786.5 MSP/1–853: Telegram
No. 669
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Department of State
priority
934. Embtel 929.1 I began with Tito last evening by telling him that I had some pleasant and unpleasant things to say, adding that I knew him to be a man who could take it as well as dish it out and would let him have it straight. He nodded approval.
I traced the history of the request for supplemental aid leading up to our decision and reasons which had prompted us to grant his government 20 million dollars at this time. He expressed lively appreciation and, although he did not comment on the amount, it was evident he was pleased.
Tito listened most attentively as I slowly read to him the aide-mémoire in English2 which was translated word for word by his interpreter, breaking in from time to time with explanations and exclamations. When I read passage about “recent public utterances of various high officials,” he explained “You don’t mean the others. You mean me.” I said “yes.”
Tito seemed really astonished at the latter part of sentence accusing him of exerting political pressure on the United States and observed: “That would have been a very foolish thing to do.” He then said that the American press and particularly the New York Times had both misread and misinterpreted his speech at Smederevska Palanka3 and wished to comment at length on this when I had finished.
During passage about Italy he was largely silent, breaking in only once to say that if he and other officials had recently publicly attacked Italy, attacks on Yuogoslavia were a daily pastime for Italian officials and Italian press.
Tito followed with particular interest next to last paragraph aide-mémoire and agreed heartily that fundamental interest of two countries were parallel with particular reference to Soviet threat and said “I don’t expect you will approve all our policies nor do you expect me to approve all yours. I believe you do, however, approve our policy of increasing our military potential against Soviet aggression. So long as you approve that, I am satisfied.”
[Page 1334]After I had finished reading the aide-mémoire, Tito began to explain his speech at Smederevska Palanka. It would hardly be correct to say he ate crow, since he began by saying that he was not taking back a word he had said, but length and detail of his explanation, which was less convincing at times than at others, showed that he was well aware that his utterances had been indiscreet and badly timed. He said those passages of the speech which had aroused greater indignation in United States were, of course, not directed against policies of United States Government particularly in its overseas aid policy. Italy had been principal target because Yugoslav Government and people had been profoundly disturbed by actions of Italy in attempting to prevent United States from continuing economic and military aid to a neighbor whose geographical position made it first bulwark of Italy’s defense. It had been necessary for internal reasons to strike out hard at this and at the same time to warn his people that if Italy’s machinations were successful and aid was not received, Yugoslavia would nevertheless survive. He said this was meaning of controversial phrase “other way out.” He had in mind, when using this expression, whole series of measures which he had drawn up but which he did not wish at that time to announce in detail, for adjusting his country’s economy to surmount effects of drought in absence of foreign aid. They would have included certain reductions in armed forces, all-around belt tightening on part of the “entire population” and other economic measures (which I understood to mean reimposition of rationing). Obviously there was no need to go into these measures in detail at that time but he had felt that note of warning must be sounded. Therefore the “other way out” was not fully explained. Nevertheless, he had been astonished to read that in some quarters, it had even been interpreted to imply desire to seek help from Russia. He had made specific disclaimer in immediately following sentence and he felt such misinterpretation could only be deliberate. He had been equally disturbed to see the phrase interpreted as indicating threat to return to isolationism and neutralism. He said those concepts were abhorrent both to him and to his people. He very earnestly repeated that he wished to take this occasion to state solemnly not only that he would not even if he could return to Cominform fold but that also any form of neutralism or isolation was a practical and moral impossibility for his people.
Tito went on to say that he had welcomed this frank exchange of views because he wanted nothing more than to see continued improvement of United States-Yugoslav relations and that this had been most helpful. He said happy occasion of our having granted additional drought aid called for public expression of appreciation [Page 1335] and forthcoming session of Parliament seemed especially timely. Kardelj, he thought, would bring this out in his address on foreign affairs. I said I thought occasion called for his doing this himself and that that was necessary to clear up misunderstandings. He said program of session did not call for speech by him but he could issue public statement. I retorted lightly that I anticipated that he might be called on to make an acceptance speech during session (this allusion to his expected elevation to presidency amused him greatly. He replied, with hearty laugh, that election was for Skupstina to decide), he indicated that it would be helpful if in expressing his government’s gratification for the additional aid he could refer to our statements that no political strings were attached. I pointed out that this was included in statement I had read to him.
Comment: I believe conversation was salutary and clarified atmosphere. Perhaps most significant statement by Tito was his emphatic stand against neutralism. Other subjects covered will be reported in separate telegrams.4
Department please repeat other missions as desired.
- Telegram 929, Jan. 7, reported that Allen, accompanied by Wallner, had called on Tito at 6 p.m. that day and had read to him the aide-mémoire. It very briefly summarized the substance of their conversation and indicated that a full report would be cabled the following day. (768.5 MSP/1–753)↩
- Supra.↩
- Reference is to Tito’s comments at Smederevska Palanka on Dec. 16.↩
- The part of their conversation in which they discussed security arrangements between Yugoslavia and the West is reported in telegram 935 from Belgrade, infra. Their brief discussion of the Trieste issue is reported in telegram 937 from Belgrade, Jan. 9. (750G.0221/1–953)↩