Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
No. 894
Memorandum of Discussion at the
166th Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, October
13, 19531
eyes only
Present at the 166th meeting of the Council were: The President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 3); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 3); the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force (for Item 3); the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary [Page 1910] of Defense McNeil, and Francis J. McCarthy, of the Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 3); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Ridgway, Admiral Carney, General Twining, and Lt. Gen. Thomas, USMC (for Item 3); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President (for Item 3); the Deputy Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; James C. Hagerty, Secretary to the President (for Item 3); Brig. Gen. Paul T. Carroll, Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.
[Here follows discussion of items 1–4, the concept of the National Security Council and its advisory and subordinate groups, significant world developments affecting United States security, fiscal year 1955 budget considerations, and United States policy toward Germany. Following the discussion of these agenda items, the President, the Attorney General, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission left the meeting.]
5. U.S. Objectives and Policies With Respect to Austria (NSC 164;2 Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated October 12, 19533)
In presenting the background of NSC 164, Mr. Cutler called attention to the principal differences between the Departments of State and Defense with regard to U.S. policy on Austria. The first of these, in paragraph 16–d, related to the degree of neutralization of Austria which would be acceptable to the United States. The second concerned the wisdom of accepting Article 35 of the long draft treaty concerning Soviet assets in Austria.
Secretary Dulles stated that it was his view that while we should of course oppose the neutralization of Austria just as far as possible in any negotiations, the decision in the long run would depend on the Austrians themselves. If, in order to induce the Russians to get out of Austria, the Austrian Government refused to align itself with NATO, there was very little, said Secretary Dulles, that the United States could do about it, even though we should refuse to sign the treaty. We can, of course, explain our position to the Austrians, but we could not impose our will upon them, nor could we carry the British and French along if they agreed with the Austrian [Page 1911] viewpoint. In any case, an embittered Austria would never prove a reliable ally of the United States.
In response, Admiral Radford said that the Joint Chiefs realized the validity of Secretary Dulles’ points, but they insisted that a neutralized Austria would greatly weaken us in Europe.
Secretary Dulles then proposed certain changes in the language of paragraph 16 which he thought might make this statement less objectionable to the Joint Chiefs. Mr. Cutler suggested further revisions in order to achieve agreement.
Admiral Radford stated, however, that these changes were not sufficient to meet the anxiety of the Joint Chiefs about the proposal ultimately to accept a neutralized Austria.
Secretary Dulles replied that while he recognized the force of the statement in the JCS comment which Admiral Radford had read, it remained true that Austria was in the last analysis master of its own destiny. We had never had any legal control over the Austrian Government, and since our economic aid was about to be terminated, we would shortly be unable to use that as a means of influencing the Austrian Government.
Admiral Radford said that he was not only concerned about a neutralized Austria, but even more worried that we might face a similar situation in Germany itself. A neutralized Germany would be much more serious.
Secretary Dulles replied that indeed it would, but that in Germany, at least, we still had a measure of sovereignty and certain legal controls. Accordingly, Germany was easier to manage than Austria. To sum up his position, Secretary Dulles said that the State Department simply did not wish us to get into a situation where we are opposing something that is inevitable.
Admiral Radford recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff undertake a study of the results if the inevitable happened.
Governor Stassen observed that to his mind the status of neutralization did not necessarily imply disarmament. What we want to avoid above all else, especially in Germany, is the combination of neutralization with disarmament. It was for this reason that he has been so anxious to see the German units come into existence.
After the Council had agreed to accept the views of the Secretary of State on the neutralization issue, Mr. Cutler turned to the question of Article 35, and pointed out that on this issue, likewise, the Joint Chiefs were very concerned.
After Secretary Dulles had explained the content of Article 35, Admiral Radford read the comments of the JCS on this issue, pointing out that the matter was so serious that we should all take a stand on insisting that the article be eliminated or revised. Even [Page 1912] the Austrians, he thought, should be willing to take a stand on this.
Secretary Dulles corrected Admiral Radford, and explained that the Austrians were already engaged in under-the-table conversations with the Russians which would accept the latters’ position on Article 35. As in the case of the neutralization problem, Secretary Dulles said that we could not let this one stand in the way of final agreement on an Austrian treaty, though here too he was prepared to fight to the last ditch for revision of the article.
Mr. Cutler pointed out the previous Council decision in favor of the point of view taken by Secretary Dulles, who thereafter recommended that the Council now adhere to its previous decision.
Governor Stassen said that what he was most afraid of was complete Soviet control of Austria if (1) Austria were disarmed, and (2) if Austria were put at the economic mercy of the USSR by virtue of accepting Article 35 of the long draft treaty.
Expressing agreement with Governor Stassen, Admiral Radford insisted that Austria would not in fact be really neutralized if the Soviets secured the rights accorded them under Article 35. This would enable them to stay in Austria and ultimately to subvert it.
Secretary Dulles answered that although they have much greater power now than they would after a treaty, the Soviets had not yet succeeded in subverting Austria. Indeed, there was no country in the world with less indigenous Communist strength. The issue with respect to Article 35, he continued, was much the same as the neutralization issue. We would end by making an enemy of Austria if we insisted on revising Article 35 and thus prevented the achievement of a treaty. Communist influence would certainly then increase in Austria, and it would be best for the Council to reiterate its previous stand.
Admiral Radford then said that the Joint Chiefs would reappraise the effect of accepting Article 35, and would bring before the Council any significant conclusions they reached.
The discussion then turned to various other suggested revisions of the paper by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and agreement was reached on each of these points.
Mr. Cutler also called the attention of the Council to the Financial Appendix, and pointed out that the estimated costs therein would increase if we transferred our forces now in Trieste to Austria.
General Ridgway commented that the Joint Chiefs were now in the process of examining the courses of military action open to us in Trieste, but were not yet ready to state what they were.
[Page 1913]The National Security Council:
a. Discussed the reference report on the subject in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in the enclosure to the reference memorandum.
b. Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 164, subject to the following amendments:
(1) Page 9, paragraph 16–d, first sentence: Delete “particularly as a possible precedent for a German settlement.”
Third sentence: Revise to read as follows: “Nevertheless, the United States should refuse to sign a treaty which would preclude Austria’s association with the economic community of Western Europe, which would prejudice Austria’s capacity to preserve internal order, or which would restrict the Western Powers in giving aid to Austria in the establishment of adequate internal security forces.”
(2) Page 13, paragraph 17-h: Delete the word “interim”.
(3) Page 13, paragraph 19: In the first sentence, change the word “concerning” to “supporting”; delete the second sentence.
(4) Page 13: Add a new paragraph 20 to read as follows: “20. Seek to obtain, in addition to the tripartite declaration, an Austrian commitment to raise and maintain forces adequate for the internal security and integrity of the Austrian state and the acceptance of Western assistance in the formation of these forces.”
. . . . . . .
(6) Page 14, Annex to NSC 164, subparagraph a: Delete the words “under the command of the Commanding General of the United States Forces”.
(7) Page 15, Annex to NSC 164, paragraph h: Delete the first, second and fourth sentences and, in the last sentence, change the word “You” to “U.S. authorities”.
c. Noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would study the military implications of the degree of neutralization of Austria which might ultimately be accepted by the United States under paragraph 16–d of NSC 164, and would report back to the Council if, in their opinion, reconsideration of this subparagraph was necessary.4
Note: NSC 164 as amended, and approved by the President, subquently issued as NSC 164/1 and referred to OCB as the coordinating agency. The action in c above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
[Here follows a notation indicating that the Council noted the proposed amendment of Executive Order 10450 submitted by the Attorney General.]
- Drafted on Oct. 14.↩
- Not printed, but see the amendments under paragraph b. below and NSC 164/1, infra.↩
- Not printed. This was the covering memorandum attached to NSC 164 indicating that it would be considered by the Council at its meeting on Oct. 13. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 164 Series)↩
- See Document 904.↩