Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

763.00/9–3052

No. 822
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer)¹

secret

[Washington,] September 30, 1952.

Subject:

• Reference of Austrian Question to UNGA.

With reference to your memorandum of August 29,² the following answers to the three questions raised in your memorandum are submitted:

1. Would the three Western Powers be able, if directly challenged by the Soviets with the support of a majority in the General Assembly, to agree to withdrawal of troops without a definite settlement of the assets problem or on the basis of the disposition envisaged in Article 35 of the long treaty?

It is assumed that the term “withdrawal of troops” means the end of all occupation functions and the surrender of all occupation powers. In this process there should, from a U.S. policy point of view, be a settlement of the assets problem; otherwise, because of the extent of the assets and the nature of the extra-territorial powers exercised by the Soviets over them, the Soviet Union could harass or suborn the Austrian Government to a dangerous degree. Even by the adoption of Article 35 the danger would be extreme. The concession to the Soviets represented in this Article was originally made to obtain a quick signature of the Treaty. During the three years since, it has failed to gain its purpose and it renders us vulnerable to a Soviet plot of the sort you envisage. At this late juncture it is probably impossible to disassociate ourselves completely from the long draft before the UN considers the Austrian question. Hence if we are forced to give up the abbreviated treaty, we should insist upon the addition of a “most favored nation” clause which would serve to circumscribe the USSR’s administration of the assets. The likelihood of a situation arising where a withdrawal without four-power agreement is approved by the UN is not great, however, since the U.S. delegation in its presentation plans to make abundantly clear to UN members outside the Bloc how important the assets question is. Furthermore, a public affairs program designed to educate UN members and world public opinion is being put into effect. If all the above fails and despite our own efforts a resolution calling for withdrawal of troops without four-power agreement is passed (and I reiterate that it is most unlikely), we should have to give serious consideration to withdrawal without settlement of the German Assets question—we should of course try to amend such a resolution to include a clause calling for the return of all German assets to Austria and/or the withdrawal from Austria of all foreign governmental personnel not specifically accepted by Austria as members of accredited missions, etc.…³

2. Is it anticipated that sufficient progress will have been made on the Austrian security force program and that a decision regarding the strategic position of Austria will have been reached in this Government by the time of General Assembly consideration which would enable the three powers to agree to withdraw in a relatively short time?

The problem of Austria’s strategic position is being submitted to Defense, but it is hoped to get a decision by October 14. If our view is adopted, the limitations thereby imposed on withdrawal are obvious.

3. In the event the answer to either of the above questions is negative, does the United States have assurance that the Austrian Government, if faced with the necessity of expressing its views, would be willing and able in the General Assembly to oppose withdrawal of troops except upon conditions upheld by the three powers?

Any prospect of a quick end of the occupation would unleash political forces sufficient to change radically the present configuration of the Austrian Government. The whole Austrian temperament and philosophy would favor acceptance. If this unlikely state of affairs came to pass, it could be expected that the Soviets would broach the matter in such a plausible fashion that no Austrian politician could hold many public doubts about it. The Soviet scheme would have to be transparent for a responsible Austrian politician to oppose withdrawal of troops. Again, however, it should be stressed that every effort is being made to avoid such a possibility.

1. Drafted by Rutter and Collins and cleared by Byington and W. P. Allen.
2. Document 815.
3. Ellipsis in the source text.