763.00/2–2754: Telegram
No. 915
The Acting United States High
Commissioner for Austria (Yost) to the Department of State1
2202. Reference Embtel 2159.2 Conversations with leading members of Austrian Government and two coalition parties during past week indicate that, while government’s post-Berlin policy not yet fully formulated, present inclination of leaders both parties is to seek alleviations through early bilateral negotiations with Soviets. Austrian leaders apparently feel they have no alternative to such course since (1) public opinion will demand they continue efforts to liberate Austria (2) Soviets are principal obstacle to liberation and hence in position to confer major benefits. Theoretical alternative [Page 1951] of aggressive anti-Soviet policy Austrians reject as raising old spectre of partition. Austrian leaders assure us, however, they would not undertake bilateral negotiations without prior consultation with Western powers.
Both Figl and Kreisky have also urged resumption of five-power treaty negotiations, but it is likely they regard these as supplement rather than alternative to, in their eyes, more promising bilateral negotiations in which Soviets would be in position of making concessions to Austrians rather than to West. With perennial optimism Austrian leaders, in this case Socialists as well as People’s Party, seem to hope for some alleviations from Soviets, particularly in Austrian control of its own frontiers and restoration some USIA properties. Austrians increasingly concerned about economic and political effects of prolonged Soviet possession USIA factories.
Our discussions with General Arnold, British, French, and Austrians have led us to conclusion that alleviations which West could safely accord are extremely meagre. Two principal fields explored were troop reduction and revision of control agreement.
As to first, General Arnold believes, and we concur, that any significant reduction in his present forces would render them incapable of performing assigned mission and open whole of Austria in case of war to immediate Soviet occupation. We doubt that propaganda benefits, either in Austria or elsewhere, to be derived from reduction warrant incurring such risk. We shall therefore endeavor persuade Austrians not to raise this issue publicly and, if they do, would recommend our line be that Soviets first reduce to Western level before we consider reduction. French HICOM strongly supports this attitude though British somewhat more uncertain. Austrian leaders seem inclined not press this issue for present though Chancellor’s future attitude still ambiguous. We should however recommend Department and Defense continue study possible reduction in unlikely event Soviets should make proposal or Austrian pressure become serious.
As to control agreement, British and French HICOMs and Chancellor agree with us that it constitutes important protection for Austria as long as Soviet troops remain and should not be tampered with. We shall endeavor maintain this position. Other Austrian leaders however will continue urge revision, particularly abolition review of Austrian legislation, and it is conceivable heavy pressure may be built up. We are studying possible procedural changes which would assuage Austrian dignity without affecting text agreement. We must also keep in mind that Soviets may in line with Molotov’s Berlin proposals, suggest scrapping control agreement, which would probably attract Austrian public opinion and create difficult situation for us.
[Page 1952]It is clear that Austrians will negotiate with Soviets on German assets, trade agreement, and control of goods and persons across their frontiers. Soviets have in their power to grant substantial alleviation and to exact economic and perhaps political quid pro quo. As indication inherent advantages their bargaining position, leaders both parties have intimated to us that proposal to join Council of Europe, which before Berlin had overwhelming parliament support, will now be shelved for time being to avoid provoking Soviets.
There are still few measures pending in AC, such as civil aviation, limitation allied arrest and court jurisdiction over Austrian nationals, and elimination controls over Austrian police, which we shall continue to press but progress depends on Soviets. Chancellor anxious for approval pending constitutional laws but our concurrence still dependent on heirless property settlement. Unilateral alleviations meagre and uncertain though hope rail rate problem can be quickly solved and continuing progress made in housing. Latter offers prospect substantial alleviation without troop reduction if stockpile and other problems can be solved.
Dilemma confronting West powers in Austria is following: Since they have little more to concede and Soviets have much, Austrians are inevitably led to bargain with Soviets for liberation or alleviation. This bargaining will be bilateral unless West promptly reopens five-power treaty negotiations. Such negotiations, if reopened, seem condemned to sterility until Soviets are ready to withdraw troops. Bilateral Austro-Soviet negotiations might achieve more immediate partial results but could lead Austrians to excessive and dangerous concessions which West could not wholly prevent.
We would wish to explore more thoroughly attitude of Austrian leaders before making definitive recommendation on this question. Our present inclination is first to let Austrians probe Soviet willingness to negotiate and, if it develops willingness exists, thereafter to propose renewal five-power negotiations. Risk in this procedure is that, if Austro-Soviet negotiations should progress to their common satisfaction, both might later be unwilling to shift to broader forum.