663.001/2–1454: Telegram
No. 911
The Acting United States High
Commissioner for Austria (Yost) to the United
States Delegation at the Berlin Conference1
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63. On assumption that agreement on Austrian treaty in Berlin is impossible, we presume US delegation considering means of avoiding total and indefinitely prolonged impasse on this question. We submit following suggestions as one possible device for gradual liberation of Austria or at least, if Soviets should turn it down, for demonstrating even more clearly their complete disregard of Austrian rights and interests.
- 1.
- Declaration to be issued by four Ministers at Berlin embodying first five articles of Austrian treaty draft and stating that any violation of terms of these articles would be matter of joint concern to four powers.
- 2.
- Instructions to be issued by four Ministers at Berlin to four
High Commissioners in Vienna to negotiate, within framework of
control agreement and in conjunction with Austrian Government:
- (a)
- Gradual establishment of Austrian armed forces up to level envisaged in treaty draft, and step by step withdrawal of occupation forces as Austrian forces come into being;
- (b)
- Settlement of economic clauses of treaty, along lines of treaty draft but with due regard for Austrian Government’s request for alleviation burden of Article 35.
- 3.
- Decision by four Ministers at Berlin to resume Austrian treaty negotiations, through whatever channel seems most appropriate, as soon as task assigned to High Commissioners has been carried out.
We realize that this suggestion draws us immediately into delicate question of withdrawal of forces. Since this is however heart of Austrian problem, it cannot long be avoided. It seems unlikely that proposal would be accepted by Soviets in their present mood but, if it were, it would enable us to ensure that any withdrawal or reduction of forces would be coupled with creation of Austrian army and settlement of German assets problem, and that until these problems were settled AC machinery would remain in being. Other advantages [Page 1946] we see in this proposal are that it would commit Austrians to creation of army and would reduce likelihood of bilateral Austro-Soviet negotiations on these questions, which otherwise are almost certain to occur and in which Soviets will be in most favorable position. Propaganda advantages of proposal would also be considerable, at least in Austria.
- Repeated to London, Paris, and Washington. The source text is the copy in Department of State files.↩