Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

747C.00/12–154: Telegram

No. 399
The Ambassador in Greece (Cannon) to the Department of State¹

confidential

Athens, December 1, 1954—2 p.m.

1166. Reference (a) Department telegram 1238 November 24, 1954;² (b) Secretary’s letter to Prime Minister November 16, 1954;³(c) memorandum of meeting with Secretary November 12, 1954 on current aspects Cyprus problem;⁴ (d) Embassy telegram 928 October 27, 1954.⁵

Foreign Minister has handed me tentative draft resolution Cyprus question as variant of Kyrou text already known to Department.⁶ Full text in next following telegram.⁷

He says Greece would be deeply grateful for US ideas and guidance in developing final text compatible with criteria set forth in Secretary’s letter (reference (b)) and most anxious make every effort, short of withdrawing resolution, to resolve UN problem in manner consistent US policy of avoiding divisive confrontation with British. He added notwithstanding Papagos’ remark to Secretary,⁸ Greece’s position now is against postponing issue.

While this draft apparently inadequate and I left Foreign Minister in no doubt our unwillingness have hand in drafting resolution for situation we have tried so hard to avert, I believe we might persuade Greeks accept solution meeting our objectives if term “substantive resolution”⁹ interpreted along lines set forth by Secretary in reference (c) which correspond Greek interpretation and Embassy understanding US policy and objectives. In such case, suggestions set forth reference (d) still appear useful. Now is time when US can exert its influence with reasonable expectancy of achieving equitable solution. This might, for example, be in form resolution proposed by some third delegation commending Greeks and British for interest in welfare Cypriots, noting official statements indicating intention British Government offer constitutional reforms expanding area self-government and concluding with expression confidence that in ensuing months British and Cypriots supported by Greeks will cooperate in seeking orderly evolution of situation. As seen from here, developments subsequent to our earlier recommendations make more attractive alternative proposal of disposing of issue without formal resolution but after controlled debate. Could not way be found to overcome procedural difficulties?

I have not discussed these alternatives with Greek leaders and believe some persuasion would be required, but have reason to think they would at this time accept something fairly close. Greek Government badly shaken by recent phase Markezinis affair,¹⁰ setbacks in municipal elections, and ferment in opposition groups now moving toward Popular Front concept to bring Rally down. Moreover, public morale at lowest point since Rally came to power. If Papagos government further weakened outlook for US policy objectives definitely disquieting. Leaders are showing anxiety and are badly in need positive and specific guidance.

Foreign Minister says if it will help in downgrading importance of issue he would be willing not to participate in person but leave matter in hands regular delegation even though they would give him bad time with Greek public.

Embassy recommendations obviously based on assumption Secretary’s understanding of US obligation to British (reference (c)) will prevail. If on other hand, we accept interpretation set forth reference (a) US objective would not be, as Embassy has hitherto assumed, to soften or avert divisive discussion in international forum. On contrary, it seems to us here that US objective would then become attainment of clear-cut decision without much concern for how much damage is done in process.

With the possible exception of one or two men on British Ambassador’s staff, I know of no observers in Athens who would agree that this British solution will dispose of issue. I am convinced that solution based on point 5 of reference (a)¹¹ would substantially raise emotional content of issue, would tend encourage violence and would create more serious division among allies.

Cannon

1. Repeated to London, Ankara, Nicosia, and USUN in New York.
2. Telegram 1238 reported on Key’s meeting with Beeley, Nov. 22. (747C.00/11–2454)
3. Document 396.
4. Document 394.
5. Telegram 928 recommended that the United States seek British and Greek agreement to a formula whereby Greece would state its case for Cypriot self-determination, without proposing a resolution by the U.N. General Assembly. The British would restate their intention to continue talks with Cypriot representatives on adoption of a constitution expanding the area of self-government. (747C.00/10–2754)
6. Telegrams Delga 255 and 311 from New York, Nov. 18 and 30, quoted similar Greek draft resolutions. (747C.00/11–1854 and 747C.00/11–3054)
7. Telegram 1167 from New York, Dec. 1, not printed. (747C.00/12–154)
8. Regarding Papagos’ remark to Dulles, see Document 389.
9. A handwritten notation on the source text defines “substantive resolution” as “any resolution smacking of action or intervention in the affairs of Cyprus.”
10. Markezinis resigned from his position as Minister of Coordination in April 1954, reportedly over personal differences with Papagos on the extent of Markezinis’ power. In November, Markezinis withdrew from the Rally and three members of the Greek Government resigned, developments prompted by a statement of Papagos on Nov. 10 that Markezinis had made economic commitments in negotiations at Bonn in November 1953, without reporting them to Papagos. Reports on these developments were transmitted by telegram 59 from Salonika, Apr. 4 (781.00/4–454); despatch 994 from Athens, Apr. 20 (781.00/4–2054); and telegram 1028 from Athens, Nov. 12. (781.00/4–1254)
11. It reads as follows: “UK does not want its friends initiate or support any softening of terms any resolution that may be introduced by Greece.” (747C.00/11–2454)