511.68/6–3053: Despatch
No. 682
The Charge in Yugoslavia (Wallner) to the Department of State
No. 1042
Ref:
- Embassy despatches 984 and 1033 of June 26, 1953.1
Subject:
- Démarche to Foreign Office concerning developing pressure against US information program
The evidences of the changed attitude of the Yugoslav Government or at least of the Yugoslav Communist Party (now known as the Union of Communists) toward the foreign information services operating in Yugoslavia and particularly the USIS, clearly called for a frank talk of an exploratory nature at the top level in the Foreign Office. Consequently I took up the whole question with Dr. Bebler, Under Secretary of State, on June 24. As the attached Memorandum of Conversation shows,2 Dr. Bebler, while assuring me that no top level governmental decision had been taken directed against foreign information services and disclaiming any personal knowledge of Foreign Office planning looking toward their regulation, volunteered the statement that the new role of “education and persuasion” assigned to the Yugoslav Communist party could be interpreted by individual Communists as a mandate to discourage the propagation of western non-Communist ideas. He also agreed that this was a subject of mutual interest which should be frankly discussed before any new regulation went into effect and [Page 1360] seemed impressed with my argument that any sharp curtailment of USIS activities here could be variously and unfortunately interpreted abroad.
While US information activities in Yugoslavia have, at various times since the break with the Cominform became complete, run into varying degrees of opposition from doctrinaire Communist elements here, they have constantly expanded to where they now reach undisturbed a proportion of the population great enough to be without precedence, I believe, in any Communist and in most totalitarian countries. The thirst for greater knowledge of the western and particularly the American way of life is unquenchable in Yugoslavia among Communists and non-Communists alike, although the latter are more attracted to ideas and the former to mechanical and scientific achievements. Certainly the non-Communist majority in Yugoslavia has constituted the more avid readership, but recent developments indicate that our activities have likewise made an impression on Communists too, and the success of the program in all classes of Yugoslavs must, I think, be credited in part with causing the opposition to it which is now developing. The new role of the Communist Party is also important in recent developments, but it is doubtful that this alone would have brought them about had the program not been as successful as it is.
We have been in touch with both the British and the French Embassies on this subject. The British Ambassador made a démarche to Bebler on June 27 along somewhat the same lines as mine and while we have not had an exact account of what transpired I gather that Sir Ivo Mallet was somewhat sharper than I and Dr. Bebler replied in kind. Bebler did indicate to Mallet however that it was the vastly larger American program which was causing principal anxiety to the Union of Communists, and this perhaps foreshadows an attempt on the Yugoslav part to prevent the three Embassies from presenting a united front. The French Embassy which has a much smaller program and publishes no news bulletin is not planning a démarche for the moment, although the Ambassador is following the matter personally. All three Embassies are in agreement to resist energetically any attempt to regulate our activities here on the same basis as those of the Russian Embassy, but this question may very well not come up since it is unlikely that the Soviet Government will permit the Yugoslavs to undertake any information activities in Moscow and reciprocity will undoubtedly be applied to the Russian Embassy here.
Until further discussions have taken place with the Foreign Office in the light of the British Ambassador’s and my démarches it is not possible to predict the future much less to chart any specific course of action on our part.
[Page 1361]As already stated, resistance to foreign information programs in Yugoslavia has occurred before, usually on the heels of party reprimands. This resistance would, in time, level off, usually in the same ratio as zeal to “revitalize” the party flags. At this stage, however, the party officials, with less demand on their administrative talents, may well channel their enthusiasm into activities designed more to “educate” than regulate. With constant reminders from the press and from party officials to generate their zeal, their actions could have a distinct influence on the work of USIS.
While the Yugoslav Government probably would not take any overt action designed to close down or seriously cripple the operation of USIS activities, the party could do a great deal to discourage their use. A close watch is being kept for press comments or other evidences that this campaign will flag, continue at the present rate, or increase
Meanwhile I have requested USIS officers to keep—for the time being—activities at the present level and to conduct them quietly and unspectacularly in such a way as to avoid providing ammunition which might be used to give impetus to the current wave of opposition.
The Department will be kept informed of developments.