Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

No. 1061
Editorial Note

Appendix D of the final agreed version of the “United Kingdom Memorandum on Defence Negotiations with Egypt” contained alternatives, or “Cases” as they were soon to be called, “A”, “B”, and “C”. It reads as follows:

Facilities Required in Peace and War

Peace

Case “A”

1. The Canal Zone would be handed over to Egypt and the base area would be placed under Egyptian control. Within this base existing depots and installations would be retained and would be run and controlled on the analogy of our base in Belgium or the United States base in the United Kingdom.

2. The depots and installations would act as a working maintenance base for a proportion of the Middle East Land Forces in peace. The R.A.F. would not, however, carry out any maintenance from installations in Egypt in peace.

3. The Royal Navy would retain equipment in Egypt for the defence of ports and maintain it under British supervision and have the use of the existing commercial oil storage facilities and pipelines.

4. The Army would retain not more than 5,000 personnel to run these installations and the R.A.F. not more than 2,000 for the same purpose.

5. There would be an integrated Anglo-Egyptian Air Defence Organisation, including Headquarters, two British Day Fighter Squadrons and one British Night Fighter Squadron, C. and R. Organisations, &c.

6. An Allied-manned staging post would be maintained in Egypt.

7. Implications.—If the Egyptians could be persuaded to accept these conditions in peace-time, the Allies would be assured of having a working maintenance base in peace to which they could return and operate immediately in war, and which would be protected by an efficient air defence system.

Case “B”

8. The base would remain in Egypt and be placed under Egyptian control. The Egyptians would take over such depots and installations as the Allies wished to retain in Egypt for war, assuming full responsibility for keeping all communications, &c., in working order and for maintaining Allied war reserves and heavy workshops in a state to be reactivated at short notice. There would also be some turnover of stores and equipment for use by the Middle East Land Forces in peace.

9. In order to assist the Egyptians in their task a rather smaller number than under Case “A” of Allied supervisory and technical Army and Air Force personnel would be required.

10. The Royal Navy would retain equipment in Egypt for the defence of ports and maintain it under British supervision and have the use of the existing commercial oil storage facilities and pipelines.

11. There would be an integrated Anglo-Egyptian Air Defence Organisation, including Headquarters, two British Day Fighter Squadrons and one British Night Fighter Squadron, C. and R. Organisation, &c.

12. An Allied-manned staging post would be maintained in Egypt.

13. Implications.—Under these conditions there would not be a fully satisfactory working base in Egypt in peace, but it should be possible to reactivate it within 60 days. Some stocks for the initial maintenance of Allied forces in the Middle East in war would have to be located outside the Canal Zone.

Case “C”

14. The base would remain in Egypt and be placed under Egyptian control. The Egyptians would assume the same responsibilities as for Case “B” (paragraph 8 above) except that there would be no turnover of stores and equipment for use by the Middle East Land Forces in peace.

15. The right of periodic inspections of reserves and installations should be retained. The military personnel to carry out these inspections should, if possible, be stationed in Egypt. However, if the Egyptians were adamant that they would not allow this, agreement might be given to Service personnel wearing plain clothes or to the use of civilians. Failing this it might be necessary to agree that inspecting personnel should be stationed outside Egypt and carry out periodic visits.

16. The Royal Navy would retain equipment in Egypt for the defence of ports and place it under Egyptian supervision for maintenance, with the right of periodic inspection. They would have the use of the existing commercial oil storage facilities and pipe-lines.

17. No R.A.F. units would be left in Egypt, but agreement could be given to seconding to the Egyptian Air Force some instructors and advisers. No guarantee of participation in the air defence of Egypt could be given, but agreement might be reached to send units in peace-time to take part in exercises with the Egyptian Air Force.

18. The Allies would require the use of an Egyptian-manned staging post in Egypt and the necessary overflying rights for peacetime movements and training.

19. Implications.—In these circumstances, it is estimated that it would take at least 90 days to reactivate the base. It would be necessary therefore to retain at least 90 days. stocks for the whole of the Middle East Garrison in locations outside the Canal Zone. In addition, the United States use of Abu Sueir and Farouk airfields in the very early stages of war might become impracticable since the equipment would not be adequately maintained there in peace-time.

in war

20. Under all cases the use of a working base in Egypt in war, together with Egyptian assistance and co-operation, is an essential requirement. In addition, allied Naval Forces will require the use of Alexandria, Port Said and Suez.

21. To obtain these facilities is the paramount object of the negotiations. (774.5/1–1453)