Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

663.001/2–1853: Telegram

No. 850
The United States High Commissioner for Austria (Thompson) to the Department of State¹

secret

Vienna, February 18, 1953—7 p.m.

2431. Western High Commissioners discussed future procedure regarding Austrian treaty (Deptel 2424 February 16² and London’s 4418 February 10³). French and British expressed concern with unsatisfactory position in which we now find ourselves before Austrian public opinion, which enables Soviets to allege we are blocking progress by our insistence on technical point of refusing formally to withdraw abbreviated draft. They were particularly disturbed by article in government coalition paper Neues Oesterreich (Embtel 2411, February 17⁴). They wished to recommend some formula whereby at next Deputies meeting or in prior exchange of notes we would agree formally to withdraw short draft and insist Soviets agree to discussion of long draft without other conditions.

I argued that Soviets clearly were unwilling actually to conclude treaty even if we accepted their version of long draft. They agreed this was true and that what we must consider is a propaganda position. I then pointed out that their formula would mean we would have given up short draft and important question of principle this involves without having actually obtained anything from Russians. Our willingness to do this would indicate that we are willing to conclude treaty without taking account of Russian exploitation since 1949. I persuaded them to agree to recommend to their governments an approach which would have the advantage of forcing Russians either to accept formal withdrawal of their conditions regarding Trieste, remilitarization, etc. or refuse to state their position, either of which would clearly strengthen us propagandawise. Should Russians agree to withdraw their conditions we would have secured strong point in that they would have exposed fact that these points had no substance and had been raised merely to block treaty progress. Moreover, it would assist us here in countering further Soviet attacks against Austrian Government. In event their withdrawal, however, we would, of course, be virtually obliged to withdraw short draft, and I, therefore, made clear I had no indications what Washington’s views on this proposal would be.

Western High Commissioners decided it would be preferable not to inform Austrians of this possible approach pending agreement by three governments, in order to avoid any possible leak regarding plans. It was felt, however, that we should see Gruber to obtain current views of Austrian Government, and this was done last night. Although Gruber reiterated thesis of division of opinion East and West Austria (Embtel 2295, February 9⁵), and admitted Neues Oesterreich editorial reflected to some extent opinion in Soviet zone, where there was no need for further Western move for meeting at this time. In conversation, he developed following points:

(1) Go slowly, so that impact of Western moves on Austrian opinion would come later in spring when elections and formation of new government out of way;

(2) Attempt clarify Soviet position, either in Deputies meetings, contacts with Soviets in Vienna or Moscow, or through notes to Soviet Government;

(3) Endeavor resume negotiations at early date, possibly first part of April, for which invitations to Deputies meeting could be issued latter half of March, thus affording opportunity for Western Powers to consult with new Austrian Government before negotiations actually resumed.

In further meeting this morning, West High Commissioners agreed that approach set forth paragraph 2 above was consonant with Austrian views, and decided to recommend to three governments that Soviets be queried by note re position prior to another meeting of Deputies. We proposed draft note contained my next following telegram.⁶ British and French High Commissioners also submitted draft notes which differed from ours in reviewing situation at end of recent Deputies meetings and more importantly in posing query on basis “if abbreviated treaty were formally withdrawn”. It was agreed three texts could be reconciled here in light of comments of three governments and if they so desired. British and French texts being despatched airmail for Department’s consideration.⁷

Re timing, it was agreed that for Austrian opinion, favorable time for despatch of notes would be end of month. This would also presumably forestall any Soviet propaganda alleging failure of Deputies chairman to call meeting as suggested in last session.

Thompson

1. Repeated to Moscow, London, and Paris.
2. Telegram 2424 noted the Department of State’s agreement with the view that the Soviets had clearly indicated that they had no intention of undertaking serious treaty negotiations. (663.001/2–1053)
3. Document 848.
4. Telegram 2411 summarized an article which described the abbreviated treaty as invalid and as already abandoned by the Western powers. (963.61/2–1753)
5. See footnote 2, Document 848.
6. Reference to telegram 2432 from Vienna, Feb. 18. (663.001/2–1853)
7. The British and French texts were transmitted to the Department of State in despatch 1435 from Vienna, Feb. 19. (663.001/2–1953)