Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

763.00/2–2754: Telegram

No. 917
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Austria¹

top secret

Washington, March 12, 1954—7:27 p.m.

2643. Re Embtel 2202.² Following views may be helpful in connection Embassy’s consideration occupation alleviation and, if Embassy agrees, in discussion with British, French and later Austrians.

1. Believe next tripartite step should be preparation in Vienna of report to UN with timing presentation to be decided later (Deptel 2498³).

2. Unilateral U.S. action to return to Austrian control Linz and Salzburg radio stations, conclude new agreement freight and communication rates, and housing program resulting from studies we understand are under way should serve somewhat reduce tensions resulting from failure conclude treaty Berlin.

3. Concur desirability retaining Control Agreement as protection Austria long as Soviet troops remain. Article 8a Control Agreement provides means however seeking redefinition functions troops and four-power action might be initiated thereunder with view making presence occupation troops less oppressive to Austrians. We understand specific proposals this nature are in preparation and will be interested in whatever you can develop with General Arnold.

4. Pension and heirless property questions now seem so near solution we are reluctant remove pressure at possibly decisive time. However if restitution settled, or well under way to settlement, and if necessary do something about review Austrian legislation, three alternatives seem possible (appreciate further Embassy comment).

a. U.S. or three West Powers declare intent approve all outstanding laws, constitutional or otherwise, and make known general policy of abstaining from veto;

b. initiate action in AC to permit all Austrian laws to go into effect in 31 days unless, on basis official gazette publication, they are brought up in AC where present rules would apply (c) formal revision Article 6 to end review (would this necessarily endanger whole Control Agreement?).

5. Raab’s statement (Vienna’s 2183⁴) that he does not intend raise troop withdrawal is welcome but not convincing in view Embtel 2228.⁵ Overall troop reduction is aspect alleviation which would have greatest popular impact. Should Austrian pressures force AC consideration this problem, proposal suggested paragraph 2(a) Embtel 2049⁶ might be useful basis for West proceed discussion reduction of forces. Our conditions would remain as stated Tosec 42,⁷ Tosec 59,⁸ Dulte 62⁹ and Tedul 43¹⁰ (latter two messages being repeated Vienna). Formula proposed should protect our present strength in Austria until Soviets reduce to our level and require increase Austrian forces proceed satisfactorily commensurate with overall reduction.

6. We welcome assurance Austrian leaders (Vienna’s 2202) that bilateral negotiations with Soviets will not be undertaken without prior consultation West powers (see CA 1289, September 5, 1953¹¹ subject transfer USIA complex to Austria prior treaty settlement). Under circumstances we believe consideration should be given to exploring tripartitely and with Austrians possibility seeking four-power settlement German assets question with Austrian participation bearing in mind (1) Austria’s plea for alleviation economic burdens; (2) professed Soviet desire meet Austrian wishes for alleviation as evidenced by proposal amend Article 35; (3) Western withdrawal offer accept Soviet proposed amendment Article 35, our offer having been conditioned on conclusion treaty as whole at Berlin; and (4) our desire seek alleviation more extensive than that proposed by Soviets (see BER D–3a¹²); (5) Austrian refusal pay Soviet price for German assets without ending military occupation; and (6) Austrian desire for protection against German demands. If Soviet proposal for payment in goods considered, agreement should be sought for West participation determination quantities and types goods to be furnished. Scope these negotiations might subsequently be enlarged to encompass other aspects treaty problem if any indication Soviet readiness make concessions without imposing dangerous price on Austria.

Defense concurs.

Smith

1. Drafted by J. W. Jones, Appling, and E. P. Allen and cleared by Bonbright and the Department of Defense. Repeated to London, Paris, and Moscow.
2. Document 915.
3. Telegram 2498 stated that the Department of State considered a tripartite report to the United Nations on the Austrian Treaty desirable and instructed the first draft to be written by Embassy officials in Vienna. (763.0221/2–2554)
4. Document 913.
5. Telegram 2228 reported Raab’s press interview of Mar. 2 in Vienna. (663.001/3–354)
6. Not printed. Paragraph 2 (a) reads as follows: “Gradual establishment of Austrian armed forces up to level envisaged in treaty draft, and step by step withdrawal of occupation forces as Austrian forces come into being.” (663.001/2–1454)
7. Tosec 42 recommended opposition to the British and French suggestion that the West propose a reduction to token forces in Austria and stressed that the gendarmérie was presently inadequate. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 211)
8. Not printed, but see footnote 4, Document 378.
9. Document 454.
10. Telegram 43 reported the concurrence of the JCS with the views outlined in Dulte 62 concerning the reduction of forces in Austria. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 212)
11. CA 1289 noted the approval by the Department of State of the Embassy’s recommendation that the Austrian Government be clearly informed of the U.S. position on the pre-treaty return of USIA properties to Austrian control. (663.001/8–1353)
12. Not printed. It was one of the position papers prepared for use at the Berlin Conference.