Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

768.5 MSP/1–553

No. 668
The Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Government of Yugoslavia¹

secret

[Belgrade, January 7, 1953.]

Aide-Mémoire

The Yugoslav Government will recall that upon the occasion of his last call on the Under Secretary on November 19,² the Yugoslav Ambassador described the grievous impact upon the economy of Yugoslavia of the recent drought and propounded the need for United States assistance. At that time the Ambassador was informed that the United States Government was aware of the seriousness of the situation and was giving it earnest consideration.

As the Yugoslav Government knows, in the past when resources have been available the United States has consistently aided friendly peoples who through no fault of their own have suffered economic or other severe hardships due to exigencies of weather, disease, or war. This United States policy has had its applicability to the peoples of Yugoslavia in the UNRRA and 1950 food aid programs as well as the tripartite program of assistance.

In accordance with these humanitarian traditions, the United States Government has now been able to arrange for the reprogramming of mutual security³ funds so as to grant to the Yugoslav Government as extraordinary drought assistance the sum of $20 million.

United States experts have thoroughly studied the situation with officials of the Yugoslav Government and believe that the Yugoslav Government should be able with this additional assistance of $20 million to cope with the emergency. It is understood that estimates and judgments of what the Yugoslav Government might be expected to be able to do in this respect can be made available in detail to the appropriate Yugoslav authorities by MSA representatives in Belgrade. It should be emphasized that these views do not constitute economic conditions to the additional grant but are simply technical suggestions which it is hoped will prove helpful.

As the Yugoslav Government knows, neither in respect to the Yugoslav Government nor any other government, has the United States endeavored to impose political conditions⁴ to any aid which it has extended—military, economic or financial. The countries of Western Europe can testify to this in connection with the Marshall Plan aid and mutual defense assistance. The Yugoslav Government itself knows from its own experience that this has been the fact in connection with the various aid programs which have been extended to Yugoslavia.

Notwithstanding this broad policy, which the United States has followed in the past and continues to follow, the United States Government feels impelled to call to the attention of the Yugoslav Government certain factors which are making it increasingly difficult for this Government to pursue its policy of developing mutual cooperation⁵ with Yugoslavia.

The United States Government wishes to refer in the foregoing connection to the frequency with which in recent public utterances various high Yugoslav officials have adversely criticized United States policy toward their country and by so doing have in effect attempted to exert political pressure on the United States Government to alter these policies, particularly in the economic sphere. For example, Marshal Tito in recent speeches implied that Yugoslavia was getting no help from the United States in its current economic difficulties and indicated that, faced with this attitude, there was “another outcome” for Yugoslav policy. Such public misinterpretation of United States motives and actions is gravely prejudicial to the development of that mutual understanding which the United States Government desires. This tone, which presents a sharp contrast to the attitude of the United States Government in carefully refraining from attaching political strings to its economic assistance to Yugoslavia, was being sounded at the very time this government was moving toward its decision to grant additional drought aid to Yugoslavia and was in the midst of making the difficult financial rearrangements necessary to provide funds for this purpose.

As the Yugoslav Government knows, one of the fundamental convictions of the United States Government is the necessity to create a strong collective security system against Soviet aggression in all parts of the world including, of course, southeastern Europe. In this area an indispensable link in the establishment of such a system is an Italian-Yugoslav rapprochement and the United States has, therefore, a profound and direct interest in furthering the development of friendly relations between Yugoslavia and Italy which it has repeatedly manifested.

For this reason, the United States Government is experiencing increasing concern over the growing friction between Yugoslavia and Italy, its ally in NATO, which has recently become so apparent. In illustration of the bitter feelings which have developed between the two countries, it is necessary only to turn to the failure to reach a satisfactory solution of the Trieste problem, and various inflammatory statements by Yugoslav officials concerning Italy.⁶

It is not intended to pass judgment on the merits of these issues. It is the fact, however, that they have resulted in the deterioration of Italian-Yugoslav relations to their present low point and have worked to place the United States in a position vis-à-vis its Italian ally and the other members of NATO which it is impossible to ignore.

The United States Government has sincerely endeavored to improve relations with Yugoslavia and will continue to do so. While the United States Government does not agree with many of the policies and actions of the Yugoslav Government, it has gone on the assumption that the fundamental interests of the two countries are parallel, particularly when both the United States and the rest of the world are under the shadow of the Soviet threat. Cooperation between the United States and Yugoslavia to be successful must be extended by both sides in a mutual spirit of understanding. It cannot be a one way street. The emergency drought aid which the United States Government is now extending to Yugoslavia has been made available in this spirit.

It is the intention of the United States Government to keep the foregoing expression of its views secret and it will not discuss them with any other government.

1. Transmitted in telegram 842 to Belgrade, Jan. 5, and amended by telegrams 845 and 847, Jan. 6. (Both in 768.5 MSP/1–653) The amendments are indicated in footnotes below.
2. See Document 660.
3. The original text here read “economic aid.” The Department of State in telegram 847 requested the Embassy to substitute “mutual security” for “economic aid.”
4. The original text here read “has the United States endeavored to exert pressure or to impose political conditions.” The Department of State in telegram 845 requested the Embassy to delete the phrase “to exert pressure or.”
5. The original text here read “closer relation.” The Department of State in telegram 847 requested the Embassy to substitute at this point “mutual cooperation.”
6. The original text here read “a satisfactory solution of the Trieste problem, various inflammatory statements by Yugoslav officials concerning Italian irredentism, and most recently the seizure by Yugoslav authorities of a number of Italian fishing vessels.” The Department of State in telegram 845 requested the Embassy to change this portion as printed here.