Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

781.5 MSP/4–2054: Telegram

No. 338
The Ambassador in Greece (Cannon) to the Department of State¹

secret

Athens, April 20, 1954—noon.

2527. Noforn. Reference: Embtel April 16 sent Department 2507.² Despite call Turkish Chargé on Director General Foreign Office Saturday³ “on instructions his government to emphasize fact Turkish-Yugoslav conversations referred only to eventual extension Ankara pact into defense alliance”, top ranking Greek civilian and military officials continue shocked and hurt at action stemming from Tito visit Ankara. Communiqué issued at close visit⁴ will probably relieve Greek Government of some public pressure, but doubtful whether it will substantially reduce resentment shared all responsible officials.

Over weekend Foreign Office spokesman issued statement to effect military alliance had from outset been recognized as natural development military discussions under Ankara pact, that Marshal Papagos had been first to speak publicly on this requirement but that question would have to be decided by Council Ministers of three participants.

Main elements Greek reaction include (1) surprise (Embassy Despatch 968, April 14⁵), (2) anger and embarrassment at what they consider to be Turkish irresponsibility and (3) conjecture regarding US position vis-à-vis Turkey on matter. While Greeks strongly object to inconsiderate action of partners in issuing statement of such importance on bilateral basis, their resentment against Turks runs deeper. In their view Greeks not Turks have most at stake in developing effective military cooperation with Yugoslavs. Turks have consistently endeavored secure political advantage with Yugoslavs by promoting alliance concept when they knew that Greece, in support US position, was endeavoring postpone action. Greeks feel that as result Turkish tactics, Greeks who have contributed most to effective military cooperation placed in anomalous position of appearing less friendly to Yugoslavs.

In Embassy view, incident has not seriously threatened Ankara pact and military discussions, but it has injected new note of urgency into problem of coordination of Turk and Greek policy and this policy with US views. We believe it may still be possible to delay further action on military alliance for about six months, but only if two things are done. First: We would have to agree that if Trieste issue is not settled this fall, we will consider necessity of separating question of Ankara pact military alliance from Italian question. Second: Identical representations should be made to all three Ankara pact nations setting forth frankly Department’s objections to excessive speed in direction of alliance. If US is not prepared take some such measures, we fear issue may soon arise in an even more pressing form. Best alternative course as we see it would be informal discussions among NATO countries with view to arriving at agreed formula for associating two pacts.

In appraising danger of lack Greek-Turkish coordination this issue, Embassy also bearing in mind fact Cyprus issue may also create serious additional burden on efforts place Turkish-Greek friendship on solid basis.

We are confidentially informed Tito will visit Athens last ten days May although public announcement will indicate June.

Cannon

1. Repeated for information to Ankara, Belgrade, Frankfurt, Paris, and Rome.
2. Telegram 2507 reported that the Greek Government was embarrassed by news reports that Yugoslavia and Turkey, during the course of a visit by Tito to the latter country, had “agreed on military alliance as part of Balkan Pact.” (781.5 MSP/4–1654)
3. Apr. 17.
4. For text of the communiqué, Apr. 16, see Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1954, p. 193.
5. Despatch 968 transmitted a memorandum of conversation between Schnee and Kyrou in Athens concerning a recent staff level tripartite military conference in Ankara. (760.5/4–1454)