768.5/6–353
No. 680
The Secretary of
State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)1
My Dear Mr. Secretary: This Department has examined the recommendations to the United States, United Kingdom and French Governments, and the proposed Terms of Reference for the [Page 1356] next contingent military discussions with the Yugoslavs which were transmitted by Mr. Nash’s letter of June 3, 1953,2 and is pleased to concur therein with the following comments.
We believe it desirable, in order to obviate the possibility of any misunderstanding on the part of the Yugoslavs, that the US, UK, and French military representatives at the outset of the conversations with the Yugoslavs, make it explicit that what are to follow are a series of military discussions on a contingent planning or assumptive basis, and that no commitments of any nature can be made. While this is made adequately clear in the Terms of Reference themselves, the point is sufficiently important to bear emphasis, and as a matter of strategy it would seem preferable to make it crystal clear at the outset rather than continually to reiterate the point throughout the discussions themselves.
. . . Once the approval of the British and French Governments has been obtained and a firm date set for the talks with the Yugoslavs, this Department would be pleased to prepare for the consideration of your Department and of the British and French Governments a suitable statement for this purpose.
In the Terms of Reference themselves, we would suggest that the word “then” in paragraph 8 be interpreted so as to give the tripartite representatives more freedom of action in the actual negotiations with the Yugoslavs.
With regard to the desire of the British Government to modify the language of paragraph 1–e of the Recommendations in order to avoid the implication that only the Yugoslavs are responsible for the lack of cooperation between Yugoslavia and Italy, and to avert discussion of the broader political aspects of the Trieste issue, this Department is informing the British Government that it agrees with the substance of the British proposal but prefers not to alter the actual language of that paragraph at this late date. The suggestion is being made to the British and French Governments that rather than actually amend the paragraph as now drafted, the three military representatives be instructed by their governments to interpret the existing language in the light of the desired amendment.
In communicating with the British and French Governments in the above sense, this Department is also informing them of its concurrence in the Recommendations and the proposed Terms of Reference for the next talks with the Yugoslavs with the indicated qualifications, and is confirming to them its approval of the date understood to have been proposed by the three military representatives for the actual resumption of the talks, i.e. June 29, 1953. Once [Page 1357] the approval of the British and French Governments is obtained, this Department will work out with those governments an appropriate procedure for the issuance of an invitation to the Yugoslavs and will take any required action in that regard. Your Department will of course be kept fully informed.
Sincerely yours,
Deputy Under Secretary