Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

763.0221/2–1554: Telegram

No. 912
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference¹

top secret
niact

London, February 15, 1954—3 p.m.

113. For Merchant from Thompson.² Despite February 13 statement of Austrian Government still hope we can make at least some progress on Austrian question at Berlin. Tactics followed and Secretary’s devastating exposure of Soviet aims³ leave us in excellent propaganda position and will have effect of continuing pressure on Soviets to conclude treaty. Realize any agreement on our part to keep troops in Austria would weaken this pressure for complete Austrian independence. Hard fact, however, in my opinion is that such pressure likely be ineffective. I cannot judge effect of agreement re Austria on German question and recognize my views may have little value. Wish point out, however, that if present situation continues most likely developments are eventual Austrian-Soviet bilateral arrangements or Austrians following dangerous policy of needling Soviets in efforts force issue in hope achieving independence.

Also wish emphasize that the fact Soviets have not fully exploited their present possibilities does not mean there would not be real advantage in removing some of these by agreement. For example, they could reinstitute zonal controls, step up Communist infiltration and control of police in Soviet sectors and zone and by a kind of creeping paralysis make it very difficult for us to have showdown on any one issue or action. Following is rough outline of kind of agreement I believe would in long run be advantageous if it could be achieved and Austrian Government agreed.

(1) Instructions to Deputies to conclude draft treaty with reduction in amount to be paid for German assets and if possible restoring oil fields to Austria against payment specific amount of oil which might be estimate of production less liberal allowance Austrian needs.

(2) Negotiation agreement with Austrian Government on status of Allied troops.

(3) Problem of Vienna to be handled either by maintenance Allied Kommandatura or provision against stationing armed forces within given distance from city.

(4) Question of provisions against military alliance to be deferred until agreement reached for withdrawal of troops but Austrians allowed to conclude bilateral undertaking with Soviets to effect they would not enter any alliance prior to conclusion agreement withdrawal foreign troops. In return for which Austria allowed to rearm up to treaty standard or at least expand gendarmérie.

(5) Refusal to consider any provisions re Trieste.

If foregoing not possible on grounds which I recognize I am not in position to judge, hope we can at least leave open some such possibility as that suggested in Vienna’s 63.⁴

Since I am not in touch with current situation in Austria, do not suggest much weight should be given foregoing views, but offer them merely in hope they may assist in making difficult decisions which must now be taken.

Aldrich

1. Repeated to Vienna and Washington. The source text is the copy in Department of State files.
2. Thompson was in London to serve as the Chief U.S. Negotiator for the three-power talks between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia concerning Trieste which continued from February through May 1954.
3. Reference to Secretary Dulles’ speech of Feb. 2. See Secto 70, Document 407.
4. Supra.