Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 164 Series

No. 904
Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

top secret

Washington, December 9, 1953.

Subject:

• U.S. Objectives and Policies with Respect to Austria—NSC 164/1.²

1. Reference is made to your memorandum dated October 27, 1953,³ subject as above, which requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff study the military implications of the degree of neutralization of Austria which might ultimately be accepted by the United States under subparagraph 16–d of NSC 164/1, and report whether or not, in their opinion, reconsideration of this subparagraph by the National Security Council is necessary.

2. In his recent comments regarding the withdrawal of British and French forces from Austria, General Gruenther stated that “… The proposed withdrawals have a considerable impact on the entire defense concept for Central and Southern Europe in that they expose the southern flank of Central European Forces as well as the North-Western flank of the Southern European Forces… . The proposed withdrawal will require additional Italian Forces to defend the passes into Italy, previously assigned to Allied Forces in Austria and some provision must also be made to strengthen the Southern flanks of Allied Forces in Central Europe. I am deeply concerned over the growing tendency to abandon consideration of any defense of Austria in war, and the consequent impact on the allied position in Europe.”

3. If there were to be imposed upon Austria a degree of neutralization which would prevent the replacement of Allied occupation forces by reasonably effective Austrian defense forces, SACEUR would be deprived of the means of retarding a Soviet advance across Austria, thereby considerably reducing the time-space factor upon which SACEUR depends in the establishment of the planned defense of the southern flank of Allied Forces Central Europe and for the defense of NATO territory in southern Europe.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that regardless of the provisions of any Austrian peace treaty which the Soviets might sign, the ultimate Soviet objective in Austria will continue to be the incorporation of Austria into the Soviet bloc. Acceptance of the Soviet versions of the long draft treaty, combined with a severe neutralization of Austria, would create conditions which would facilitate the achievement of Soviet ultimate objectives through subversion, and thereby greatly increase the risk of the eventual loss of Austria to the Communist orbit. The loss of Austria would present a serious military threat to the NATO central and southern defense sectors under the present defense strategy for Europe in that it would place Soviet forces in a position to outflank NATO defense positions. Further, the more forward strategy now contemplated for adoption when a German contribution becomes available would be attended by such serious risks as to render such adoption hazardous to the security of the NATO forces in Central Europe… .

5. In stating that the neutralization or loss of Austria to the Soviets would require major revisions of existing NATO strategy for the defense of Western Europe, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were addressing themselves primarily to the increased risk of ultimate loss of Austria which would attend a severe neutralization of that country, and to the possible consequences of such loss.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that subparagraph 16–d of NSC 164/1 is designed as a broad statement of United States policy and as such is intended to permit a considerable latitude in its application. Viewed in this light, the Joint Chiefs of Staff find the present phrasing of subparagraph 16–d acceptable. They are of the opinion that the manner in which this broad policy is interpreted and applied in the course of any forthcoming negotiations for an Austrian peace treaty will determine the degree of military risk involved. Specifically, it is considered that if the United States is obliged to accept a neutralization of Austria, the degree of neutralization accepted should not deprive Austria of the authority and ability to create and maintain forces which will be adequate not only for her internal protection against Soviet attempts at subversion but also to provide a reasonable capability for retarding a Communist invasion of Austrian territory. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that Austria would not be capable of maintaining such forces without outside (United States) assistance.

7. It is recommended that the National Security Council be advised that, subject to the above considerations pertaining to the application of the policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider a revision of the statement of policy contained in subparagraph 16–d of NSC 164/1 to be unnecessary.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford

1. Attached to the source text was a memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, James S. Lay, Jr., to members of the Council, dated Dec. 22, informing them that this memorandum by the JCS was being circulated for the information of the Council. For a record of the 180th meeting of the NSC on Jan. 14, 1954, at which this memorandum was discussed, see the memorandum of discussion, Document 906.
2. Document 895.
3. Not found in Department of State files.