768.5/6–353
No. 679
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Nash) to the
Secretary of State
top secret
Washington, June 3, 1953.
Dear Mr. Secretary: Appended hereto is a
statement of the agreement which General J.
Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, acting as U.S.
Representative in conducting tripartite military conversations with
regard to talks with Yugoslavia, reached with designated United Kingdom
and French representatives on 22 May 1953. This Appendix consists of
recommendations to the three Governments (U.S., U.K., France), and
additional terms of reference, which favor the resumption of
Tripartite-Yugoslav military conversations on a covert basis in
Washington, D.C., as soon as possible after the Italian elections (7–8
June 1953). General Ridgway was
consulted personally in the preparation of this Tripartite military
position and account therein has been taken of his views.
[Page 1354]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that this Appendix constitutes an
appropriate basis for early resumption of Tripartite-Yugoslav military
conversations. The Department of Defense concurs in these views of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. General J. Lawton
Collins will be the U.S. Representative in these
forthcoming conversations.
In view of the Tripartite recommendation favoring resumption of these
conversations as soon as possible after the Italian elections, as well
as the recently expressed desires of the Yugoslavs to resume military
conversations at an early date, it is requested that necessary political
steps be taken at the earliest practicable date to enable the initiation
of the above discussions. Sincerely yours,
Appendix
Agreement Between Military Representatives of
the British, French, and United States Governments
top secret
[Washington, May 22, 1953.]
Tripartite (U.S., U.K., French)
Military Talks With the Yugoslavs
- 1.
- The U.S., U.K., and French Chiefs of Staff recommend to their
governments that:
- a.
- Military discussions should be resumed with Yugoslav
military representatives for the purpose indicated in
the Annex hereto.
- b.
- Such discussions should take place covertly in
Washington at an early date, as soon as possible after
the Italian elections.
- c.
- The ostensible purpose of the presence of the Yugoslav
representatives in Washington should be to examine
MSA problems
affecting Yugoslavia.
- d.
-
Although no political guarantees can be given to
Yugoslavia, the Tripartite Military Representatives
should be authorized at the next meeting of the
Yugoslav Representatives, to inform them that, at
the military level, the Tripartite Powers consider
the successful defense of Yugoslavia of great
strategic importance. They should state that as
military men, they do not believe that a Soviet
and/or Satellite attack against Yugoslavia could be
limited to a local war. . . .
. . . . . . .
- g.
-
The realistic coordination of Tripartite/Yugoslav
military planning requires some mutual exchange of
information between
[Page 1355]
the Yugoslavs and the
Tripartite Powers, and that in the forthcoming
Tripartite/Yugoslav military talks the Tripartite
Military Representatives will be permitted to
exchange information at their discretion regarding
Tripartite troop dispositions and possible combat
and logistic support to Yugoslavia in accord with
the Tripartite position set forth in the Annex.1
. . . . . . .
- 2.
- They further recommend that:
- a.
-
Urgent consideration should be given to the
question of informing the Greek and Turkish (and
where politically possible the Italian) governments
as early and as fully as possible regarding the
outcome of all future military discussions with the
Yugoslavs. In the interests of military cooperation
with those governments this information should be
given as soon as politically feasible and,
specifically as regards the forthcoming Yugoslav
Tripartite discussions, the Italians, Greeks and
Turks should be informed of the subject, time and
place of these discussions prior to their
inception.
… Further the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, should be
authorized to write personally to General Ridgway and invite
him to select British, French and U.S.
representatives from his staff to be sent to
Washington on a covert basis so as to be readily
available before and during the discussions to
advise the Tripartite Military Representatives
regarding SACEUR’s views but not to attend the
discussions themselves. The Yugoslavs should not be
informed of the presence of the SHAPE representatives
in Washington.
- 3.
- General Ridgway has
been consulted informally in the preparation of these terms of
reference (Annex hereto) and account has been taken of his
views.
