663.001/10–853: Despatch
No. 893
The United States High Commissioner
for Austria (Thompson) to the Department of
State1
air priority
No. 543
Subject:
- Austrian Policy With Respect to the Austrian State Treaty
The Department’s telegram No. 1070 of October 7, 19532 suggests that the Embassy’s reporting may have been misleading with respect to the attitude and motivation of Foreign Minister Gruber in connection with the negotiations for the Austrian State Treaty.
The purpose of this despatch is to attempt to evaluate Mr. Gruber’s policies and place them in proper perspective. While the Department is aware from our long experience in dealing with the Austrian Foreign Minister that he has certain personal characteristics, [Page 1907] including a somewhat cynical concept of integrity in the conduct of foreign relations and a tendency to the use of questionable tactics, it is nevertheless true that Mr. Gruber’s basic policies are those of both parties in the Austrian Government coalition. Both political parties are desperately anxious to conclude the State Treaty and end the occupation of Austria. Both are willing to pay almost any economic price and would probably go far in making political concessions if they were certain this would achieve the desired result. The Socialists probably have a more realistic appraisal of Soviet methods and objectives and are far less inclined than Minister Gruber to engage in maneuvers which have little prospect of success. Mr. Gruber’s position as Foreign Minister makes it understandable that he should feel obliged to prevent any feeling from arising in the minds of the Austrian public that failure to achieve a treaty is due to any negligence or lack of effort on the part of the Austrian Government.
Our recent difficulties and differences with the Austrian Foreign Minister arise largely out of this preoccupation on his part with public opinion in Austria. He has informed me many times that he does not consider that there is more than a faint chance of concluding the treaty at this time and that his policies are guided chiefly by propaganda considerations. He professes to be concerned that if the Austrian Government does not make crystal clear that failure to conclude a treaty lies with the Soviet Government, the continuation of the current Soviet soft line in Austria will eventually have serious political effects. I do not wish to minimize the effects which Mr. Gruber’s maneuvers have had in weakening our negotiating position on Article 35, but repeat that on the basic issues involved he has the support of the Austrian Government.
I am also aware that some of the maneuvers of the Foreign Minister are not without danger, such as his approach to the Soviet Government through the Indian Government and his urging of the Chancellor to visit Moscow. Nevertheless, I believe we would do Mr. Gruber an injustice if we attribute these moves to any lack of determination on his part to keep Austria aligned with the West and to oppose the basic objectives of Soviet policy. I am convinced that he is well aware that nothing will satisfy Moscow short of a Communist government in Austria and the danger to our interests lies in his belief that he can out-smart and out-maneuver the Soviets. I believe, however, these risks have been lessened by the appointment of Mr. Kreisky as his deputy, which has done much to ensure that major moves in the field of foreign affairs cannot be taken without the knowledge of both of the major political parties. The three Western High Commissioners have in addition adopted the practice of discussing questions of foreign affairs with prominent [Page 1908] members of both parties. I at least, however, have been careful not to furnish material for Mr. Gruber’s enemies, who are numerous in both parties, as I am convinced, as are my French and British colleagues, that it is to our interest that Mr. Gruber remain as Foreign Minister. He has a much wider knowledge and understanding of the outside world than any potential candidate for his position and, while not minimizing the risks of ill-considered moves on his part, I believe that the Chancellor and Vice-Chancellor can be counted upon to keep him in line.
I do have a number of serious preoccupations about the course of Austrian foreign policies. I believe, however, that many of these policies are not personal policies of Minister Gruber but are in many cases formulated under the initiative of the Chancellor. Most of Raab’s policies can be understood on the basis of the hypotheses, which I believe to be well founded, that he is convinced that an Austrian State Treaty is unlikely and that Austria’s best course is to attempt to obtain as many as possible of the advantages of a treaty in the interim. It is well known that the Chancellor is particularly sensitive to the situation in Lower Austria where the burden of occupation is particularly onerous.
The greatest uncertainty so far as the State Treaty is concerned is the extent to which Austria might be willing to go in the direction of neutrality if it became clear that this was the only step preventing the conclusion of the treaty. Recent pronouncements of the Chancellor, as well as the Foreign Minister, have indicated a considerable stiffening of the Austrian attitude in this regard.
Another cause of concern is the attitude of the Austrian Government toward the withdrawal or reduction of foreign troops in Austria. There seems to be no question but that the Austrians would welcome a Soviet move to reduce their forces to a token occupation even though this were conditioned on similar action on the part of the United States. They recognize the greater ease with which the Soviets could later reenforce their troops, but would be willing to pay the price of this risk in order to get the Russians out. We can certainly expect pressure on both ourselves and the Soviets to reduce our troop strength in Austria. While it is unlikely that the Soviets will agree we should be prepared for such a contingency. In any event I am convinced that our greatest problem so far as the military occupation is concerned is that of housing and that if we are not to encounter serious difficulties with the Austrians we must move rapidly to a situation where we can give up all requisitioned private housing in Austria.
A third problem is that of the Austrian attitude toward our East-West trade controls. I am convinced that in formulating his overall policies Raab is already being influenced by this problem. He is [Page 1909] under constant pressure from the Austrian industrialists, which group forms one of the principal supports of his party. He is doubtless looking forward with concern to the time when Austrian exports to Western markets meet increasing competition. Our new policy on East-West trade, if implemented promptly, will be of considerable assistance but I am doubtful if it goes far enough to remove entirely the feeling in Austria that they must eventually get in a position which will allow them greater freedom to exploit their natural markets. Sooner or later a visit of Raab to Moscow is likely and one of his most important objectives in any negotiations is likely to be an attempt to develop substantial trade with the Soviet bloc.
There is no doubt that Austria will in the future engage in a more active foreign policy under Raab’s leadership, and I believe it will be greatly to our advantage to encourage him to visit the United States, not later than spring of 1954, in order that he may obtain a better understanding of the United States.
So far as internal affairs are concerned the coalition appears to be more stable than ever and many leading Socialists have grudgingly expressed to me their admiration for Raab’s ability. On the other hand, it must always be remembered that circumstances could again arise in which Raab might consider it to his interest to attempt a coalition with the VDU although there is nothing to suggest this at the present time.
- Distributed by the Department of State to London, Paris, and Moscow.↩
- Telegram 1070 stated that the Soviet suggestion that Austria be discussed through diplomatic channels was a tactic of obstruction and delay and urged that every effort be made to deter Gruber from “further dancing to Soviet tune.” (663.001/10–553)↩