641.74/6–153: Telegram

No. 1177
The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State1

top secret
niact

2513. Further to my telegram 2512 I should like to add by way of general observation that the hour is far later for the West in the ME than would seem to be realized. The sentiment of the people in this area is more especially anti-Western and more prepared to be sympathetic to the enemies of the West than we like to believe. The officials of the RCC are Egyptian Nationalists of middle class background brought up during a generation of continuous anti–British agitation. They are closely attuned to, and themselves largely reflect, the attitudes of the Egyptian people. They are, at the same time sincerely anti-Communist and desirous of leading Egypt into a firm association with the West. Being honest men and realistic as regards their own internal capabilities, they have consistently rejected and will continue to reject proposals which do not take into sufficient account the complexes created by three-quarters of a century of British occupation.

We have an opportunity to do business with a group of men who will not easily give commitments because they believe in keeping their word. If we are going to do business with them, we shall have to take this into account and we shall have to move quickly. Admittedly such a course of action will involve a considerable gamble and a large measure of trust. Nothing breeds confidence like a display of confidence, however, and the vicious circle of Anglo-Egyptian recrimination and distrust must be broken. (Churchill’s gratuitous pro-Zionist remarks, for example, unquestionably set back the prospects of any Arab-Israel settlement.)

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It must also be borne in mind that if agreement is not reached with the present regime, the UK will have no alternative but to maintain its position by force. Although the Egyptians have not the capability of expelling the British, they can tie up 80,000 of the best British troops indefinitely and can make life difficult for any Britisher or even any Westerner in Egypt. If matters drag on as at present, no Egyptian leader will dare raise his voice in favor of cooperation with the West. The probable impact of such a development on the Western position in the other Arab states can be surmised.

In short, we are playing for big stakes in Egypt. By playing too cautious a game we are sure to lose. The problem is not only to convince the British of that but to help them find a graceful way out of the impasse.

Caffery
  1. Repeated to London as telegram 810.