663.001/3–2454: Telegram
No. 918
The Acting United States High
Commissioner for Austria (Yost) to the Department of State1
2412. Three acting HICOMs (Payart now in Paris) met today with Raab, Schaerf, Figl and Kreisky who informed us of desire Austrian Government to seek resumption treaty negotiations through vehicle four HICOMs sitting in Vienna with participation Austrian representatives. Figl argued:
- (1)
- For sake Austrian public morale some means must be found to restart negotiations which could well be stalled indefinitely if we await Soviets fixing date for troop withdrawal and
- (2)
- While negotiations would not produce treaty, they might result in partial agreements, e.g. on German assets, which would bring about substantial alleviation for Austria. Austrians suggested they might despatch note to four powers proposing resumption negotiations in Vienna, or alternatively that three western powers, or US as power which had at Berlin rejected Molotov’s suggestion to this effect, might wish to take initiative.
Chancellor repeated assurances previously given that Austrian Government will not accept treaty which involves continued occupation, and that it desires control agreement to remain in force as [Page 1957] long as occupation continues. Figl and Kreisky both emphasized dangers bilateral Austro/Soviet negotiations on German assets or other subjects falling within scope of treaty, but insisted Austrian Government would not be able wholly to reject this expedient if no other channel of negotiation were open. Kreisky referred to what he considered to be firm assurances three western Ministers at Berlin that, if no treaty there forthcoming, some means would be found to keep negotiations alive.
Being asked to comment, I said I must of course consult my government but felt their first reaction might be serious doubt whether there is advantage to be gained in reopening treaty negotiations when treaty is clearly unobtainable, thereby giving Soviets opportunity to appear conciliatory when they have in fact no intention of being so. Referring to second point made by Figl, however, I inquired whether it would not serve Austrian purpose as well if HICOMs and Austrian representatives were charged with negotiating not treaty but alleviation burdens of occupation arising from absence of treaty. Austrians agreed they would be satisfied with this formula, that important point is that negotiations be undertaken and progress be made in settling problems falling within scope of treaty draft. They promised us written memo setting forth their views.
To French query whether it was worthwhile raising question in advance of Geneva,2 Austrians replied matter might be informally discussed with Molotov at Geneva. I expressed view US Government would oppose introduction European issues at Geneva and Austrians themselves would hardly wish to involve their problem with Korea and Indochina. British strongly concurred, as did French and Austrians somewhat less firmly.
Comment: If Austrians are in fact willing to modify their proposal along lines suggested, it would seem to fit in with our intention to push forward alleviations, with Department’s suggestion for German assets settlement set forth paragraph 6 Deptel 2643,3 and with our earnest desire to forestall bilateral Austrian/Soviet negotiations. Austrians seem in fact to have offered us opportunity to keep problem of alleviations firmly in our hands without obliging us to appear obstructive or mistrustful of their good faith. British and French here will almost certainly recommend acceptance. There is some question whether best vehicle for negotiation would be AC itself, four HICOMs acting outside AC, or four Ambassadors, though British and French inclined to favor second. We shall comment [Page 1958] more fully on this and other aspects of question when Austrian memo received.