760.5/2–1354: Telegram
No. 337
The Acting
Secretary of State to the Embassy
in Greece1
2460. Noforn (except Greeks). You may your discretion inform Foreign Minister Department knows no basis his reports alleging official American concern regarding position Yugoslavia (Athens telegram 20382). While Tito’s position between East and West is of course subject continuous evaluation on part this Government, and while new situation created by Malenkov’s replacement of Stalin and ostensibly new tactics on part USSR have admittedly altered international climate and resulted in some “normalization” of relations between Yugoslavia and Eastern bloc nations, US best judgment continues to be that Tito sees balance his interest in continued cooperation with West. We have no evidence that the “normalization” [Page 641] between Yugoslavia and the Eastern countries is any more than just that, and concur with Greek opinion that Yugoslav eagerness pursue military cooperation with Greece and Turkey as well as with US, UK and France is perhaps most concrete evidence that however much Tito feels his political situation requires him to adopt publicly an ostensibly equivocal position between East and West, he himself recognizes that his future is inextricably linked with West. While Djilas case has overtones in field Yugoslav-Western relations, its primary significance is internal reflecting impact on Yugoslav communist party structure of liberalizing influences of West. While initial result of Djilas downfall can be expected be negative as regards receptiveness to Western influences, we do not anticipate that this will alter basic orientation of the regime.
Regarding Yugoslav pressure for more binding military arrangements with Greece (and Turkey?), we regret that in present situation when satisfactory resolution Trieste issue remains to be worked out, we cannot usefully add to position we have already put forward (e.g. Department telegram 1937 to Athens3). We would observe however from accounts of recent military talks which Greeks have made available to US, that while very real progress has been made considerable remains to be done even on “contingent” basis. As we understand situation, the main emergency defense plan is not yet fully drafted and several subsidiary plans remain to be prepared for consideration of next Entente military discussions. We assume that even those which were prepared during the November meetings have yet to be approved by the respective general staffs, and then submitted to the three Governments for approval. Since draft master plan we have seen provides that plans will be effective as “first directive” of respective general staffs in the case of surprise attack and even in the absence of previous ratification by Governments, we suggest that there is still ample ground for further progress with the Yugoslavs under the present formula, and that the Greeks might well take the position with them that it would be premature to endeavor to alter the terms of collaboration before the potentialities of the present formula are fully exploited.
We sympathize with the Greek Foreign Minister’s belief that contingent framework no longer fully serves our common purposes, and recognize importance which Greeks and Yugoslavs attribute to a satisfactory military understanding as an integral element their mutual defense plans. Greek Government well aware political considerations within NATO as concerns Italy and certain Northern European members which make it impossible (repeat impossible) advance Greek-Yugoslav military planning beyond contingent stage [Page 642] at this time. However, solution Trieste situation would permit thorough reexamination of military situation in Balkans without all political repercussions which would result if this problem were prematurely approached.
- Drafted by Marcy; cleared in NEA, WE, GTI, and RA; and signed for Smith by Bonbright. Repeated for information to Ankara, Belgrade, Paris, Rome, and Frankfurt.↩
- supra.↩
- Document 335.↩