Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

INR–NIE files

No. 681
National Intelligence Estimate¹

secret
NIE 93

Washington, June 26, 1953.

Probable Developments in Yugoslavia²

the problem

To estimate (a) the current situation in Yugoslavia and probable future developments in Yugoslav domestic and foreign policies, and (b) the effect of these developments upon the international position of Yugoslavia.

conclusions

1. Yugoslavia remains a Communist dictatorship, with Tito in unquestioned control. The majority of the population is still opposed to the Tito regime. However, barring a Soviet/Satellite attack, there is almost no likelihood that it will be overthrown in the foreseeable future.

2. The present regime owes its strength and stability in large measure to Tito’s dominant position. In the event of his death, a successor regime would probably attempt to continue the main outlines of his internal and external policies. However, it is possible that a struggle for power would develop, with results which we cannot now estimate.

3. The Tito regime, with substantial outside assistance, has made some progress in overcoming Yugoslavia’s many postwar economic problems. Completion of the current investment program over the next three years would lessen his dependence on outside economic aid. However, continued maintenance and improvement of the armed forces will require outside military aid for a considerable period.

4. Although Tito is aware of the scheduled cutbacks in US aid, he may not take the steps necessary to reduce his dependence on US economic aid in the hope that the strategic importance of Yugoslavia to the US would lead the US to underwrite Yugoslavia’s foreign exchange deficits.

5. We do not believe Tito will abandon his policy of socializing agriculture, but the timing and execution of this policy will depend on his need to retain US support and to maintain agricultural production.

6. We do not believe that Yugoslavia will rejoin the Soviet Bloc as long as the Tito regime remains in power. The Kremlin may, however, attempt to weaken Tito’s ties with the West through increasingly conciliatory gestures toward Yugoslavia and to undermine Tito’s internal position.

7. Although Yugoslavia could repel an attack by a single Satellite, it does not have and will not be able to develop the capability to defend the plain of northeast Yugoslavia against a Soviet/Satellite invasion or a concerted Satellite attack logistically supported and centrally directed by the USSR.

8. In the initial stages of such a war, we believe that the Yugoslav armed forces would offer vigorous resistance to the invaders and that the Tito regime would be able to withdraw sizable organized ground units to the mountainous regions. After such a withdrawal the effectiveness and duration of organized resistance or guerrilla activity is difficult to estimate. First, a major campaign by Soviet/Satellite forces would almost certainly be able to wipe out all organized resistance, however determined, in the absence of prompt and substantial Western military support. Second, under the impact of military defeat the opportunities for popular defection would increase and the Tito regime might even lose control over some of its armed forces. In those circumstances, anti-Tito guerrilla units might be formed, thus reducing the effectiveness of guerrilla activity against the Soviet Bloc invaders.

. . . . . . .

10. Italo-Yugoslav relations, strained by the Trieste issue and the anti-Catholic policies of the Tito regime, constitute a major stumbling block to closer Yugoslav cooperation with the West. Resolution of the Trieste issue will not be easy, but Yugoslavia will probably continue to seek an improvement in relations with Italy in order to reduce one of the major obstacles to fuller Yugoslav participation in European defense arrangements.

11. We believe that the Yugoslavs have no present intention of precipitating a coup against the Hoxha regime. They probably calculate that to do so would create serious risks of provoking Western disfavor and Soviet retaliation. . . .

[Here follows the “Discussion” section of the estimate, comprising paragraphs 12–36.]

1. Regarding National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), see footnote 2, Document 635.
2. According to a note on the cover sheet, the IAC concurred in this estimate on June 23, with the FBI representative abstaining since the subject was outside that agency’s jurisdiction. The note also indicated that the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated with the CIA in the preparation of the estimate. A record of the discussion at the IAC meeting on June 23 is in INR files, lot 59 D 27, “Meeting Notes.”