Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

663.001/10–352

No. 825
The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)¹

top secret

[Washington,] October 3, 1952.

Dear Mr. Secretary: I refer to Mr. Matthews’ letter to General Marshall of September 12, 1951² regarding the Austrian treaty question and would like to inform you of developments which have taken place since that time.

On March 13, 1952 the United States, in concert with the British and French, proposed to the Soviet Government an abbreviated Austrian treaty.³ This proposal was made not only in an effort to secure the resumption of four-power negotiations but to obtain for Austria, if possible, a more equitable settlement. It contained seven previously agreed upon articles and a new article calling upon all four occupying powers to return to Austria all so-called German assets. Since the Soviet Government did not reply to this proposal, the Austrian Government decided to appeal to the United Nations to secure a settlement permitting the termination of occupation and on July 31, 1952 sent a memorandum⁴ to all sixty members. In this memorandum the Austrian Government stated that no treaty was necessary since Austria had never been considered as an enemy state and stated that the only requirement for the full restoration of independence was the withdrawal of the occupation forces.

The Department of State was not aware of the contents of the Austrian memorandum prior to its dispatch to the members of the United Nations. The argument used by the Austrian Government has caused us some concern since it ignored the problem of the future status of the so-called German assets in the Eastern Zone and, if accepted, might not provide the necessary period of time for the fulfillment of plans for the creation of an Austrian internal security force.

The Government of Brazil has agreed to sponsor this question in the United Nations. The problem is formulated for the agenda as “Question of an appeal to the powers signatory to the Moscow declaration of 1 November 1943 for an early fulfillment of their pledge toward Austria.” The tentative Brazilian resolution addresses “an earnest appeal to the Governments concerned to make a renewed and urgent effort to reach agreement on the terms of an Austrian treaty with a view to an early termination of the occupation of Austria and the full exercise by Austria of the powers inherent in her sovereignty.” We hope the Austrians have retreated from their view as expressed in their memorandum; they have indicated approval of the above tentative resolution.

In the meantime, the prospect of defending its record in Austria before the United Nations probably induced the Soviet Government to reply on August 14⁵ to our proposal of March 13 concerning the abbreviated treaty. The Soviet note followed the usual line in stating that the Soviet Government was prepared to conclude the negotiations on the old draft treaty if the Western powers would indicate their good faith by carrying out the provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty regarding Trieste and withdraw the abbreviated treaty. The issues of demilitarization and denazification were also raised. In direct response to our proposal, the Soviet Government listed specific objections to the abbreviated treaty. The Western reply to the Soviet note, delivered on September 5,⁶ did not mention the Trieste question or the issues of denazification or demilitarization. To meet the specific objections raised by the Soviet note, the Western powers simply proposed the addition to the abbreviated treaty of four agreed articles taken from the long draft. The note also proposed a meeting of the Deputies in London on September 29 to initial the settlement consisting of the abbreviated treaty and the four additional articles. The Soviet reply received in Moscow September 27⁷ again rejected the Western proposal on the same grounds and the Soviet Deputy failed to attend the September 29 meeting.

We are proceeding with preparations to discuss the Austrian case in the United Nations General Assembly, which convenes on October 14. It will be necessary for us to be ready at any time after that date to state the United States position on a feasible and final settlement for Austria. In doing so, we will make every effort to conclude an Austrian settlement as defined in the abbreviated treaty. Two other possibilities, however, exist which will affect our position. In the first place, the Soviet Government may suddenly propose to accept the long draft of the treaty together with the Western versions of the five unagreed articles. If such a proposal were to be made, it would be desirable to bring the long draft up to date and eliminate its punitive, restrictive, and burdensome features. We think that good grounds exist for the redrafting of Article 35, for example, which contains concessions to the Soviets agreed upon in 1949 with the understanding that treaty negotiations would be ended by September 1949. Since this has not been done three years later, we would be justified in reopening discussion of the article. Certainly we could attack that part of Article 35 which requires the Austrians to pay to the Soviets $150,000,000 for the so-called German assets by pointing out that the Soviets have taken more than $150,000,000 out of Austria since 1949. However, if our efforts fail completely and British, French, and Austrian pressure to accept the long draft becomes irresistible, we could do so under the authority of NSC 38/6.⁸ Any settlement on a treaty basis could be made to provide the necessary time for the formation of an Austrian security force.

I believe, however, there is some possibility that during the discussion of the Austrian question in the UN a member state, either anxious to embarrass the Western occupying powers or ignorant of the true issues involved, might propose a resolution merely calling upon the occupation powers to withdraw without a four-power treaty. Aside from the question of sufficient time to organize adequate internal security forces the concept of a withdrawal without a treaty has serious political implications in that the Soviets would be left in control of an important part of the economy of the Eastern part of Austria with immense possibilities for subversive action against the Austrian Government in both economic and political fields. It would also fail to provide the other additional guarantees such as territorial integrity and independence contained in both draft treaties. We are informing all friendly UN members of the dangerous implications of such a resolution and will ourselves support a resolution along the lines of the tentative Brazilian draft. It is, therefore, unlikely that such a proposal could succeed. Even if it did, however, we doubt whether the Soviets would comply and we would not think of withdrawing our forces unless the Soviets withdrew theirs. If the Soviets were to support such a resolution, it might indicate, however, that they would be prepared to withdraw their forces and in that unlikely event we too might be forced to do likewise. I feel that we should be prepared for all contingencies.

To facilitate a clear statement of the U.S. position on the Austrian treaty before the UN Assembly, I, therefore, would appreciate receiving your comments on the adequacy of Austrian internal security forces with relation to the unlikely situation of the four powers agreeing to one of the possibilities discussed above. The time intervals which will elapse under each alternative before the Austrian Government would have to assume full responsibility for maintaining internal security seem likely to be:

(1) In the event the four powers sign the abbreviated treaty, the West would have little excuse to delay ratification. Assuming rapid ratification and the passage of the ninety-day period to complete withdrawal. Austrian security preparations would conceivably have to be completed by late spring of 1953.

(2) In the event the four powers agree to proceed on the basis of the long draft treaty, a longer interval would elapse because of Western efforts to seek the removal of this draft’s most punitive and outmoded features, especially Article 35, and because ratification would be more difficult in the West in view of the concessions to the Soviet inherent in this draft. Thence, security preparations would probably be continued until late fall of 1953.

(3) In the event we are forced to agree to a simple withdrawal without a treaty the lapse of time is indeterminate. A considerable period might be required to liquidate the occupation and to provide for the orderly withdrawal of garrisons. It seems desirable, however, to proceed on the assumption that Austrian security preparations would have to be completed by early spring of 1953.

Sincerely yours,

Dean Acheson

1. Drafted by Collins and Hadsel and cleared with UNP.
2. See footnote 1 to the position paper prepared by the Department of State, Sept. 7, 1951, Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iv, Part 2, pp. 1123–1127.
3. Regarding this note, see Document 794.
4. For the Austrian memorandum of July 31, see Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 11, 1952, pp. 221–224.
5. Regarding the Soviet note, see Document 814.
6. Regarding the tripartite reply, see ibid.
7. The Soviet note of Sept. 27 reiterated the Soviet demand that the abbreviated treaty be withdrawn before any further discussion of the Austrian Treaty could take place. For text of this note, see Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1953, pp. 140–141.
8. See the editorial Note, Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iv, p. 397.