863.00/12–1252
No. 836
The Officer in Charge of Italian and
Austrian Affairs (Collins) to the United States High Commissioner
for Austria (Thompson)
Dear Tommy: In an undated letter of about December 1 to Mr. Bruce, a copy of which is attached, Mr. Kenney advised that MSA wished to suspend aid to Austria unless there were overriding political considerations against such action because of the Austrian Government’s unsatisfactory performance of its commitments contained in the Donnelly–Figl agreement of June 3, 1952.1 Although Ty Wood, who replaced Mr. Kenney shortly after the letter was despatched, has indicated he may withhold the sanctions until after the elections, we are increasingly anxious that a basis be found to wind up the dollar diversion investigation. A copy of our reply to Ty Wood is also attached.2
MSA’s position is far from clear because they refuse to state the essential conditions for liquidation of the affair. They insist that they must have evidence of sincere Austrian performance on the six June 3 commitments before it can be determined if the accounting standards appropriate for a recipient of U.S. aid have been met. Behind this stand is the fear they may some day have to explain the whole history of the investigation to the House Watch-Dog Committee. As the attached copy of Mr. Kenney’s letter shows, they are not yet tired of receiving accountants’ reports which no one seems able to translate into concrete proposals. For example, when Karasik and Surrey, the Washington firm of lawyers retained by the Creditanstalt, disclosed the results of the Limor audit, the Controller stated this information was insufficient and proposed the widening of the investigation to include other foreign subsidiaries of Austrian Banks.
[Page 1814]While the Department is on strong grounds in pointing out the absurdity of jeopardizing the entire U.S. position in Austria for the sake of what now seem to have been relatively minor irregularities, we can hardly justify the meagre Austrian performance on the six points. This is all the more so since the Minister of Finance seems to be proceeding on the assumption that the action of the Parliamentary Committee on July 17 in taking note of the report of the Court of Accounts concluded the investigation. Whether he has underestimated the gravity we attach to this business or believes we are not in a position to press for further progress, he does not seem to have taken obvious steps to comply with the commitments, steps which to us at this distance do not seem to involve the political risks always mentioned in connection with the People’s Party’s involvement in this affair but which might be of major importance in Austro-United States relations. These might include the following:
- 1.
- Transmission of the completed Limor audit to you by the Austrian Government together with the answers to as many of the Andersen accountant questions as Weill, the New York associate of Karasik and Surrey, can prepare. It would be very strange if material now available in Washington could not find its way into the hands of Mr. Kamitz.
- 2.
- As to prosecutions it would seem feasible that the Minister of Justice prepare a report on the culpability under Austrian law of those involved in the diversions. Presumably this would be even less definite than the opinion already prepared by the Legal Division of the Embassy.
- 3.
- Similarly with respect to reimbursement of diverted U.S. funds the Austrian ERP Bureau, the Ministry of Finance and the National Bank could examine the views of the MEC Controller to determine the Austrian position on this point.
- 4.
- As to banking legislation, it would seem easy for the Austrians to submit alternate staff plans for a new charter of the National Bank which are believed to have been in existence since 1947. It would not be necessary to introduce these into Parliament but only to indicate that the matter was under consideration.
- 5.
- We have noted your views in Embtel 1410 November 223 as to the possibility that the new Government will not renew the invitation for a bank survey group. Would you think this view would be maintained if the Austrians knew aid were cut off on just such a trifling pretext? Could we not get the assurances of the two major parties, through Figl and Schaerf, that the invitation would be given right after the elections?
- 6.
- We understand that Limor is in process of liquidation but have no word on other foreign bank subsidiaries. On this point the Government [Page 1815] could indicate what action it has or contemplates taking. If the answer is negative, it could at least present an economic justification for keeping these subsidiaries in existence.
We make no claim that the above exhausts the possibilities which have been open to the Austrians since June. That nothing has been done except vague reports on Limor and some discussion of the composition of the banking survey group convinces certain groups in MSA that the Austrians are guiltier than the evidence indicates and furthermore never intend to take any remedial action.
We have no sanguine hopes that the Austrians even with the best of intentions could wind up this affair before the elections. It does seem possible, however, that some of the staff work could be initiated with a view to presenting an Austrian proposal for ending the investigation soon after the formation of the new Government. It is suggested that in separate talks with Figl and Schaerf you may wish to review the situation frankly. If the Austrians could go through with the operation described and if MSA agreed, then a statement like the one attached4 might be the final step. Pending the receipt of your comments, the above has not been presented to MSA. For the time being we shall proceed with them on the basis of the attached letter to Mr. Wood, that is, attempting to obtain the release of $15 million, the last tranche of the $35 million promised the Austrians for the first half of fiscal year 1953.
With best regards.
Most sincerely,5
- Regarding this agreement, see footnote 4, Document 803.↩
- Not attached to the source text, but see Document 838.↩
- Telegram 1410 reported that both People’s Party and Socialist leaders were opposed to an announcement of a bank study until after the Austrian elections, although the People’s Party leaders were the most concerned about this subject. It stated that if the bank survey was not inaugurated immediately, the earliest it would be initiated was sometime in March 1953. (863.14/11–2252)↩
- Not printed.↩
- The source text has no signature.↩
- Not attached to the source text, but see footnote 4, Document 803.↩
- For Bruce’s reply, see his letter to Wood, Document 838.↩