Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

747C.00/12–154

No. 401
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Key) to the Secretary of State¹

secret

[Washington,] December 1, 1954.

Subject:

• Cyprus Problem

Discussion:

1. The British have given us an essentially negative reaction to the idea of curtailing or avoiding discussion of the Cyprus problem through a procedural resolution, thus avoiding a substantive resolution at the General Assembly. They strongly prefer coming to grips with the issue at this session, believing that any Greek resolution, if not “softened” by well-meaning friends, can be defeated. They fear any move which would imply that the Assembly would drop the matter temporarily but consider the problem next year.

2. There is danger that, having in mind your message of last September to Churchill (Tab A),² the British will expect us actively to oppose any resolution, substantive or procedural, which they do not want adopted. You will recall that, in your recent message to Marshal Papagos,³ you informed him that we would oppose any “substantive” resolution. In that connection Greek representative Kyrou has privately given Ambassador Lodge a draft resolution which, despite his comments to Lodge, clearly appears substantive to us (Tab B).⁴

3. Ambassador Lodge has already told the UK Delegation he did not feel we could be expected to lobby actively in their behalf (Tab C).⁵ Apparently he feels, consistent with that view, we can tell others of our position without pressing them to embrace it. This point also may be misunderstood by the British.

4. The British feel that if they offer the Cypriots a liberal constitution, the communists may well take control of any self-government thus created on the island. We agree that there is some danger of this but feel that tighter restrictions by the British on the activities of the communist leaders in Cyprus would reduce that danger. We believe that the British must offer a liberal constitution providing for an assembly with an elected majority if they are to have any chance of obtaining the cooperation of the non-communist Cypriots.

Recommendations:⁶

1. That you call in the British Ambassador and, in order to make our position perfectly clear, inform him that, while we will oppose any resolution of substance, we must remain free to consider a procedural solution on its merits. You might assure the Ambassador that, if a procedural solution seems indicated, we would endeavor to exclude any implication that the problem would be considered at a subsequent session.

2. That you confirm to Sir Roger our inability to lobby actively in support of their position, though we will make our own position plain in response to inquiries from other delegations.

3. That you mention to Sir Roger that we are interested in their plans for improving the political situation on the island. Specifically we wonder whether they plan to limit the freedom of action of the key communist leaders in order to facilitate British contacts with the non-communist leaders.

1. Also from Byroade and Merchant; drafted by Mangano and Wood, cleared with Murphy, and transmitted through Scott to Dulles. A handwritten notation on the source text notes that Dulles saw it.
2. Document 385.
3. Document 396.
4. Not filed with the source text. See Document 399.
5. Not filed with the source text.
6. No indication that Dulles acted on those recommendations has been found in Department of State files.