663.001/8–2952
No. 815
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer) to the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
(Bonbright)1
Subject:
- Reference of Austrian Question to UNGA
With reference to your memorandum to Mr. Hickerson of August 62 on the above subject, I would appreciate your comments on several questions that have arisen in our preparation of positions to be taken by the United States in the General Assembly on the Austrian question.
As you know, the Austrian Government in its memorandum of July 313 to United Nations members refers to a possible General [Page 1778] Assembly resolution which would call on the occupying powers to evacuate Austria before the conclusion of a treaty. Although the Austrians have, in subsequent conversations, not pressed this suggestion and have indicated that they would be agreeable to other forms of resolutions, we cannot discount the possibility that we may be faced in the General Assembly with a proposal requiring the evacuation of all foreign troops. This might arise in either of the following forms:
1. A resolution calling for unconditional and immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Austria might be introduced either by Egypt, with an eye on the British troops in Suez, or by some other small state in sympathy with Austria’s objectives as set forth in the July 31 memorandum. Such a proposal would be likely to receive considerable support. If the Soviets have concluded that we are unwilling to evacuate Austria at this time, and in any event not until the German assets question is resolved, they might conceivably propose such a resolution themselves.
Such a proposal might be quite tempting to the Austrians. The propaganda position of the Western Powers would be highly unfavorable if they were forced to oppose evacuation while the Soviets and Austrians were supporting it.
2. It is perhaps unlikely that the Soviets would be willing to agree to the long treaty now. However, if the Soviets were convinced that we would be unable to accept such an offer, they could, for propaganda effect, propose withdrawal within 30 days on the basis of the long treaty including the Three-Power versions of the unagreed articles. The Soviets might hope by such a gesture to shift the onus for intransigence to the West, compel us publicly to renounce agreed articles, and provoke disagreement between the Western Powers and the neutralist group in the Assembly or even disagreement between the Western Powers and the Austrian Government.
In view of these two possibilities it would be useful to have answers to the following questions with respect to conditions for withdrawal as discussed in your memorandum of August 6:
- 1.
- Would the three Western Powers be able if directly challenged by the Soviets, with the support of a majority in the General Assembly, to agree to withdrawal of troops without a definite settlement of the assets problem or on the basis of the disposition envisaged in Article 35 of the long treaty?
- 2.
- It is anticipated that sufficient progress will have been made on the Austrian security force program and that a decision regarding the strategic position of Austria will have been reached in this government by the time of General Assembly consideration which would enable the three powers to agree to withdraw in a relatively short time?
- 3.
- In the event the answer to either of the above questions is negative, does the United States have assurance that the Austrian Government, if faced with the necessity of expressing its views, would be willing and able in the General Assembly to oppose withdrawal [Page 1779] of troops except upon conditions upheld by the three powers?
While our policies on these questions should, of course, not be altered to suit our potential propaganda position in the General Assembly, our tactics in the Assembly would seem to depend to a considerable degree upon our position on the above points.
- Copies also sent to Williamson, Collins, E.P. Allen, and Meeker.↩
- Document 813.↩
- For text, see Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 11, 1952, pp. 221–224.↩