Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

782.5 MSP/11–652

No. 468
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Turkey (McGhee)¹

secret

Ankara, October 24, 1952.

I called on the Foreign Minister on October 24, 1952 at my request. Since I had stated that the purpose of my visit was to discuss the U.S. FY 53 Turkish Mutual Security allocation, the Foreign Minister had arranged that there be present Mr. Gork, Assistant Secretary General for Economic Affairs and Secretary General for OEEC. The meeting lasted about an hour and 15 minutes.

United States Mutual Security Aid to Turkey for FY 1953:

I opened by stating that there had been considerable discussion and, I believed, misunderstanding, with respect to the allocation of funds to Turkey under the U.S. FY 53 Mutual Security Program. I wished to explain fully to the Minister the action which had been taken by our Government in this regard, which I considered to be as favorable to Turkey as was possible under the circumstances.

I explained that, as the Minister would recall, Turkey had received in FY 52 $70 million. In FY 53 a similar amount was used as an illustrative figure in the request to the Congress; however, Congress had drastically cut the total amount of economic aid requested by the Executive branch. Turkey’s share, if Turkey received a pro rata cut, would have been reduced to $49.6 million. The MSA had, in the meantime, taken the position that the final allocation of aid to all countries should await the completion of the NATO annual review and its consideration by the NAC in its December meeting.²

Starting in July the Turkish Government experienced large EPU deficits, particularly in the month of August, and had called for the immediate application of U.S. FY 1953 Mutual Security Aid against these deficits. As the Foreign Minister would recall, Mr. Porter,³ Economic Chief of the Mutual Security office in Paris, had come to Ankara to discuss this matter with the Turkish Government and had reaffirmed the policy previously stated by the MSA in both Paris and Washington that U.S. aid funds would not be available for this purpose. This did, I understood, come as a disappointment to the Turkish Government, particularly because in the previous year aid funds had been so utilized.

I wished to point out, however, that this utilization had in fact been an exception to general MSA policy. The decision in the Turk case therefore represented merely a reaffirmation of MSA policy. I pointed out that Congress had clearly intended aid funds to be used for the purchase of items shown to be in direct or indirect support of the defense effort. Since EPU deficits arose from unprogrammed imports, they might in fact be shown to result at least in part from the importation of non-defense or even non-essential items. Although the net result might be the same, Congress would not approve U.S. aid funds being allocated against the purchase of such items.

I stated to the Minister that the MSA Mission in Ankara had, at this juncture, taken a strong position with MSA in Paris and Washington in favor of immediate allocation to Turkey of as large an amount as possible, to be utilized for the purchase of essential defense items agreed between the two Governments. Although this would not alleviate the present Turk EPU position, it would enable the procurement of agreed defense items to proceed and would, insofar as these items would have been purchased by the Turkish Government, serve to minimize Turk EPU deficits in future.

As a result of our efforts the MSA had agreed to advise the Turks that their allocation for FY 53 would not be less than $45 million. Although there was some slight possibility that the final amount would be in excess of this, the Turks could not count on this possibility. I pointed out the close correspondence between this minimum figure and the figure which Turkey would be entitled to under a straight pro rata cut. I further observed that Turkey was one of only two European countries which had been advised of a firm figure for current FY 1953. I stated that consideration of any additional amounts to Turkey must await the outcome of the NATO annual review. I stated that in my judgment the decision by MSA was favorable to Turkey, and that I hoped the Foreign Minister and his Government would so consider it.

Mr. Gork thereupon entered into a rather extended and slightly ill-humored complaint of the treatment which Turkey received in allocations of aid. He stated that everyone knew Turkey had not received as much as it should have. He pointed out the various factors which he considered justified increased allocations to Turkey, i.e., military contribution, geographical location, possibilities for development, etc. He stated that the countries which had acted badly, i.e. France, received the larger allocations. People are always saying good things about Turkey, but they did not allocate to Turkey commensurate amounts of aid.

The Foreign Minister thereupon took up Mr. Gork’s argument in a somewhat similar although more reasonable vein. He pointed out that Turkey had been making great sacrifices in maintaining a large armed force ever since World War II, when other European countries were doing little. He pointed out the large investments which Turkey was making in increasing its road, railroad and harbor facilities which he said should qualify as defense expenditures along with the expenditures of the Ministry of National Defense. He suggested that aid be allocated under a more objective basis, i.e. taking into consideration the strategic location, military strength of the country concerned.

I replied with some force to the argument presented by Mr. Gork and the Foreign Minister that I would not admit that aid to Turkey had not in fact been allocated on any other than an objective basis. The criteria which determine the allocation of aid are of necessity very complex. They cannot be measured on any easy quantitative standard and must, in the final analysis, be made by the U.S., which is the only country giving such aid. Since we are doing so at very great cost to the American taxpayer, we naturally reacted to the suggestion that we were not giving enough.

Both the Foreign Minister and Mr. Gork protested that they had only meant to refer to the relative amount which Turkey got, not the actual amount, which must be an American determination.

I continued that every country to which we gave aid considered that it did not get enough, and could cite what it considered ample evidence in support of this contention. While Assistant Secretary of State I had dealt with 18 countries of which only two, Greece and Turkey, received large scale aid. The principal problem which I had with the remaining 16 was this fact.

Turkey had since 1947 received over a billion dollars worth of aid and had continued in recent years to receive aid at the rate of approximately $300 million a year. I considered that Turkey had done well. Those of us representing the U.S. in Turkey would continue to get all we could for Turkey. After the final decision had been made, however, by people in high places in our Government, such as Mr. Acheson, Mr. Harriman, and Mr. Draper, all of whom are friends of Turkey, we must ask our Turkish friends to accept the allocation as being fair and objective and in the common interest.

I had been told about the meeting between Mr. Dayton⁴ and the Prime Minister on the previous day, and had greatly appreciated the statesmanlike attitude with which the Prime Minister had reacted when Mr. Dayton advised him of the aid figure. I had been equally disappointed by the response of the Minister of Finance in a previous meeting with Mr. Dayton, which I assured the Foreign Minister had made a most unfavorable impression both on our Mission here and in Washington. I stated that if U.S. assistance, which should constitute a basis for cooperation between our countries, became instead a basis for complaint, friction and jealousy, that our common objective in Turkey could not be achieved.

The Foreign Minister hastened to assure me that there would be no bad feeling over the American aid; even if America gave no aid, Turkish friendship for America would be just as strong. He assured me that the Turks would accept the amount of aid which had been indicated with good grace and would utilize it properly. Mr. Gork made similar protestations.

1. Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch 280 from Ankara, Nov. 6.
2. For documentation on the North Atlantic Council session, held at Paris, Dec. 15–18, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 348 ff.
3. Paul R. Porter, U.S. Deputy Special Representative in Europe for Economic Affairs.
4. M. Leon Dayton, Chief of the MSA Mission in Turkey.