Part 2, pp. 1710 ff.

3. Presumably President Eisenhower was referring to Secretary of State Dulles’ public statement which he made at Cairo on May 11. The key paragraph reads as follows:

   “The defence and well-being of this important part of the world are inevitably of great concern to the United States Government. We came to the conclusion that there should be a solution consistent with full Egyptian sovereignty, with a phased withdrawal of foreign troops—all to be arranged however so that the important base in the canal area, with its depots of supplies and systems of technical supervison, should remain in good working order and be available for immediate use on behalf of the free world in the event of future hostilities.” (Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1953 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 342)

4. See Department of State Bulletin, June 15, 1953, p. 831.
5. See Document 1061.