750G.00/8–1654
No. 240
The Ambassador in Yugoslavia
(Riddleberger) to the Chief United States
Negotiator in London (Thompson)1
official informal
Dear Tommy: Returning to Belgrade from Bled, where we put the Balkan Alliance safely to bed,2 I found your letter of August 33 awaiting me. I hope that the conclusion of the Alliance will not make our joint endeavors on Trieste more difficult than they have been. In any case, the Balkan Alliance was bound to come and although I think that in May we deferred it with good reason in hopes of getting a Trieste settlement, it was wise that the Alliance was not again postponed. Its signing seems to have evoked considerable anguish in the Italian press, but that may be only a passing phenomena.
I have read very carefully your letter of August 3, and I agree with you that if we could have sat down together some of the misunderstanding would have been eliminated. It is indeed unfortunate that it has not been possible to arrange for more personal contact between Belgrade and London. I have been reluctant, however, to propose sending Woodie4 in face of the refusal which we encountered when this was suggested last winter. In view of subsequent developments, this now seems an excess of caution, particularly as I have learned that Rome dispatched an officer to confer with you before commencing your negotiations with Brosio. I still think that a trip by Woodie would have been useful as you and he could have exchanged views on the best method of tackling the Yugoslavs on [Page 500] the second round with them. When I recall that Luce has betaken herself home twice since October 8, your long experience in Italian affairs, and the impossibility of telephoning, I am all the more ready to agree that a conversation would have been helpful. I am still mystified why we made the approach to the Yugoslavs in the manner we did, but I am the first to admit that I cannot judge this strategy in the overall sense from where I sit on the Middle Danube. We have always recognized that it might be necessary to go back to the Yugoslavs, but I should have thought this approach would have been prepared with all the skill and finesse of which we are capable.
Turning to the territorial aspects, I think we must remember the tremendous efforts which were made, particularly in London and Belgrade, to get the Yugoslavs to agree to a line which was essentially what we had proposed. Perhaps this is our real disagreement, but if you will review the earlier telegrams you will see how close it is. It is certainly not a Yugoslav line. I certainly had the impression that having gotten Yugoslav agreement we would go all out to obtain Italian acquiescence. I note your comment that we had not exerted maximum pressure at the time my message was written. I am happy to hear that we are now exerting pressure on the Italians. Where is this being applied? Perhaps more is going on in Rome than I realize and today Woodie has gone there where he will no doubt obtain additional information and background. I quite agree that we want an agreement which will improve Italian-Yugoslav relations, but when I recall how we used the whip on Koca Popovic to get the proposed territorial arrangement, I fear that if the problem can only be solved by additional Yugoslav territorial concessions, then the settlement will be an unhappy one in any event.
I some times wonder if there is a real understanding of how small these territorial changes are. When in Trieste recently I got Randy5 to drive me around the area in question and must say that the Italians are making a great holler over very little. Lazzaretto might be called “the old swimming hole” but could hardly be characterized in any higher category. The Triestinos see either Zone B or Yugoslavia proper every time they have a clear view in a southeastern direction. Therefore, I think it is fair to say that on these little strips both sides are equally unreasonable.
I did not mean to imply in my telegrams you were personally being pro-Italian, and I regret that you have such strong resentment. The point I was trying to make was that we should apply pressure to the Italians on territory comparable to that which we [Page 501] put on the Yugoslavs. I gather from your own letter that you agree this was not done, at least at the time I wrote my message. Therefore, it seems to me that there is no cause for resentment. This is basically an argument over tactics in which I, like you, am interested in finding a settlement that will be accepted. Your recommendations on tactics have been adopted, and we shall support them fully with the Yugoslavs. I hope you are right in your analysis in which case everything will come out all right. But it would be a great pity to miss a settlement through failure to apply pressure where pressure can be justifiably brought to bear.
I must tell you frankly that I do not share your view that we were on the verge of settlement given the outstanding territorial difficulties. We tried several times to direct your and the Department’s attention to this point. But again I recognize this as a matter of judgment, and I cannot be cognizant of all aspects affecting Italy. My experience with that country is absolutely nil except to report upon its pro-Nazi policy during the Hitler days. I watched the Italian gyrations from Berlin, and they were highly educational. Perhaps this experience has given me a certain skepticism on Italian reliability, but I cannot agree with you that Italian behavior is any better than Yugoslav. I think they are both equally deplorable.
I fully agree with you that we must worry about the possibility of an Italian public explosion. My concern on this is, however, somewhat diminished as I read the press telegrams from Rome which give me the impression that everything is being discussed in public anyhow.
. . . . . . .
I am sorry that the argument took place when you were so discouraged over the negotiations and the effect of the delays on your personal life. I sympathize with anyone who is ticked off for this negotiation, which I have always thought would be a lengthy one. It is not as bad as the German Debt Conference on which I worked steadily for over 13 months, but I confess it can be just as discouraging.
It is a shame about your home leave, and I hope you can still manage to get it this year. Perhaps if we could devise a good compromise plan and put on a heavy drive, both in Belgrade and Rome, we might push it over. This, in my opinion, can only be settled in Washington where the decisions on how to bring pressure on the Yugoslavs must ultimately be made.
With best regards,
As ever,
- The source text indicates that a copy of the letter was also sent to Hooker.↩
- For documentation on the signing of the Balkan Alliance by Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia on Aug. 9, see Documents 306 ff.↩
- Document 231.↩
- Woodruff Wallner.↩
- H. Randolph Higgs.↩