[Enclosure]
Memorandum by Adlai E.
Stevenson to the Ambassador in Austria (Thompson)
secret
Vienna, July 10, 1953.
Without attempting to rearrange my notes and recollections for order
and emphasis I will set forth, pursuant to your request, some of the
things Tito said, in, I fear,
utter disorder!!
I spent about four hours with him on Brioni on June 25, 1953:
The Soviet change of tactics does not reflect a change of objectives.
Russia will be aggressive as long as the internal regime and methods
are unchanged. The pressures of “state capitalistic despotism”
pushes the U.S.S.R. to imperialism. The West should not look to
external manifestations, peaceful gestures, conciliatory moves,
minor concessions for evidence of basic changes in Soviet purposes.
The real signs will come from internal
changes when force and violence are replaced by consent and
cooperation. The West would be foolish to relax its defense effort
until the Yugoslavs, who know the Kremlin’s intentions best, relax
theirs. Yugoslavia is spending more of its national income—22%—on
defense than any other nation.
Until domestic internal policies change with relaxation of police
methods and replacement of brutal autocracy by democratic socialism
in the Yugoslav pattern, Russia, it must be assumed, will race
forward.
Tito favors Four-Power talks
“to feel the pulse” without the expectation of accomplishing very
much yet. Negotiation and “cooperation” with the Soviets are
important to deprive them of propaganda weapon that West is plotting
war.
Big Russian problem today is internal. To make friends at home must
make friends abroad. Objectives are to save Germany from the West,
divide the Allies, reduce defense efforts and increase attention to
the Orient, particularly India.
[Page 1363]
The strong arm methods of Stalin
have failed at home and abroad. He was not opposed during his
lifetime because his associates did not want “to go to Siberia.”
The Berlin riots are the most important post-war event except
Yugoslavia’s break with the Soviets in 1948. They started as an
economic protest but uncovered the bad political situation. They had
to be suppressed ruthlessly or would have spread over all East
Germany. The East German workers would have to put up with stern
economic conditions if they had felt free and democratic socialist.
But they know they are a satellite and are exploited for the benefit
of the Soviet Union which takes but does not give. Russia is not
Communist but state capitalism; Yugoslavia is not Communist but
democratic socialist and on the right road. Communism and the
withering away of the state is for the future.
European unity in terms of political federation is a desirable goal,
but far in the future. Europe is not ready for it yet. There are too
many old hatchets still to be buried.
India is the most interesting and important country in the world. A
grouping of Russia, China and India would be very serious, but
India, like Yugoslavia, is opposed to Stalinist methods and
imperialism. Both are steering an independent course in foreign
affairs and are misunderstood in America.
Tito knows all of the new men
in the Kremlin. They are much more flexible and modern minded than
Stalin who was interested
only in force—an autocrat whom he compared to Ivan the Terrible.
The Balkan Pact was necessary because of the emergency. He thinks it
should be enduring and, in spite of the differing philosophies of
the members, be an important factor of stability in an area which
has been unstable in the past. It should be attractive to the
Bulgarians but he sees less evidence of internal disorder in
Bulgaria than in the other satellites.
On relations with Italy he seems fully conscious of Yugoslavia’s
awkward position which will be actually complicated by the necessity
of maintaining forces “to protect herself from Italy.” He thinks the
initiative lies with Italy which should set aside the Trieste
question and discuss many smaller problems first. He doubts if any
progress can be made in view of weakened political situation in
Italy.
Tito wishes Cardinal Stepinac
would leave the country. He has little trouble with most of the
Catholic clergy, but is under constant pressure internally because
Stepinac’s collaboration
with the Germans and puppet Croat government was not punished more
severely.
Thinks the peasants are satisfied now with the decollectivization and
the ten hectare law. Also feels that the decentralization of
industry
[Page 1364]
management,
which recognizes normal incentives, is popular and will improve
conditions and strengthen the regime. He hopes that Yugoslavia will
need no further aid from the United States after two years. Hopes
the United States will continue helping under-developed
countries.
He sees little hope of political stability and strength in France,
which has not had “a great jolt” and did not fight in the war.
Has little use for U.S. propaganda program—too much ideology and not
enough facts. What people want is positive assurance that West has
more to offer in terms of peace, security, and better living
standards than the Russians.
Finally, he said he would like to visit the United States as he did
England, but he did not think McCarthy would let him in.
Note: Please understand that this is desultory
and confused and is merely an attempt at recording some of what he
said which you thought of interest.
