I have at long last gotten my security clearance and hope it will
mean getting into the field soon. At this late stage in the
Trieste negotiations I refrain from making the suggestion I
might have made earlier, that Leonard2 and I
switch places. I have a feeling that at this point the
continuity should be maintained and that he will be able to
serve you better than I could.
You have been having a hell of a time, and I am sorry for
you.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by Robert G. Hooker of the Bureau of
European Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs (Merchant)4
top
secret
[Washington,]
August
13, 1954.
Subject:
- Possible Necessity of Forcing Settlement of Trieste
Question on Yugoslavia and Italy.
The territorial issue remains deadlocked with the Italians
insisting on a minor (in terms of area only) rectification
in their favor at
[Page 496]
the Western (Adriatic) end of the line and the Yugoslavs so
far unresponsive to our démarche of
July 29. The issue of reparations turns on the territorial
question and can be settled if the Yugoslavs meet the
Italian territorial request. We do not know whether the
Yugoslavs will accept the maximum of $10 million which the
Italians will offer if they cannot get the territorial
concession they want.
In the meantime, the Yugoslavs have stiffened their position
on minorities and the Italians under Thompson’s pressure have
“gone far” to meet the Yugoslav position. But Thompson reports that at
the meeting on August 9, when the Italian redraft of the
minorities statute was presented to the Yugoslavs, while it
was not rejected, “there were many indications that
Velebit had been
instructed to take a stiffer position on outstanding
issues”. The Italian Minister in Belgrade reports a “rather
aggressive attitude” on the part of the Yugoslavs. Thompson in a recent letter
expresses the opinion that the Italians have so far “behaved
better” than the Yugoslavs.
Thus we are faced with the possibility that while the gap
remains unclosed between the Italians and the Yugoslavs on
territory and reparations, the gap on the various other
issues may prove increasingly difficult to close and as to
some of them may even become wider.
This raises the question whether at some point, in order to
prevent the possibility of a settlement slipping away
entirely, the US–UK may be forced to determine what its
terms should be, and, if they can, force the Yugoslavs and
Italians to accept it. But we should understand clearly what
is involved in trying to force a settlement and should be
prepared to face the consequences.
It is logical to begin by asking what conclusions should be
drawn from the failure of our attempt to impose a solution
on October 8, 1953. Tito’s violent rejection of a solution which
he had previously (albeit over a year before) told Eden he could accept,
points to one major conclusion: He cannot accept a
settlement which is publicly imposed upon him, at least
when, by its nature, it is unpopular and when he has had no
opportunity to prepare opinion among the public and among
his supporters.
Since the Italians accepted October 8, the only conclusion as
to them that can be drawn is that they would again if the
conditions of that time were reproduced. What the Scelba Government could be
forced to accept today is hard to judge. We need not take
literally the Italian statement that any settlement must be
an improvement on October 8, since their counter-proposals,
including the rectification in their favor of the May 31
line, add up to something less favorable than October 8,
both as to territory and because it involves the assumption
of obligations, with at best the appearance
[Page 497]
of reciprocity as to some of
them, which were not involved in October 8 at all. The real
test would be whether all the elements in the Scelba coalition would take
the view attributed to Scelba and Piccioni as
an unconfirmed hypothesis in Rome’s 162 of July 13 that they
“have made up their minds to acceptance if they cannot
obtain any Yugoslav accommodation on the Italian
counter-proposals since they may have been impressed by the
Foreign Office briefings that Italy will never have a better
opportunity to solve the problem in the foreseeable
future”.
We must also take into consideration the rather plausible
suggestion that each side may expect us at some point to
insist on the acceptance of a solution to which it has not
yet agreed. This might well minimize the responsibility of
each government in agreeing to a solution that cannot be
popular, the more so since neither need know the extent of
any pressure put on the other. Since the major issue is
territorial and there is no middle ground between the two
positions (or rather the Italian position really represents
a middle ground), it would seem most desirable that no
matter what the nature of the solution we seek to impose, we
make every effort to hide from the side making the lesser
concessions the extent of our pressure on the other
side.
But how far can we go in “forcing” a solution? It is
axiomatic that we should make no threats that we are not
prepared to carry out. Threats to withdraw economic or
military aid would seem to be ones we could not carry out
without adding further damage to our security interests (the
real basis of all our foreign aid) beyond the harm resulting
from the failure to reach a settlement. Such threats
therefore would be ones either Italy or Yugoslavia might
feel safe in defying. On the whole, threats are not
congenial to us and do not comport well with the role of
democratic leadership which the President recently described
with emphasis on the element of partnership. They should be
avoided if at all possible. Our first démarche should therefore omit any threat. We
should make representations at the highest level, in the
strongest terms of insistences, without any reference to any
action we might take if our requirements are not met.
If our démarche is to the Yugoslavs
and they reject it, and we then ask them in a second démarche to reconsider, at this
stage, having exhausted the possibilities of negotiation
without threats, we could say that if they continue to
refuse we will implement October 8 regardless of the
consequences. It is possible Tito would yield, since the proposed
solution even on the basis of the Italian counter-proposals
is better than October 8. Put at worst this gambit could
involve us in war, with Tito in immediate possession of Trieste. We
would then have to choose between accepting a fait accompli
[Page 498]
and prosecuting
the war with the certainty that Tito’s quarrel with the Kremlin would be
settled, and the almost intolerable risk of general war.
A second alternative would be to threaten the complete
stoppage of military and economic aid. Tito might well then move
closer to the Kremlin, and the Balkan Pact could lose much
of its value.
Alternatively, we could ask Tito to reconsider and either threaten to
make or actually put into effect immediately such partial
reductions in military and economic aid as we consider
possible without undue damage to our own security interests
or driving Tito out
of the alliance. At worst we would still be in Trieste and
our relations with Tito (as well as the Italians) would have
deteriorated greatly, but we would not be at war.
Fourthly, we could accept the Yugoslav refusal and try to
force the Italians also to accept the Yugoslav position,
specifically, the May 31 line.
If it is from the Italians that we initially demand the major
concession (i.e. acceptance of the May 31 line), the chances
of our having to make a second démarche involving threats are probably less. But
if they should refuse our request the chances of their
taking a public position which might make it impossible for
any Italian government to yield to threats are much greater.
Moreover, they would probably demand, and might demand
publicly, the implementation of October 8. Tito would almost certainly
be prepared to go to any lengths to prevent this. If we
refused the Italian demand the negotiations would have
irrevocably failed, and our relations with the Italians
would be as bad as possible short of war and not much better
with the Yugoslavs.
Thompson says the
Italians “are more interested now (than the Yugoslavs) in
obtaining a settlement”, but in his view it is “to the
Yugoslavs’ best interest to make the small concession we
have asked them to make. If we get it we can, I think, get a
good agreement; if not, it will be anything but a good
agreement and one likely to lead to bad relations between
the two countries.”
The logic of the foregoing points to making another effort to
get Tito to yield on
the territorial issue, and without threatening him to make
plain that if he turns us down, while we may still get a
settlement, it will not in our opinion contribute to the
strength of the area as it should, that the fault will be
his, and that while we have no intention of cutting off
military or economic aid, he must recognize that he will
cease in our eyes to be in the “deserving” category. We
should add that if we do not get a settlement we will
consider that the major responsibility is his.
If this démarche fails, we should then
try to get the Italians to make the necessary concessions to
secure a settlement. Our démarche
[Page 499]
to the Italians
should include an indication that we appreciate that the
major sacrifice will have been theirs and that we will in
all legitimate ways take account of this fact in our future
policy, subject to our prime objective of seeking to make
the settlement a success and to bring an end to the bad
relations between Italy and Yugoslavia.
Before making any decision we must of course get Ambassador
Thompson’s views,
and consult with the British.
