Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

663.001/12–1552

No. 837
The Acting Secretary of Defense (Foster) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Washington, 15 December 1952.

Dear Mr. Secretary: Reference is made to your letter of 3 October 1952,¹ advising the Department of Defense with respect to developments concerning the Austrian treaty question, and requesting comments on the adequacy of Austrian internal security forces under certain contingencies.

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff upon this subject are attached as inclosure 1.² I consider that the recommendations of paragraph 11³ should become an integral part of the U.S. Government position concerning any withdrawal of occupation forces from Austria. If you agree, the Department of Defense suggests that steps should be taken to secure the necessary commitment by the Austrian Government concerning her post-ratification armed forces, and to explore the ramifications of a concurrent Western guarantee of Austrian integrity. It is fully recognized that these two subjects may require more detailed negotiations than can readily be achieved in the forum of the United Nations.

Because of the contingent possibility that a resolution calling for unconditional withdrawal might command substantial support in the UN General Assembly, the U.S. position in that body should be in consonance with these recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Accordingly, the Department of Defense considers that any such resolution should receive the support of this Government only if amended to make withdrawal simultaneous and conditional upon four-power agreement, as well as upon relinquishment by the Soviet Union of control over so-called German external assets in Austria.

In view of their intimate connection with the preceding, there are attached as inclosures 2, 3 and 4 copies of memoranda by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and this office relating to the utilization of Austrian manpower.⁴ I suggest that these studies should form the basis of mutual consultation between representatives of our respective departments in the near future.

Sincerely yours,

William C. Foster

1. Document 825.
2. Not printed. This was a 5-page memorandum from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, dated Nov. 18, 1952, outlining JCS views on the Austrian Treaty negotiations.

3. Paragraph 11 reads as follows:

   “Taking into account all of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that it will not be possible under any of the several contingencies outlined in the Department of State letter of 3 October 1952 to establish, prior to the withdrawal of occupation forces, Austrian armed forces immediately adequate to insure maintenance of the internal security of Austria. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are therefore of the opinion that the termination of the occupation under any of the prospective arrangements enumerated and without adequate Western guarantees or mutual agreements would be attended by serious risk to the integrity of Austria. Because of the added threat that would result therefrom, they would view as particularly undesirable the acceptance of any occupation termination arrangement which would permit agencies of the USSR to remain in Austria in control of a large segment of Austrian industry. In order to reduce the risk to an acceptable level, it is recommended that an effort be made in negotiating any occupation termination agreement in which political considerations are considered to be overriding, to secure (a) the commitment of the Austrian Government to the immediate post-ratification creation of armed forces numbering approximately 28,000 and acceptance of Western assistance in the formation of these forces, and (b) a concurrent Western guarantee of Austrian integrity.”

4. None printed.