Office of the Historian

641.74/6–553: Telegram

No. 1178
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State1

top secret
London, June 5, 1953—6 p.m.

6419. While appreciating aspects of situation in Egypt which prompted Cairo’s thoughtful telegrams 2512 and 2513, I see no prospect that suggested procedure would be acceptable here. Whatever confidence we may have in RCC’s good intentions, British do not share it to an extent which would lead them to concede unconditional evacuation, depending on an improvement in atmosphere to secure wider Western defense requirements. Nor are they likely to be impressed by argument that they are protected by phased evacuation, which they could halt if Egyptians proved intransigent. They are almost certain feel that such action would in circumstances place them in impossible moral and legal position.

In reviewing this problem, I feel I should reaffirm certain observations from this vantage point:

1.
Psychologically, British are not adjusted under present circumstances to act on trust alone (Embtel 6261).
2.
Practically, minimum program British likely find acceptable is that outlined Department telegram 7550.2
3.
From parliamentary and public opinion points of view, even this program would require some modification, perhaps along lines paragraph 3, Embassy telegram 6245.
4.
From point of view of prudence, British would heartily concur with statement reiterated penultimate paragraph Department telegram 76393 re assuring that as we proceed, “precision and details take place of vagueness and generality”.

I realize that in situation such as that which at present confronts us in Egypt and Near East generally, certan risks are necessary. In this case, however, it seems to me that Western security stakes in canal base are so high that we must exert every possible effort to minimize such risks. Cairo’s 2512 makes point that “Egyptians do not feel moral or ideological compulsion to insure Western security requirements, nor can they be bought by promises of financial assistance”. Is it likely this situation will change in flushed and emotional atmosphere of ostensibly unconditional British evacuation. Will uncommitted RCC then be willing set about forcefully to lead public opinion to realization of Egypt’s wider security responsibilities in sufficient time to permit conclusion effective Western arrangements for defense of area involving use of base?

I agree we should make every effort facilitate to extent possible RCC’s public opinion problem, and secret assurances seem to me safest device which has thus far been developed for accomplishing this end.

Aldrich
  1. Repeated to Cairo as telegram 335.↩
  2. Printed as telegram 1665 to Karachi, Document 1170.↩
  3. Printed as telegram 2278 to Cairo, Document 1174.↩