760.5/5–1754: Telegram
No. 339
The Secretary of
State to the Embassy in
Greece1
3260. As set forth Deptel 3171 to Athens,2 substance of position therein is furthest we can go at this time (Athens tel 2669 to Department3).
[Page 644]Subject concurrence posts directly concerned i.e. London, Rome, Belgrade, Athens and Ankara, Ambassadors Athens and Belgrade are therefore requested make démarches to Papagos and Popovic respectively along following lines and Ambassador Ankara to inform Foreign Office that démarches are being made in Athens and Belgrade, giving Turks substance thereof for their information.
Begin substance of démarches:
As Greek (Yugoslav) Government well aware, US has favored and continues fevor fullest cooperation in all fields between Greeks, Turks and Yugoslavs, with however continuing proviso that Greek and Turkish obligations to NATO be not infringed. Department convinced continued growth understanding and cooperation between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia has been one of most encouraging developments of present unsettled times and feels that continued successful development will require careful judgment and timing. Such development would contribute in our view to attainment of broad policy goals which we are all seeking. US however feels constrained to draw attention of Greek (Yugoslav) Government to fact that over-hasty furtherance of this cooperation at this time might well upset the very delicate Trieste negotiations which have now reached most sensitive moment and thus serve to perpetuate a situation which has represented a real obstacle to the development of the very relations which the three Balkan nations and the US consider are so essential in our common interests and objectives.
Specifically the US feels obligated, by reason of the responsibilities it has assumed together with Great Britain in seeking to assist Yugoslavia and Italy to resolve their problems, to call the attention of the Greek (Yugoslav) Government to the fact that the public announcement at this time of further concrete developments toward a formal alliance as between the three partners of the Balkan Entente would in all likelihood prompt a reaction in Italy, which would prejudice Italian agreement on a basis of Trieste settlement which the US and UK hope shortly to be able to discuss with Italy as a result of the London discussions.
As the Yugoslavs, of course, know, and we are pleased at this time to be able to tell the Greeks and Turks for their very private information, the US and UK believe they and Yugoslavia are very close to agreement on a basis of Trieste settlement. As now contemplated, following final understanding with the Yugoslavs the US and UK will initiate similar secret negotiations with the Italians in the hope that they may be brought to agreement on the arrangements which will have been agreed to with the Yugoslavs.
While we do not wish to argue the question of whether or not Italian reaction should be permitted to delay the development of cooperative relations between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, as a [Page 645] practical matter we must all recognize that the Italians will react strongly to any public indication at this time that Greece and Yugoslavia have reached concrete agreements looking toward the conversion at this time of the Entente into a military alliance. Having the forthcoming state visit by Marshal Tito to Athens in mind, the US Government has felt impelled to draw the foregoing considerations to the attention of our good friends the Greeks and Yugoslavs in the hope that they would find it possible so to guide their actions as to avoid creation of the situation we wish to avoid. We recognize that it is asking a great deal of both Governments, because of the substance of the issues involved as well as because of the public atmosphere of expectancy which has developed concerning Marshal Tito’s visit. We would hope nonetheless that in any communiqué issued at the termination of Marshal Tito’s visit, both sides would find it possible to limit themselves to statements containing specific reservations as to timing. (Ankara’s 11824) If reference to the public proposal for the creation of a military alliance which developed following Marshal Tito’s visit to Ankara is considered essential, it might be appropriate for the communiqué to state that the Greek and Yugoslav sides had agreed in principle but that such a proposal would be a proper item for further discussion at the meeting of the Entente Foreign Ministers which we understand is scheduled for July.
In asking the Greek and Yugoslav Governments to take these considerations into account, the US is confident that Marshal Papagos and Marshal Tito will receive our counsel in the spirit it is offered, and will display that degree of high statesmanship for which each is increasingly known and admired. In our considered judgment only by exercising restraint as regards immediate issues, in the interest of our common and more basic long range objectives, can we make real progress towards those objectives. End of substance of démarches.
Paris and London are requested inform respective Foreign Offices of foregoing démarches pointing out that our action does not go to substance of issues involved, which has been subject French démarche here5 and will be discussed in separate telegram. We contemplate asking Rome, providing Greek and Yugoslav responses present démarches are satisfactory, and only after Tito arrives in Athens, to inform Scelba on highly confidential basis that we have spoken with Greeks and Yugoslavs along these lines, pointing out to him that nonetheless Greeks and Yugoslavs will have to issue [Page 646] some form communiqué following Tito visit, and soliciting his cooperation in urging members his government to moderation in any public statements they may feel impelled to make.
Department has no objection, re paragraph 2 Athens telegram 2669 to Department, Athens and Ankara informing Foreign Offices of US position on EDC matter as put to Yugoslavs by Riddleberger (Belgrade telegram 1198 to Department6).
- Drafted by Marcy; cleared in NEA/GTI, WE, EUR, BNA, and G; and signed for the Secretary by Barbour. Repeated for action to Ankara, Belgrade, London, and Paris, and for information to Rome and USPolAd Trieste.↩
- Telegram 3171, May 6, reiterated the U.S. view that the Balkan Pact should be encouraged without causing conflict within NATO. (760.5/5–654)↩
- Telegram 2669, May 10, reported that Papagos felt compelled to “match” the Turk-Yugoslav position on a military alliance during the forthcoming visit of Tito to Greece, and that Papagos no longer felt able to propound the U.S. position on the Balkan Pact. (668.81/5–1054)↩
- Telegram 1182, May 11, reported that the Turks were very anxious that a Yugoslav-Greek communiqué following Tito’s visit to Greece confirm the Turkish statement that transforming the Ankara Pact into a military alliance was only a matter of timing. (760.5/5–1154)↩
- According to a memorandum of conversation between Ruffin of the French Embassy and Leverich of EE, May 11, the French Government proposed that the United States, United Kingdom, and France form a tripartite committee of experts in London to discuss a common position on the question of a Balkan military pact. (668.81/5–1154)↩
- Not printed.↩