Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

768.00/3–3153

No. 677
The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Wallner) to the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)

top secret
official–personal

Belgrade, March 31, 1953.

Dear Doug: I am the firmest believer in the principle of “No favorites in the Harem”. My only argument with the reasoning outlined in your letter of March 16¹ has to do with timing. Things looked last fall as if we had let Tito think we needed him more than he needed us. Then came the Handy talks. . . .

As of the present writing, therefore, I think the question of who needs whom the most need not loom too large as a basic consideration in our relations with Yugoslavia. We should of course be careful that we do not allow it to do so, either by swelling their heads or chilling them to the bone. They play a pretty cool game of poker and appreciate cool poker in the other fellow. Their natural Balkan romanticism is pretty well tempered by their hard-boiled training as Communists, and I see no reason why we should not have satisfactory and realistic dealings with them so long as we keep certain historical and psychological factors in mind.

Relations with Italy will always be a problem until qualities of statesmanship in both countries coincide to bring about a general settlement—something like what happened between Greece and Turkey when centuries of antagonism were finally done away with. Nothing like that can happen until after the Italian elections. Then, if De Gasperi wins by sufficient majority, he may be able to contribute that statesmanship from the Italian side. If he does, I am pretty sure that Tito will meet him halfway. In any case we should be in there pushing hard at that point. But I am equally sure that Tito will not consent to any real concessions to help De Gasperi win the elections. The Yugoslav view is that the Italians have elections too often for them to be able to afford to take the rap each time. I certainly hope that Trieste is settled before the next (and I don’t mean May 1953 elections).²

I hear George Kennan is out of the running as a successor to George Allen. Wouldn’t Sam Reber be a good man for this post if he can be pried loose from Germany? He should have a post of his own now, and this would be a pretty good place for him to begin. He would have a rousing welcome from Monica and me.

[Here follow brief personal remarks.]

Woodie

1. Document 675.
2. In a brief reply of Apr. 12, MacArthur expressed his general agreement with Wallner’s views and stated that Tito was being shortsighted in not making concessions to De Gasperi on Trieste, because, if De Gasperi were to lose the elections, the situation in Italy would be chaotic, and this would not serve the interests of Yugoslavia. (768.00/3–3153)