641.74/5–2853: Telegram
No. 1174
The Acting
Secretary of State to the Embassy
in Egypt1
2278. Request clarification certain points Amman’s 999, May 25 from Caffery:
- 1.
- Does procedure suggested last two paragraphs reftel contemplate that attempt to get written Egyptian commitment on defense arrangements will have to await conclusion of negotiations re British evacuation and base maintenance, or do you think it possible restore necessary minimum of confidence and trust during course of negotiations and prior to conclusion firm agreement?
- 2.
- Would appreciate elaboration of statement that US request for written commitment at this stage would “utterly destroy. existing Egyptian confidence in US and cause repudiation by RCC of present offer to assure continued functioning and instant availability of base.
- 3.
- Do you believe a commitment phrased in more general language than was suggested Deptel 22512 but clearly making base available to West in wartime or imminent threat of war would have chance of Egyptian acceptance or are Egyptians allergic to written commitment of any kind at this time?
In light of recent informal consultation with JCS representatives, Department is coming to believe that question of base availability to West in wartime or threat of war is both more important and more difficult than that of arranging for adequate maintenance in peace time, at least from strictly US point of view. We are also coming to the view that this problem could and perhaps must be solved without reference to creation of MEDO. This, however, merely brings up crucial question, which is: What are RCC real intentions and how far are they willing to go in giving US and UK minimum assurances upon which we can rely? It also raises question as to how far British could go in relinquishing their present control of base before insisting upon concrete guarantees of its future availability.
We have carefully examined files to determine nature of assurances given up to now. Most statements on record here are ambiguous and susceptible wide variety interpretations. Naguib’s note November 10 read: “Immediately upon conclusion of such agreement (evacuation) Egyptian Government will be prepared to give assurances that one of ultimate objectives of its policy is participation with US, UK and other free world powers in planning for common defense of area within framework of charter of UN.” Since that date most statements by Government leaders have been increasingly vague as witnessed by Naguib’s noncommittal reply to President’s letter. Cairo’s tel 2423 reported Egyptian formula that in event of attack upon any Arab State access and use of base would be given to Arab partners and any Nation allied with any of them. This has been restated informally by Egyptian Ambassador here, who says it would cover use of base by US as well as UK. This formula is most specific yet offered but is probably still insufficient to meet minimum needs of West, which would want to have use of base in event of general war regardless of whether Arab States were under direct attack. It is also to be noted that Egyptians have not offered to put it in writing. (Ambassador dodged direct question on this point. He explicitly stated formula could not be extended to cover attack on Turkey or Iran.)
We are therefore unable to find any clear recognition by Egypt of need to assure functioning and availability of base in sense we understand those terms. In fact perusal of complete British minutes covering discussions ending May 6 gives contrary picture RCC intentions. Minutes show RCC aim was secure departure all British personnel taking with them if necessary all British stores. Egyptian delegation studiously avoided any intimation it prepared consider base in context of free world defense or for any purpose other than defense of Egypt itself. While we gather Secretary’s visit had [Page 2084] salutary effect on Egyptian attitudes, we are still gravely concerned.
As stated Deptel 678, September 30, 1952, “We must make certain as we proceed that precision and detail take place of vagueness and generality . . . .” Essential thing is to obtain undertaking of such definite nature that we could act upon its authority in time of war and that this undertaking be obtained before British withdrawal has passed point of no return.
Department would appreciate Embassy’s further views on how this might be accomplished.
- Repeated to London as telegram 7639. Drafted and approved by Jernegan.↩
- Printed as telegram 1665 to Karachi, Document 1170.↩