768.5/1–853: Telegram

No. 670
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Department of State1

top secret

935. No distribution outside Department. Following my statement to Tito yesterday that US wished to create collective security system against Soviet aggression in all parts of world, Tito remarked that General Handy had indicated that broadest basis on which he was authorized to discuss joint strategic planning with Yugoslavia was assumption that Yugoslavia would become another Korea in case of attack. Tito said this had made a most unhappy impression on Yugoslavs and that officials who knew about it were still dismayed over it. Tito expressed again his confidence that attack on Yugoslavia would lead sooner or later to general war but [Page 1336] said that as long as Western powers were unwilling to go any further than General Handy had been permitted to go, he had felt if necessary to prepare Yugoslav public for fact that they might have to depend principally on their own manpower and resources in case of attack. His only recent public speech is on this subject.

I referred to talk with Kardelj in this regard (Embtel 873 December 202) and said I thought basic problem of Yugoslavian relations with West was precisely this question of collective security and that chief stumbling-block to real progress in this regard was bad Yugoslav-Italian relations, primarily due to quarrel over Trieste. Hence Trieste solution was principal objective to be obtained before wider political decisions could be reached.

Comment: Tito’s remarks are further evidence that Yugoslavs are deeply concerned over lack of definite security arrangements with West.

Allen
  1. Repeated for information to London, Paris (for Reinhardt), Frankfurt (for Handy), Athens, Ankara, Rome (for Unger) eyes only for Chiefs of Mission and senior military attachés.
  2. See footnote 2, Document 663.