Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

750G.00/5–1953: Airgram

No. 678
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Italy¹

top secret

Washington, May 25, 1953.

A–1036. The questions raised by Ambassador Luce in her telegram No. 4797 May 19 to the Department (repeated as 171 to Belgrade²) highlight recent developments which have given rise to speculation concerning the impact of the changed regime in the USSR on what has become known as the “Tito heresy”, and can only be commented on in that context. In the nature of the problem, no categoric answers are possible, nor would it be prudent to seek them. The following reflects the Department’s current thinking on this matter.

The query is valid as to whether a rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the USSR might be possible as a result of the removal of Stalin’s personality from the scene, together with whatever changes of method or emphasis his death may presage in the character of the Soviet international communist mechanism or the ideological framework which ostensibly supports it. Such evidence as is now available does not indicate that a rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the USSR is in the making. On the contrary, there are material considerations which would seem to preclude such a development from the Yugoslav side. From the Soviet side, it is fair to assume that the USSR would like nothing so much as to recapture Yugoslavia, with or without Tito though perhaps preferably the latter. Failing that, the USSR’s interest would appear to lie in endeavoring to create doubt in the West regarding Tito’s sincerity, his ability to control the situation in Yugoslavia, and/or his ultimate value as an ally.

In analyzing the probable reaction of Tito and of the men around him to the new situation which has been created by Stalin’s death and by the apparent new tactics of the successor Soviet regime, a number of factors must be taken into account. These include, without attempting to evaluate their relative importance, (a) Tito’s sense of self-preservation, and that of his immediate entourage, (b) Yugoslav patriotism (both within the Tito regime itself, and on the part of the conscript Yugoslav army), and (c) the possible influence of ideologically convinced communists within the Yugoslav regime. As regards the latter, while we have evidence—and common sense confirms—that there are cominformist influences at work within the Yugoslav communist hierarchy, we have no reliable evidence (other than the statements of the Tito regime itself and the even more questionable assertions of Yugoslav political refugees and other parties at interest) that these are significant. On the other hand, we do have reason to believe that such cominformist elements as do exist are well under control. We conclude, therefore, that the course of Yugoslav policy will be determined by Tito and his immediate group of fellow-thinkers and associates, and not significantly influenced by other elements within the Yugoslav party or government which may possibly be desirous of patching up differences with Moscow for ideological reasons.

As regards (a) and (b), such internal support as Tito has arises largely from his “patriotic” anti-Soviet stand. It is doubtful if even Tito, let alone other lesser personalities, could now lead Yugoslavia back to the Kremlin fold. Be that as it may, it has been apparent throughout our dealings with Tito since the break with Moscow, that he has felt that one of his best cards in dealing with the West has been his ostensible position mid-way between East and West. He has publicly camouflaged his reluctance to commit himself to the West, variously, behind assertions that the Yugoslav public would not tolerate such a move, and claims that his value to the West vis-à-vis the satellite bloc would be compromised were he to become completely identified with the West. It seems more likely, however, that his primary motive has been, and continues to be, to maintain the most advantageous bargaining position. His recent moves to develop and exploit support from socialist and other non-cominformist leftists throughout the world supports this analysis, although it cannot be excluded that Tito has vague aspirations of ultimately leading or inspiring some form of “socialist international”. Such aspirations, however, though perhaps real are necessarily subordinate to the more immediate task of ensuring that neither East nor West overthrows his regime in the pursuit of its own objectives.

In his efforts to maintain a middle position between East and West, and whatever his own ideological aspirations may be, Tito has been plagued by all of the traditional Yugoslav and Balkan foreign policy problems, including that posed by past and possibly present Italian aspirations in the Balkans. While the external manifestations are admittedly different due to the differing political systems, the “Italian problem” is as politically important to Tito as the “Trieste problem” is to the Italian Government. Were Tito to yield to what the Yugoslavs consider Italian efforts to regain a foothold in the Balkans, and particularly were he to do so under ostensible Western pressure, his posture as a Yugoslav patriot, and as the leader of a “national communist” ideology able to hold its own between East and West, would be destroyed. While facing this political reality, Tito has at the same time been forced to recognize that he cannot expect from the West the military and other guarantees he requires without reaching some form of modus vivendi with Italy. Given the vital importance of such assurances from the West, we are inclined to believe that Tito genuinely desires an early solution to the Trieste situation, always provided that the solution is not one which will lead directly to his downfall.

As regards timing, in view of the emphasis which has recently been placed on the Trieste issue in the West’s dealings with Tito, and particularly in connection with the military discussions between the US, UK, France and Yugoslavia, and given the Yugoslav belief that the West is irrevocably committed to support the Italian point of view, the Department is not inclined to ascribe untoward significance to Tito’s alleged desire to achieve a negotiated Trieste settlement prior to the Italian elections. In any event, although May 25 is reportedly Tito’s birthday and Prime Minister De Gasperi is expected to make a formal speech on the previous day, the magic of the date would appear to lie in its relation to the Italian elections.

In circumstantial support of our conclusion that a genuine reconciliation with Soviet communism is not in the interest of the present Yugoslav Government, and is not in fact being sought by that Government, the following may be cited:

1.) Ironically enough, the Yugoslav regime seems to be unduly sensitive to the harassment accorded their representatives behind the Iron Curtain as well as, to a much lesser degree of course, to real or fancied harassment at the hands of the West. In consequence, Yugoslav representatives have since Stalin’s death consistently maintained that the hoped “formal and correct” relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR could be established in the new international climate. The call of the Yugoslav Chargé Djuric upon Molotov³ (which, coupled with Yugoslav-Rumanian negotiations concerning the Danube, apparently prompted the major share of Western speculation concerning a possible rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the USSR), was made no secret by the Yugoslavs. The Yugoslavs informed our Ambassador in Moscow concerning the meeting shortly after it took place, and published the news in both press and radio a few days later (May 4 and 5). The only suspicious element in this exchange appears to have been the role of the Soviet Union, which withheld public announcement of the visit until the news was released that the Yugoslavs and Rumanians were reaching agreement on Danubian problems at which time it might have been anticipated that it would make the maximum impression.

2.) As regards the Yugoslav-Rumanian negotiations on the Danube, we have not yet seen the final text of the agreement which was apparently reached, and therefore cannot judge as to which party to the negotiations was the more (or least) conciliatory. We have sufficient background concerning the genesis of the negotiations, however, to know that they were being planned before Stalin’s death, and to believe that they arose from purely practical considerations of resolving an economically impossible situation as regards traffic on the Danube.

3.) Although Soviet May Day slogans contained none of the usual attacks upon Tito’s regime, those of several of the satellites did, and both Soviet and satellite propaganda has continued without significant abatement, as have border incidents between Yugoslavia and the satellites.

4.) The appointment of a new Soviet Chargé in Belgrade cannot yet be evaluated. However, it is significant, we believe, that the move required only Russian initiative, that it prompted sufficient Yugoslav concern for them to call it to our attention (through the rather transparent device of inquiring whether we had knowledge of any MVD connection on the part of the chargé designate: information which, in view of the record of the individual concerned, the Yugoslavs are in a much better position to have than are we), and that such a move is much more apt to be ascribed significance by the West than to reflect any real significance so far as Soviet intentions are concerned.

5.) We have no information concerning the purpose of the recent conference of Yugoslav Ambassadors from Western Europe and the Middle East. While press speculation commented upon the absence of the Yugoslav Ambassador to Washington, it is perhaps significant that he had returned to Belgrade only last fall. The circumstances of the conference, particularly its time relationship to the Italian elections, to De Gasperi’s bid for Soviet support on Trieste, and to developments in the military relations between the West and Yugoslavia, strongly suggest that the conference was as concerned with Tito’s relationship to the West as with his relationship with Moscow.

(6) It is perhaps not without significance that the USSR succeeded only a year ago in provoking disquiet, both in the West and in Yugoslavia, by tactics designed to suggest that a rapprochement between the USSR and Tito was not impossible. Given circumstances in which the USSR had ample reason to suppose that the West was bringing pressure upon Tito to yield to the Italians over Trieste, it is plausible that the USSR might well see and endeavor to exploit an opportunity to sow dissension in the West by so acting as to suggest that Tito’s “heresy” might be forgiven by the Kremlin. Such a tactic might appear to the USSR particularly opportune in view of the Yugoslavs’ uneasiness at the delay in the appointment of a new US Ambassador to Belgrade, which the Yugoslavs (and possibly also the Kremlin) tend to interpret as a manifestation of Western displeasure with Tito.

Smith

1. Drafted by Marcy and cleared with WE. Repeated to Belgrade and Moscow.
2. In telegram 4797, Luce asked whether Yugoslavia’s recent efforts to enter secret negotiations with Italy regarding Trieste might presage a shift by Yugoslavia back to the Cominform, in that a Trieste settlement acceptable to Italy would help Italian Communist Party chief Palmiro Togliatti and increase the stature of Tito in the eyes of Italian Communists. She also raised the possibility that Yugoslavia’s recent tactics regarding Trieste might be designed, on the other hand, to make possible full military, political, and economic agreement with Italy preparatory to a Yugoslav request to enter NATO and to help elect De Gasperi as the only type of Italian leader who would permit closer Yugoslav cooperation within the NATO framework. (750G.00/5–1953)
3. An account of Ambassador Bohlen’s report on the meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and Yugoslav Chargé Djuric was transmitted in telegram 1543 from Moscow, Apr. 30. (661.68/4–3052)