663.001/2–1953: Telegram
No. 851
The United States High Commissioner
for Austria (Thompson) to the Department of
State1
2435. Further to my telegram 2431, February 18,2 I believe we shall face increasing difficulties in our negotiations on Austrian treaty with British, French and Austrians, as well as with Soviets, unless we review and firm up Western position on certain basic issues and confirm Austrian concurrence therewith. For example, if Soviets should agree under formula proposed in my reference telegram to another meeting of deputies, we should have to determine what our position is on unagreed articles of long draft.
In second place, I believe we should decide whether it would be preferable to reopen agreed articles with view to elimination or revision of outmoded and undersirable provisions, or to maintain Western position stated in December 15, 1950, deputies meeting3 that agreed articles can not be modified.
First course is obviously one we must choose if we are to obtain any more equitable treaty for Austria. In this case, however, Soviets are certain to raise question of neutrality and to demand effective modification of Articles 1 and 2 on Austrian sovereignty and independence. Also, they would be able to create further difficulties on Article 9.
Second course would serve to block Soviet attempts to include neutrality provisions in treaty. They could of course, approach Austrians directly for commitment on this question as price for treaty ratification, and if we should ever reach this point it would be well for us to secure assurances from Austrian Government in advance to forestall any such Soviet maneuver.
Middle course might be to hold position that agreed articles can not be reopened with exception of Article 35, on which agreement in principle was conditioned on understanding agreement on treaty as whole would be reached by September 1, 1949. This might, however, lead to our involvement in risks of both first and second courses.
[Page 1840]Nub of question, as Department has stated, is what kind of treaty can be concluded which would give Austria reasonable chance of maintaining political and economic independence.
Personally, I am inclined to agree with local British and French view, which I believe reflects opinions of most Austrians, that it would be to advantage of both West and Austrians to end occupation and reverse tide of Soviet expansionism even at cost of unmodified long draft with Article 35 as it stands. This would of course, require material assistance from US, but I believe it would be worth price and that with reasonable amount of US assistance, Austria could maintain her integrity in fact of anything short of direct aggression.
In this connection, it must be kept in mind that we would not be giving up a strong position in Austria in exchange for settlement not entirely to our satisfaction. Soviets have unexploited potentialities of pressure here which although long in abeyance could still be used to bring east Austria under their domination. Moreover, eight years of occupation have created situation in which Austrian people, and especially those in Vienna and Soviet Zone, would not be inclined to quibble at price for early treaty, but could be led through Soviet blandishments to accept even grave risks for future if it meant immediate Soviet withdrawal. Greatest danger to me appears to be tremendous appeal which Soviet proposal for neutralization of Austria would have if they could persuade Austrians it would lead to prompt end of occupation.
I am, of course, not able fully to judge military advantages or disadvantages of Austrian independence under long draft treaty, although it would seem that parts of Austria which we would in any event want to defend would be readily accessible to us from NATO-held territory in event of necessity. I am also uncertain as to what effect such treaty would have on situation in Germany. It seems clear, however, that psychological and political advantages of Soviet retreat would be enormous, and would have profound effect in satellite states.
- According to an instruction drafted by E. P. Allen and cleared with Collins, the text of this telegram was repeated to Paris, London, and Moscow on Feb. 26. (663.001/2–1953)↩
- Supra.↩
- For a record of the 258th meeting of the Austrian Treaty Deputies on Dec. 15, 1950, see telegram 3481, Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iv, p. 472.↩