Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

768.11/3–2153: Telegram

No. 676
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State¹

top secret
priority

London, March 21, 1953—4 p.m.

5214. Eden gave me the following résumé of the British Government’s talks with Tito this week:²

1. Defense. Neither Britain nor Yugoslavia desire admission of Yugoslavia NATO at present. Tito, however, has felt and been concerned by his position of isolation. Result of defense talks was summarized in communiqué issued by UK Government yesterday which included this statement: “The two Governments declared their common interest in resistance to aggression and to the preservation of national independence.

“They undertook to work closely together and with other freedom loving nations to defend peace. They were in full agreement that in the event of aggression in Europe the resulting conflict could hardly remain local in character”.

This does not indicate that any promises were made and no commitment was in fact made. It is intended to be mere statement of the reality that war involving Yugoslavia would surely become general.

2. Tripartite military talks. As previously reported British informed Tito tripartite staff talks are in progress in Washington preparatory to resumption of talks with Yugoslavia.

3. Balkan treaty. British told Tito that they consider the Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish alliance very good but at same time lectured the Yugoslavs at length on the necessity that they be on good terms with Italy, both in military matters and with respect to territorial adjustments, in order to make this treaty effective.

4. Trieste. Eden said he very carefully avoided the points which we had wished not mentioned. Possibility of a temporary solution was explored but Yugoslavia stated this would not be acceptable: They insisted that only a permanent solution could be satisfactory. (Popovic referred to fact that Italians have elections every three years and under any temporary arrangement would ask for more each time.) With respect to permanent settlement Yugoslavs have not excluded possibility of minor adjustments but Eden carefully did not discuss details. Tito hinted he might a little later take the initiative in seeking talks with De Gasperi.

5. Albania. British suggested and Yugoslavs completely agreed that situations should be left undisturbed.

6. USSR. Marshal Tito had expressed the view that the situation in Russia had not been greatly changed, for the present, by Stalin’s death. He did not think that the new rulers of Russia would be any more anxious for war than Stalin had been, though perhaps for different reasons. They might well, however, step up the pressure of the cold war and, in the Marshal’s view, the most powerful weapon in the Western armory was a sincere policy for peace. It was particularly important to avoid any hint of a preventive war in Western propaganda, since this would only serve to unite elements in Russia which might otherwise be disposed to quarrel.

7. Religious questions. Were discussed in general terms and Eden said they found Tito very sensible and liberal. (Tito had fairly long and amicable talks with Archbishop of Canterbury.)

Eden did not tell me that any specific proposals were ventured. Popovic in press conference remarked British leaders were “too polite and correct to make representations.”

8. In summary, both British and Yugoslavs were very satisfied with results of visit. Tito has departed feeling more confident that he is no longer in an isolated position. His last remark was that he was “very satisfied and felt visit had been most successful”.³

Aldrich

1. Repeated for information to Belgrade, Paris, and Rome.
2. Tito visited England Mar. 16–20. For text of the communiqué issued on Mar. 20 at the conclusion of his visit, see Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1953, pp. 273–274.
3. The British Foreign Office furnished the Embassy in London further details of the conversations during Tito’s visit. These were communicated to the Department of State in telegram 5261 from London, Mar. 25. (768.11/3–2553) The conversations in London between Tito and British leaders were also the subject of a conversation on Mar. 30 between Wallner and Ambassador Ivo Mallet, who had been in London throughout the Tito visit. A memorandum of the Wallner–Mallet conversation was sent to the Department of State as an attachment to despatch 777 from Belgrade, Mar. 31. (768.11/3–3153)