Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

747C.00/11–1654

No. 394
Memorandum of Conversation, by Philip A. Mangano of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs¹

secret

[Washington,] November 12, 1954.

Subject:

• Current Aspects of the Cyprus Problem

Participants:

• The Secretary
• Mr. Byroade, NEA
• Mr. Key, IO
• Mr. Elbrick, EUR
• Mr. Baxter, GTI
• Mr. Mangano, UNP

The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office on Friday morning, November 12.

Mr. Key began by explaining the nature of the soundings he had made with Sir Robert Scott of the UK Embassy on November 5 of British Foreign Office reactions to alternative possibilities of postponing or cutting off Assembly discussion of the Cyprus problem in order to avoid the risk that a mild resolution might be put forward and obtain two-thirds support. (See Deptel 1073, November 5 to Athens, repeated to London 2554 and USUN 245.)² In view of the Secretary’s stated desire that the Department explore ways and means of postponing or avoiding discussion of this problem at the General Assembly, it had been felt necessary to consult first of all with the British, bearing in mind the commitment made to them last September in the Secretary’s letter to Sir Winston Churchill,³ that we would “actively oppose the passage of any resolution…”.⁴

Mr. Key added that the immediate, personal reaction of Sir Robert Scott had not been promising, but we had not yet received the considered Foreign Office reaction. In the meantime it was felt essential that the Secretary reply to recent messages from Marshal Papagos making it clear that a) we had never undertaken to remain “neutral” on the substance of the Cyprus issue, b) we would feel obliged to oppose adoption of a resolution because of the resultant dangers to Western solidarity.

Mr. Byroade produced a revised draft letter to Marshal Papagos⁵ which the Secretary might hand personally to the retiring Greek Ambassador. Ambassador Politis is being replaced apparently because of failure to obtain some degree of US backing for the Greek position on Cyprus. Mr. Byroade noted that, responsive to the President’s comment,⁶ the revised draft letter to Papagos had been made less cool and abrupt. It now included a sentence alluding in general terms to our willingness to explore possible ways and means of reducing tensions aroused by this problem. In this way the message could reflect the Secretary’s awareness of Papagos’ mention of “postponement” during their conversation in Paris,⁷ without committing us at this time to work for such a procedure. Mr. Byroade urged upon the Secretary the importance, in terms of our relations with Greece, of clarifying our position to them at the earliest possible moment.

The Secretary, after refreshing his memory on the background leading up to his message of September 21 to Churchill, said that his own position had always been that, in assuring the British that we would oppose “any resolution”, he obviously meant any “substantive” resolution, i.e., any resolution smacking of action or interference in the affairs of Cyprus. He pointed out that we had also assured the British that we would “do all possible to keep any discussion to the absolute minimum”. The British could not logically expect us to oppose a resolution which would result in what we both wanted, namely the adjourning or cutting off of discussion at the current GA session.

Mr. Key and Mr. Elbrick expressed concern that, in view of the rather categorical language used in the commitment to the British, the latter might nevertheless insist on holding us to a literal interpretation of the assurance offered. Mr. Key added that the UK Embassy felt that London wanted the whole issue knocked down once and for all this year. He felt that, unless the British reacted favorably to the soundings he had made on procedure, it would be necessary, perhaps for the Secretary himself, to explain his position to the British Ambassador so that there would be no misunderstanding on that score. The Secretary agreed that his position should be explained clearly to the British in the near future, unless the Foreign Office showed willingness to consider our suggestions for avoiding full-scale discussion of the problem this year.

Mr. Elbrick observed that a “postponement” formula would be difficult for the British because it seemed to imply that the matter could properly come before the Assembly next year. The Secretary said that, while the term “postponement” was not a good one, what we were after was a way to “adjourn discussion”, or have the Assembly decide not to consider the matter further at this time. If this could be accomplished, we would have to let next year’s Assembly worry about what to do with items submitted to it at that time.

The Secretary then reviewed the proposed letter to Papagos and made a few changes, inserting the word “substantive” at several points when reference was made to our opposition to an Assembly “resolution”. He then agreed that the letter be prepared for his signature, so that he might give it to the retiring Greek Ambassador at the earliest practicable moment. The Secretary also noted that, while the British, in seeking our help, argued that they felt as strongly on Cyprus as we did on the Guatemalan problem, they had in fact given us no help on the latter problem and had abstained in the SC vote at the June 25 meeting.⁸

1. Drafted Nov. 16.
2. Document 392.
3. Document 385.
4. Ellipsis in the source text.
5. Not found in Department of State files. For text of Dulles’ letter to Papagos, Nov. 16, see Document 396.
6. Regarding Eisenhower’s comment, see footnote 4, Document 391.
7. See Document 389.
8. For documentation on the question of dealing with the Guatemalan complaint at the United Nations or in the Organization of American States, see vol. IV, pp. 1027 ff.