750G.00/8–354
No. 231
The Chief United States
Negotiator in London (Thompson) to the Ambassador in
Yugoslavia (Riddleberger)
Dear Jimmy: I don’t know if there is much purpose in continuing our argument but it might be helpful for your background if I at least made some answer to the points contained in yourtel 23 [33] of July 20.1 The territorial proposal we made was to move the boundary back a kilometer or so on the Muggia Peninsula. The exact line we settled on, however, was a result of Velebit endeavoring to push it much farther to the North. It is true that we had mentioned Punta Settile but my point is that the line we had proposed was not this exact line but one more feasible to the Italians. In drawing the line I repeatedly said to Velebit that I was not a geographer and that we would have to be free to consider minor changes in the line. We also made quite clear that we would not consider ourselves bound by their statement that they had made the maximum concessions and when he talked of putting this in writing we told him if he did we would also protect our position by stating we could not be bound by these proposals until we had heard from the Italians. In the recent discussions Velebit not only has never denied this but has never suggested in any way that we were guilty of bad faith. We did agree to press the territorial proposal on the Italians and have done so. You have a valid point that at the time your message was written we had not exerted maximum pressure. I am completely convinced, however, that we should not have done so without at least going back to the Yugoslavs with the Italian counter-proposal. I am also convinced that it would have been to the Yugoslav’s best interest to make the small concessions [Page 486] we have asked them to make. If we get it we can, I think, get a good agreement, if not, it will be anything but a good agreement and one likely to lead to bad relations between the two countries. Quite apart from the fact that the Yugoslavs will probably have to forego a considerable amount of reparations. I have never meant to suggest that this minor change would be easy to obtain but I am equally convinced that we are right in pressing for it.
So far as your suggestions of the way to handle going back to them are concerned I suppose I or the Department should have answered this as such. I did not do so myself as I thought the telegrams exchanged with the Department and Trieste spoke for themselves and were convincing in making clear that none of them with the possible exception of additional economic aid, on which I was not competent to speak, were feasible.
Your messages hit me at a time when I was very discouraged not only over the negotiations but also the effect these delays were having on my personal life and plans, and I should tell you frankly I bitterly resented the implication that we were being pro-Italian and anti-Yugoslav in the way we were handling the matter. I do not think this was justified. I quite agree that if we could have sat down together and talked this over we could have at least dispelled part of the misunderstanding but the pouch takes so long that I did not feel at any one time that anything I could write you to supplement my telegrams would have been useful by the time the letter arrived. Looking back this was probably a mistake but we have constantly felt we were on the verge of a settlement. I do think the Italians have up to now behaved better than your clients for the reason that they doubtless are more interested now in obtaining a settlement. They, at least, spared us several months useless argument by refraining from starting from their extreme position. We have been careful to keep strong pressure on the Italians by not letting them know that we are still trying to improve the territorial settlement but we have to worry about the possibility that they will explode in public and our chances for a settlement will be completely ruined. I imagine the issue will have been decided by the time you have received this and my guess is that our chances are somewhat better than even. If your clients don’t give an inch we may still be able to bring the Italians into line but I would not want to put any money on it.
. . . . . . .
To add to my miseries the Department is pulling out Charlie Yost almost immediately. I was not consulted and learned of it only from him. In the circumstances and because of the impossibility [Page 487] of changing again the plans of Jane’s family and mine for the fifth time I have finally decided to defer my home leave until next spring. It is not practical for us to go in the winter but this will mean that we will have been away for five years. You can imagine that my morale is not as high as it might be. If on top of all of this we don’t succeed I shall probably add another ulcer to my collection.
All the best,
Sincerely yours,
- Reference is presumably to telegram 314 from London, July 19, repeated to Belgrade as telegram 33. This message is briefly summarized in footnote 1, Document 228.↩