Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

747C.00/11–1654

No. 396
The Secretary of State to Prime Minister Papagos¹

secret

[Washington], November 16, 1954.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister: The President has asked me to reply to your letter of October 23 concerning Cyprus.² He has told me of his deep concern in this matter and of his hope that it will be possible to avoid an open aggravation of the relations between our Greek and British friends. This letter is also an answer to the one you gave me during our conversation in Paris on October 23.³

I sincerely regret that there has been a misunderstanding of our position in the General Assembly on this question. We refrained from opposing the inscription of the item on the agenda because of our friendship for Greece and because of our traditional support of the principle of freedom of discussion in the General Assembly. However, we are convinced that at this time a discussion of the matter in the General Assembly or the adoption of any substantive⁴ resolution would harm the good relations between certain of our friends and allies. This to us is the most important consideration in the entire question. Thus while we have not opposed the desire of the Greek Government to bring the Cyprus question to the attention of the General Assembly, we would be compelled to oppose the passage of any substantive⁴ resolution. However, we will be glad to explore otherwise methods of reducing the tensions which are being created by this question.

The climate for endeavoring to find such methods appears to be improving. Responsible opinion in the United Kingdom now seems ready to take steps toward eventual self-government for the people of Cyprus, provided there is cooperation from the Cypriots. In Greece, I believe, there is an increased realization that the problem cannot be solved quickly, but will take time and patience. My own feeling is that lasting progress can be made only by gradual steps which will not upset allied unity and that such steps can be taken only when the British and the Cypriots are willing to meet in good faith and discuss the political problems of the island.

In seeking the best method to approach the problem, I therefore suggest that our common objective should be to encourage constructive negotiations in Cyprus. The Cypriots and the British authorities are the parties most directly concerned, and I strongly urge that your Government use its friendly influence with non-communist Cypriot leaders to encourage them to undertake serious discussions with the British authorities. We shall similarly use our own influence to encourage the British Government actively to seek such negotiations. In the future, our own feelings on the subject will be influenced by the degree of willingness with which the British authorities and the leaders of Cyprus seek to work out their common problems.

I wish to assure you that United States officials are not engaging in any lobbying activities on the Cyprus issue either in New York or Washington or other capitals.

In conclusion I would like to tell Your Excellency that the President and I sincerely admire the qualities of leadership and dedication which you have shown in serving your country and in furthering our united endeavor to give strength and stability to the free world.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

1. This letter, drafted by Wood and Baxter and cleared by Barbour, was handed to Politis, Nov. 16, for transmittal to Papagos; see the memorandum of conversation, infra.
2. See footnote 1, Document 390.
3. See footnote 3, ibid.
4. The word “substantive” was added to the draft text by Dulles; see Document 394.
4. The word “substantive” was added to the draft text by Dulles; see Document 394.