Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

782.00/7–752

No. 467
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Turkey (McGhee)¹

secret

Ankara, July 2, 1952.

On the occasion of the visit to Ankara of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Frank Nash, a flight was arranged on July 2 in Mr. Nash’s plane, which included the Foreign Minister, General Gurler² and the British, Canadian and Chinese Ambassadors, in addition to members of Mr. Nash’s staff, General Arnold, Mr. Keith³ and Mr. Emery.⁴ In the course of the flight, which lasted some five hours and covered most of Eastern Turkey, the opportunity was afforded for conversation between Mr. Nash, the Foreign Minister and myself, which was interpreted by Mr. Batu of the Foreign Office, and in which we were joined in part by the British Ambassador.

1. Yugoslavia. The subject was introduced by Mr. Nash’s explaining to the Foreign Minister that he would shortly visit Yugoslavia at which time he would have discussions with Mr. Tito.⁵ I had previously outlined to Mr. Nash the status of Turkish-Yugoslav relations, particularly from the standpoint of the developing rapprochement between the two countries in which our Government is particularly interested. I therefore asked the Foreign Minister if he would bring us up to date on what had transpired between the Turkish and the Yugoslav Governments in the approximately onemonth period since I had last had the opportunity to discuss the matter with him.

The Foreign Minister replied that developments had in fact taken place which he considered most encouraging. In the first place, the Yugoslavs had now officially invited the Turks to send a delegation of members of the Grand National Assembly, and another delegation of journalists to Yugoslavia. He himself still planned to visit Belgrade, en route to Western Europe, at the first opportunity. The Foreign Minister said that Yugoslavia was, moreover, now prepared to engage in actual military talks if certain conditions were met.⁶ This fact had emerged from six excellent talks he had had with the Yugoslav Ambassador in Ankara. The Yugoslavs are now willing to engage in military talks with the Turks (and, I presume, the Greeks) if Turkey is prepared to participate in the defense of Thrace, along the lines of the proposal recently made to Greece and Turkey by Marshal Montgomery. The Yugoslavs are not prepared to engage in military talks if Turkey plans only to withdraw to interior defensive positions and not to engage in a positive defense of Thrace.

I advised the Foreign Minister that I was sure this information would be of great interest to Admiral Carney, since it would have a bearing on his military plans. I asked the Foreign Minister the status of the consideration of the question of the defense of Thrace by the Turkish General Staff and Government.

The Foreign Minister replied that although no final decision had been made, they would like very much to make such a defense, since otherwise the Russians could easily push through to the sea and the defense of the Straits would be jeopardized. The Turkish decision hinged, however, on the availability of additional sea and air support, as had been discussed by Marshal Montgomery.

I asked the Foreign Minister whether or not he considered that Turk-Yugoslav relations were adversely affected by the strong anti-Communist position of the Turkish Government.

The Foreign Minister replied that he did not think so. Turkey was anti-Communist principally because Communism constituted the front for Soviet aggression. Although Turkey disliked Communism, she was prepared to collaborate with Yugoslavia despite her Communist policies provided Yugoslavia had no aggressive intent.

I queried the Foreign Minister as to whether or not the Yugoslavs might not find it easier to talk with General Plastiras or other members of the Greek Government, who had a softer attitude toward communism.

The Foreign Minister did not think this was the case.

2. Middle East Defense Organization. We advised the Foreign Minister that Mr. Nash had been present at the recent meeting in London between the British and US Foreign Ministers.⁷ As the Foreign Minister is aware, the question of the Middle East Command, or Middle East Defense Organization as we now prefer to call it, is under active consideration by both our Governments and as a consequence there had been some discussion on this question between the Foreign Ministers. The thinking that emerged was that after diplomatic discussions between the seven interested governments, i.e., U.S., U.K., Turkey, France, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa a discreet approach should be made to the Arab States to sound them out as to whether or not they would be interested in joining the defense organization.

If the Arab States were not actually hostile to the idea, but merely timid, then the suggestion was that the outside powers should go ahead with the creation of the organization regardless of the willingness of the Arab States to participate from the outset. The Foreign Minister was asked to give his reaction to this proposal which, it was emphasized, had not been finalized and would not be pending discussion with Turkey and the other powers. In particular, the Foreign Minister was asked his judgment as to the best approach to the Arab States.

The Foreign Minister thereupon entered into a considerable discussion on the Arab States. He stated that it was, in the first place, an illusion to consider them Arab States. Iraq, he pointed out, had a large Iranian and a considerable Turkish minority. It was divided between two Moslem sects. In Syria, there was a considerable Turkish minority. The Lebanon, as we knew, was equally divided between Moslems and Christians and contained many foreign elements. Jordan was not a state at all, merely a creation of the British to compensate King Abdullah. Egypt was not really an Arab State. Many of the people were Copts and the ruling classes were Turks, Balkans and other foreigners. The only true Arab States were Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, which were feudal states living in the past.

The Arab League was a creation of the British for their own purposes and was not representative of the Arabs. The British and the French, who have traditionally had colonies and spheres of influence in the Arab States, did not understand the Arabs. They knew very well the present leaders, whom they themselves had created. They knew how the leaders lived, what sort of furniture they had in their homes, and their personal habits, but their knowledge did not go beyond this. In the view of the Foreign Minister only the Turks, among the powers concerned, really understood the Arabs. Speaking very broadly, he thought the Turks had the best possibilities for approaching the Arab States with respect to the proposed command. In particular, he thought that the Turks were very close to Syria and the Lebanon.

In the Foreign Minister’s view, the defense of the Middle East lay basically in the defense of Turkey. Turkish forces in Turkey constitute the bulwark of the Middle East defense. The Russians can under no circumstance bypass Turkey by going through Iraq or Iran, but must first attack Turkey in an effort to defeat or neutralize her. As a consequence, the best way to increase the defensive capability of the Middle East is to increase the strength of the Turkish forces. The principal objective of the Middle East Defense Organization should be a psychological one, to obtain the friendship and political cooperation of the Arab States.

The Foreign Minister was asked what particular tactics he could recommend with respect to the approach to the Arab States on the question of the Middle East Defense Organization.

He replied that the four powers must give most careful thought to this approach and that the necessary groundwork must be laid in private conversations with Arab leaders before a formal approach was made. The real danger was that the Arabs would, upon being approached, reply that the matter was one which must be considered by the Arab League, which would mean that the proposal would get nowhere. He had, however, no concrete suggestion as to how this could be avoided. He emphasized that the present leaders of the Arab world are largely discredited because they came to power during the period of foreign domination and owe their position to the support of the European powers. However, in response to a query, he replied that we must of course deal with these leaders, except in those cases where the people are more powerful than their leaders. He had no concrete suggestion, however, as to which countries are included in this category or how this can be done.

Following an interruption we were joined by Sir Knox Helm, and the conversation was resumed very much as it had been left off. The British Ambassador concurred that it was his understanding that his Government favored consultation by the seven sponsoring countries before an approach was made to the Arab States. The Foreign Minister took exception to this, saying that the four powers should first reach agreement, since agreement would be difficult to obtain among seven. However, in the light of the arguments put forth by the British Ambassador, Mr. Nash and myself, based on the desirability of encouraging the Commonwealth countries to make a contribution to Middle East defense, the Foreign Minister appeared to agree. It was pointed out, however, that this would not preclude preliminary discussions among the four powers subject to subsequent agreement of the remaining three. The British Ambassador emphasized that the Commonwealth countries could not be taken for granted; however, all recognized that they would not be likely to differ on such technical Middle East matters as the approach to the Arab States.

Mr. Nash asked the Foreign Minister whether or not Turkey would be willing, in the event of Russian aggression in the Middle East, to permit Turkish troops to go out of Turkey to participate in the defense of other Middle East nations, such as Iraq and Iran. The Foreign Minister replied, as before, that Turkish forces in Turkey constitute the greatest force of defensive strength in the Middle East. He stated that more could be done for Middle East defense by building up these forces, so that they could resist Russian attack. Russia, if she planned an attack against the Middle East, could not take the risk of extending long lines of communication through Iraq and Iran, which Turkey might move out and cut, and as a consequence must attack Turkey.

The Foreign Minister did at one point state that Turkey was willing, if circumstances so justified, to make a contribution of forces in the Middle East outside of Turkey, however, he placed this contribution in the context of joining in a joint effort with Turkey’s allies. He pointed out that Turkey was now a member of NATO and that it would be necessary for any decision with respect to utilization of Turkish forces outside of Turkey to be made by NATO.

Mr. Nash and I both emphasized that membership in NATO did not necessarily involve commitment of all Turkish forces to NATO. Both the US and UK, even though members of NATO, have accepted military responsibilities outside of the NATO area, i.e., in Korea and Southeast Asia. Mr. Nash advised that it had been agreed between the US, UK and French Governments that each would accept certain responsibilities outside of NATO: the US in Korea, the British in Malaya, the French in Indochina. He stated that he thought that the Turks should be willing to accept responsibilities in the Middle East.

The Foreign Minister replied that the Turkish position was different from that of Great Britain and the US in this regard, in that Turkey was adjacent to the area in question and could contribute to the defense of the area with its forces in its own country.

I stated that we had a situation in the United States somewhat similar to what the Foreign Minister had described, in that many isolationists in the US consider that America can make its best contribution to world peace by becoming strong at home. Nevertheless, we had despatched forces to Europe and Korea and elsewhere.

The net of the Foreign Ministers’ comments on this point was neither to accept nor to preclude the possibility of Turkish troops being engaged outside of Turkey. However, the implication was clear that they would do so only if supported by forces of their Allies.

The Foreign Minister stated that it was first of all necessary for the area to be defended in the Middle East to be agreed upon and a legal basis established for the commitments of the participating powers. It would then be necessary for these commitments to be approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Before the area to be defended could be defined, it was necessary to determine which of the States in the Middle East wished to participate. In discussing whether or not Iran would participate, he mentioned parenthetically that he had received information to the effect that Iran would accept membership in the NATO, however, all present seemed to regard it improbable that an invitation could be extended to Iran.

In response, I stated that our concept of the MEDO was somewhat different. We had conceived of the MEDO as a cooperative effort, without a legal basis such as NATO, because the political situation in the Middle East did not appear to permit such a legal basis. What was proposed was the next best thing to a legal commitment. It was pointed out, for example, that we did not necessarily propose to submit our participation in the Organization to the Congress in the form of a treaty.

As far as the area to be defended was concerned, I considered that this should be based on strategic considerations. While it would be desirable to have all the States in the area which it was decided to defend participate in its defense, we would, in the final analysis, probably seek to defend the area in any event even if the States of the areas opposed our doing so. It was very important, however, to attempt to persuade the States to cooperate. Even if they do not or could not possess significant military forces, their cooperation would nevertheless assure their orientation toward us in the cold war, and their cooperation with us in the event of a shooting war.

Mr. Nash asked the Foreign Minister whether or not he believed that the Arab States should be furnished arms. The Foreign Minister replied that he did, although he assumed the amounts they could utilize would be small. However, he believed the furnishing of arms should be subject to bargaining. Unlike Turkey, the Arab States had a bargaining mentality and could only be persuaded to assume their obligations through the offering of a quid pro quo. The British Ambassador agreed and repeated that what was required was not a “carrot” but “trade goods”, to which the Foreign Minister readily agreed.

The Foreign Minister suggested that approaches be made by the nation in the most influential position with respect to each of the various Arab States, even though this was somewhat contradictory to his previous statement that Turkey offered the best approach to the Arab States. He mentioned that the British might approach Iraq and Jordan, the Americans Saudi Arabia, and Turkey could approach Syria and Lebanon. When Mr. Nash repeated this proposal later, he agreed, although the British Ambassador commented “What about the French?”, when Syria and Lebanon were mentioned.

I remarked that although it might be well for the nation with the most influence to attempt to persuade the State concerned, we should seek to avoid recognition of spheres of influence which would militate against the multilateral approach implicit in the MEDO proposal. The implication as to spheres of influence in the tripartite declaration, even though not intended, had detracted from it.

The British Ambassador seemed to deprecate British influence over Iraq and Jordan, and all appeared to agree that a truly multilateral approach was desirable. All agreed, however, that the basic problem lay in preventing the Arab States from referring the matter to the Arab League, where it was agreed it would be stymied.

I pointed out, however, that our problem really arose when the Arab leaders or Governments would be forced to take a public position on the MEDO proposal. The British Ambassador recalled that the British Chiefs of Mission meeting in London had concluded that the Arab States would refuse an invitation to join the MEDO. The British Ambassador preferred the approach which he has previously described to me as “setting up a shop” to which the Arab States will ultimately be attracted. Mr. Nash pointed out that the thought in London had been to avoid, through discreet initial approaches, a refusal on the part of the Arab States which might make it impossible for them to join the Organization later, assuming they did not now wish to join.

I then put forward on a personal basis for discussion the suggestion that after the necessary preliminary private discussions, an open invitation be made to the Arab Governments which would, in effect, be only an invitation to come to a meeting on Middle East defense, without any commitments as to what might emerge from the meeting. This course would have the advantage of presenting the easiest possible public decision for the Arab leaders to make, in accepting the proposal made by the outside powers. Even though the proposed meeting might be a difficult one, and might give rise to conflicting points of view, the mere participation of the Arab States in the meeting would make them feel that they were participating as equals in a defense organization.

I described, as I had done previously, to the Foreign Minister, the history of American relationships with Latin American countries starting with the Roosevelt regime. Without great expenditure of funds on our part, we had succeeded in building a hemispheric solidarity by making the Latin American states feel that we had a genuine interest in them and friendship for them and that they participated as equals in the hemispheric system. I suggested that similarly the Middle East states could be oriented towards the West by being made to feel that they were part of a cooperative organization in which they participated as equals. Although the Foreign Minister appeared to agree to my analysis, the British Ambassador preferred the approach of “setting up a shop” previously referred to.

Mr. Nash stated that the thinking in London had been that the ultimate direction of the MEDO would be through a military representative committee in which all the countries participating, the Middle East States as well as the outside powers, were represented, and over which there would be rotating chairman. There had been discussion of a British chairman to a subsidiary planning organization of this body. The Foreign Minister did not react or appear to take any exception to this statement.

In conclusion, the Foreign Minister emphasized the necessity for sincere four power cooperation if MEDO were to be organized. He stated clearly that such cooperation had not existed in the past and made a statement, which appeared to be directed, at least in part, to the Ambassador, that certain actions which outside powers had taken in the Middle East in the past must be discontinued if the organization were to be successful. To this all present heartily agreed.

1. Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 13 from Ankara, July 7.
2. Lt. Gen. Sahap Gurler, Turkish Deputy Chief of Staff.
3. Gerald Keith, Counselor of Embassy in Turkey.
4. George H. Emery, Attaché in Turkey.
5. Regarding Tito’s conversation with Nash and Ambassador Allen on July 14, see Document 645.
6. For documentation on the Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav military talks which resulted in the signing of the Balkan Pact, see Documents 306 ff.
7. Regarding Secretary Acheson’s conversation with Foreign Secretary Eden at London in June 1952, see the editorial note, vol. v, Part 2, p. 1544.