641.74/6–1053: Telegram
No. 1180
The Secretary of
State to the Embassy in the United
Kingdom1
priority
7865. Given below is amplification Department’s thinking re message from President to Churchill contained Deptel 7841. Information is for use by Holmes (in Aldrich’s absence) to extent he may feel advisable in explanations to British. (FYI. Regret not possible consult Aldrich re this series telegrams. End FYI)
General consideration behind message is that while basic US–UK objectives remain unchanged, attainment concurrently or immediately of five items included in “package proposals”2 impossible. Political conditions Egypt necessitate adjustment to long-range effort, accepting calculated risks involved for immediate future. Emphasis to be placed on eliminating factors causing friction between Western powers and Egypt, and creation essential confidence. Although forcible measures would permit retention present position for period, such course would destroy remnants of good will in area [Page 2091] toward West. Approach involves deferment efforts create regional defense organization.
Since both sides apparently awaiting US initiative before resuming talks, first step would be to urge UK and Egypt (after British approval of entire procedure obtained) to recommence talks on basis formula quoted following telegram. Use of formula, which is intended to constitute terms of reference for “Base Committee” only, should result in base arrangement substantially better than Case C.3 Embassy should furnish Foreign Office copy now.
Department convinced Egyptians will prove adamant (para 4, London’s 6245) in demanding instructions to technicians flow through Egyptian base commander.
Only committee which would be required at this stage in addition to Base Committee” would be “Evacuation Committee”.
To minimize insofar as possible difficulties foreseen by Caffery (Amman’s 999 and Cairo’s 2512) timing of different moves would be altered from that specified Deptel 7550.4 US would be willing approach Naguib in endeavor to obtain “private undertaking”. In Department’s view, this might take form of specific written secret commitment of such a nature as to provide basis for action upon its authority if necessary. Approach would take place after progress in Anglo-Egyptian negotiations has resulted in reestablishment measure of trust and confidence with the exact time dependent upon course negotiations. US ability obtain commitment would depend largely on success British efforts to create propitious atmosphere.
Suggestion para 3 London’s 6245 incorporated in effort to ease Churchill’s public relations problem. During negotiation of formal defense requirements, air defense of Egypt and military and economic aid items of original “package proposals” could be considered. This step, even though presented to Egyptian public as taken on Naguib’s initiative, would require considerable political courage on his part. As in case secret commitment, willingness Naguib to undertake move and his success in carrrying Egyptian public with him will depend mainly on manner in which negotiations conducted by British. Conceivably Naguib might wish to broaden his invitation to include other states. While US would welcome such decision, question should be left to Naguib’s judgment and no effort made by US or UK to force him into multilateral defense arrangements at this time.
- Repeated to Cairo as telegram 2337. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Byroade.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 1082.↩
- See Document 1061.↩
- Printed as telegram 1665 to Karachi, Document 1170.↩